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ABSTRACT
In 1971, 85 nations (including the United States) formed the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization “INTELSAT,” a public intergovernmental 
treaty organization.  INTELSAT was charged with operating the world’s first global 
telecommunications satellite system, in order to guarantee the interconnectedness of the 
world’s communications systems and the availability of international telecommunications 
service to every nation on earth.  By the late 1980s, however, INTELSAT’s operations 
began to experience substantial competition from the private sector.  In 2000, the 
proliferation of privately-owned telecommunications satellites and transoceanic fiber 
optic cables led the U.S. Congress to mandate the privatization of INTELSAT.  That 
privatization process began in 2001, and was substantially completed on January 28, 
2005, when INTELSAT’s former satellite system was sold to private investors for $5 
billion dollars.
The privatization of INTELSAT has been said to threaten universal global 
connectivity and/or the continuation of international telecommunications service to 
developing countries.  Are the legal safeguards instituted during the privatization (which 
include the maintenance of a residual treaty organization) sufficient to dispel such 
economic and political threats?  Economically, the privatized satellite system is now 
legally obligated to serve developing countries at rates no higher than those charged prior 
to privatization.  It likely will remain capable of honoring this legal commitment.  Even if 
its business operations fail, however, this commitment would survive a bankruptcy.  
Politically, the privatized satellite system has been rendered subject to U.S. law., 
including U.S. international trade policies.  Current U.S. law, however, strongly protects 
the satellite system’s ability to serve every country on earth.  Congress, of course, retains 
power to amend U.S. law.  But certain political safeguards, including U.S. participation 
in the World Trade Organization, would interpose significant obstacles to any 
Congressional attempt to implement telecommunications sanctions as a means of 
advancing U.S. foreign policy.  Accordingly, the privatization of INTELSAT is unlikely 
to undermine the universal global connectivity of the world’s communications systems.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 2005, a consortium of private investors paid $5 billion dollars to 
purchase a global fleet of 30 commercial communications satellites used to transmit a 
variety of mass communications—including television, radio, the Internet, and domestic and 
international telephone calls—to virtually every country or territory on earth.  Despite its 
large price tag, the sale of these satellites passed largely unnoticed by the American media.  
In fact, however, the transaction marked the final major step in a remarkable four-year 
process in which the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
“INTELSAT,” a multilateral intergovernmental treaty organization, was privatized.
The INTELSAT treaty organization was formed, in several stages, in the 1960s.  
Before anyone knew whether it was possible, INTELSAT was charged with creating and 
operating a global fleet of international communications satellites that would guarantee the 
universal connectivity of the world’s telecommunications networks.  In this, INTELSAT 
succeeded.  By the mid-1990s, the INTELSAT treaty organization consisted of 148 member 
nations, and operated a global fleet of 25 geostationary satellites that served virtually every 
populated location on earth.
INTELSAT’s success, however, also laid the seeds of the organization’s eventual 
demise.  In the 1980s, separate international satellite systems inspired by INTELSAT’s 
success began competing against INTELSAT.  By 2000, more than 200 operational 
geostationary commercial communications satellites orbited the earth, of which only 19 
belonged to INTELSAT.  As competition intensified, some commentators questioned 
why a public intergovernmental treaty organization was still needed to provide 
telecommunications services that by then were substantially provided by the private 
sector.  Acting on such concerns, Congress enacted the ORBIT Act of 2000, which 
mandated the privatization of INTELSAT.  The privatization process began in July 2001, 
and essentially ended with the sale of INTELSAT’s satellites on January 28, 2005.
Although widely welcomed in the United States, the privatization of INTELSAT 
caused alarm in many developing nations.  Particularly in “lifeline” nations not served by 
any other international telecommunications carrier, fears were voiced that the privatization 
of INTELSAT could threaten the interconnectedness of the world’s communications 
systems, by rendering the future of global connectivity subject to both market forces and 
U.S. national trade policies.
To address such concerns, in executing its privatization, INTELSAT left in place a 
small residual International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, now known by the 
acronym “ITSO.”  ITSO’s primary charge is to ensure that the new owners of 
INTELSAT’s former satellite system preserve global connectivity and continue to serve 
those poor or underserved countries that remain highly dependent on INTELSAT for 
international telecommunications service.  However, ITSO has no role in operating the 
privatized satellite system, nor any satellites of its own.   Thus, for the first time since 
1971, the sole public international organization charged with ensuring that every country 
2on earth receives international telecommunications service lacks the technological 
facilities to provide such service itself.  Instead, ITSO must rely entirely on political and 
legal tools to accomplish its mandate.
To date, INTELSAT’s private successor has continued to serve every country and 
territory on earth.  Indeed, under the supervision of ITSO, the private successor has 
executed “lifeline connectivity obligation” (LCO) contracts that guarantee the 
maintenance or expansion of existing service to “lifeline” nations.  At present, no country 
is threatened with being cut off from the global network of communications systems.
Concerns have been raised, however, that the global connectivity of the world’s 
communications systems has been rendered less secure by the privatization of 
INTELSAT.  Some of these concerns are economic in nature:  will the private successor 
honor its commitments to serve “lifeline” countries at reduced rates?;  will honoring such 
commitments threaten the successor’s financial viability?; what will happen if the 
successor goes bankrupt?   Other concerns are political in nature, and principally revolve 
around fears that the United States government might use its legal authority over the 
private successor to force the removal of certain “rogue states” from the world’s 
communications grid.
In Part I, this Article briefly reviews the formation of the INTELSAT treaty 
organization in the 1960s, and explains its structure and the nature of its operations from the 
1970s through 1990s.  Part II surveys the pressures favoring privatization that arose in the 
1990s, both from outside INTELSAT and from within.  Part III provides a detailed narrative 
documentary history of the privatization of INTELSAT, from the enactment of the ORBIT 
Act in 2000 through sale of INTELSAT’s satellites in January 2005.  Part III also 
documents the formation of the residual treaty organization ITSO in 2001, and the activities 
ITSO has engaged in since its formation.  In Part IV, this Article catalogues and evaluates 
certain specific claims that have been raised concerning the threat to global connectivity 
posed by INTELSAT’s privatization.   In particular, Part IV.A evaluates whether the 
financial and economic framework left in place following the privatization of INTELSAT 
provides a sufficient and viable means of providing international communications service to 
underserved and developing nations.  Part IV.B then evaluates whether the legal and 
political framework under which INTELSAT’s former satellites are now governed unduly 
empowers the United States government to interfere with global connectivity, and creates an 
intolerable risk that the United States government will do so to advance a political agenda.  
The Article concludes that while privatization does pose certain theoretical risks to global 
connectivity, the risks are sufficiently remote and improbable that, in practice, global 
connectivity remains highly secure.
3I. INTELSAT’s Formation and Structure
On May 14, 1959, a radio signal transmitted from Jodrell Bank, England, was 
bounced off the moon and received at the U.S. Air Force Cambridge Research Center in 
Bedford, Massachusetts.1  This transmission proved that radio signals could be bounced 
off passive objects in space (either natural or artificial) and relayed to distant points on 
the earth.2  Recognizing the practical implications of this demonstration, the United 
Nations General Assembly resolved in 1961 that “communication by means of satellites 
should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-
discriminatory basis.”3  In 1962, AT&T’s experimental TELSTAR satellite performed the 
world’s first intercontinental broadcast transmission of a television signal.4  Very shortly 
thereafter, the United States Congress enacted the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 
(“Satellite Act”).5
The Satellite Act declared it “the policy of the United States to establish, in 
conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable a 
commercial communications satellite system, as part of an improved global 
communications network, which will be responsive to public needs and national 
objectives, which will serve the communication needs of the United States and other 
1 Stephen E. Doyle, Communications Satellites: International Organization for 
Development and Control, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 431, 432 & n.3 (1967) (citing Eugene M. Emme, 
Aeronautics and Astronautics 1915-1960, at 55 (1961)).
2 Id.  The concept of an artificial geostationary communications satellite had first been 
proposed in 1945 by engineer-turned-science-fiction-writer Arthur C. Clarke.  See Arthur C. 
Clarke, Peacetime Uses for V2, WIRELESS WORLD, Feb. 1945, at 58 (letter to the editor) 
(proposing that “[a]n ‘artificial satellite’ at the correct distance from the earth would . . . remain 
stationary above the same spot and would be within optical range of nearly half the earth's 
surface.  Three repeater stations, 120 degrees apart in the correct orbit, could give television and 
microwave coverage to the entire planet.”).  See also Arthur C. Clarke, Extra-Terrestrial Relays: 
Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at 305-
08 (expanding this proposal).
3 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), Part D (Dec. 20, 1961).  Several months 
before the United Nations adopted this resolution, President John F. Kennedy had called for the 
United States to spearhead an international effort to develop a global satellite communications 
system that would serve all the nations of the world on a nondiscriminatory basis.  See Statement 
of the President on Communications Policy (July 24, 1961), appended to S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 
25 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2287.
4 See Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Telstar Web Page, 
<http://www.lucent.com/minds/telstar/fit.html>.
5 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 425 (1962), codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-769 (“Satellite Act”).  For a legislative history of the Satellite 
Act, see Note, The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1962).
4countries, and which will contribute to world peace and understanding.” 6  In effectuating 
this program, the Act directed that “care and attention . . . be directed toward providing 
[satellite communications] services to economically less developed countries and areas as
well as those more highly developed. . . .”7  It also directed “that all authorized users have 
nondiscriminatory access to the system.”8
To achieve these ends, the Satellite Act created a new stockholder-owned District 
of Columbia corporation, COMSAT, and directed this corporation to raise private 
financing and to seek foreign partners with whom to establish the proposed satellite 
system.9  In 1965, an ad hoc partnership led by COMSAT and involving 44 nations 
successfully launched into geostationary orbit the world’s first commercial 
communications satellite, “Early Bird.”10  In 1971, after several more satellites had been 
launched by ad hoc international partnerships led by COMSAT,11 85 nations entered into 
an international agreement that established the International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization “INTELSAT.”12  INTELSAT was established as a permanent 
intergovernmental treaty organization in order “to continue and carry forward on a 
definitive basis the design, development, construction, establishment, operation and 
maintenance of the space segment of the global commercial telecommunications satellite 
system. . . .”13  As its “prime objective” INTELSAT was charged with providing, on a 
commercial basis, the satellite transmission capacity (also called “space segment”) 
“required for international public telecommunications services of high quality and 
6 Satellite Act § 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a).
7 Satellite Act § 102(b), 47 U.S.C. § 701(b).
8 Satellite Act § 102(c), 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
9 See Satellite Act § 102(c), 47 U.S.C. § 701(c) (“United States participation in the global 
system shall be in the form of a private corporation.”); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 731-35 (setting forth 
structure and mission of the new private corporation).  The new corporation that was formed 
pursuant to the Act was named “Communications Satellite Corporation,” or “COMSAT.”   See
2 I.L.M. 395 (1963) (setting forth COMSAT’s articles of incorporation).
10 See Communications Satellite Corporation, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 369, 371 (1965).
11 See COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C. 2d 564, ¶¶ 63-65 (1980) (describing interim 
arrangements); Stephen E. Doyle, Communications Satellites: International Organization for 
Development and Control, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 431, 434-42 (1967) (same).
12 See Agreement Relating to The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
“INTELSAT”, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, 1220 U.N.T.S. 22 
(“INTELSAT Agreement”) (establishing permanent intergovernmental treaty organization); see 
also id., 23 U.S.T. at 4066-4083 (listing the 85 nations that founded INTELSAT).   By 2000, just 
before INTELSAT was privatized, the number of member nations that had become Signatories to 
the INTELSAT Agreement had risen to 144.  See United States Department of State, Treaties In 
Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force as of 
January 1, 2000, at 457-58 (2000) (listing INTELSAT member nations).
13 INTELSAT Agreement, Art. II(a), done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3816, T.I.A.S. 
No. 7532, 1220 U.N.T.S. 22, 24.
5reliability to be available on a non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the world.”14  In 
addition, to the extent it could do so without impairing its prime objective, INTELSAT 
also was authorized to provide satellite transmission capacity for domestic public 
telecommunications services, and for specialized international or domestic 
telecommunications services, other than for military purposes.15
INTELSAT was governed via a complex, four-level structure that reflected the 
organization’s dual nature as both a public international treaty organization and a 
commercial provider of telecommunications services.16  At the top of this structure was 
the Assembly of Parties, “the principal organ of INTELSAT.”17  Populated by diplomats 
representing each INTELSAT member state, the Assembly of Parties met biennially to 
establish general policy and long-term objectives of INTELSAT, to consider “those 
aspects of INTELSAT which are primarily of interest to the Parties as sovereign States,” 
monitor INTELSAT’s compliance with other multilateral conventions adhered to by at 
least two-thirds of the Parties, and confirm the nomination of the “Director General” who 
exercised executive responsibility over day-to-day operations.18
Just below the Assembly of Parties was the Meeting of Signatories.  Within 
INTELSAT, each member state was required to designate a single telecommunications 
entity known as a “Signatory” to make the capital contributions necessary to finance that 
state’s share of the global satellite system, and to perform the commercial and technical 
operations necessary to furnish the transmission capacity and communications services of 
the satellite system to carriers and users located in their home state.19   Most INTELSAT 
member states designated their government-owned Post, Telephone, and Telegraph 
Offices (“PTTs”) to serve as Signatories.20
14 Id. Art. III(a).
15 Id. Art. III(b)-(d).  All such services, like INTELSAT’s “prime” international public 
telecommunications services, were to be provided commercially on a non-discriminatory basis.  
Id.
16 See id. Art. VI(a).
17 See id. Art. VII(a).   A “Party” to INTELSAT means “a State for which the Agreement 
has entered into force or been provisionally applied.”  Id. Art. I(f).
18 See id. Arts. I(f), VII.
19 See id. Art. I(g);   These telecommunications were called “Signatories” because they 
“signed” a separate “INTELSAT Operating Agreement” on behalf of their member states.   See
id. Art. I(g), 23 U.S.T. at 3816 (defining “Signatory”); see also Operating Agreement Relating to 
the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization “INTELSAT”, Art. 2, done Aug. 20, 
1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091 (“INTELSAT Operating Agreement”).  The INTELSAT Operating 
Agreement was a commercial agreement that set forth the commercial rights and obligations of 
Signatories within the INTELSAT cooperative.  See id.
20 The United States, in contrast, designated COMSAT (the new private corporation that 
had been created under the 1962 Satellite Act) to serve as “the U.S. Signatory to the Operating 
Agreement of INTELSAT.”  Senate Report on International Maritime Satellite 
(continued. . . . .)
6INTELSAT’s third level of governance, the Board of Governors, was assigned 
principal responsibility “for the design, development, construction, establishment, 
operation and maintenance of the INTELSAT space segment and . . . for carrying out any 
other activities which are undertaken by INTELSAT.”21  Unlike the Assembly of Parties 
and the Meeting of Signatories, which each adhered to a one-vote-per-state rule, 
representation on the INTELSAT Board of Governors was apportioned based on 
Signatory ownership share, which, in turn, was apportioned based each Signatory’s share 
of utilization of INTELSAT satellite transmission capacity.22
Finally, a unitary executive “Director General” served as “the chief executive and 
the legal representative of INTELSAT and [was] directly responsible to the Board of 
Governors for the performance of all management functions.”23
During the 30 years that it existed (1971-2001), the INTELSAT treaty organization 
used its global fleet of international communications satellites to guarantee the universal 
global connectivity of the world’s telecommunications networks.  By the late 1990s, 
INTELSAT’s satellites served not only the organization’s nearly 148 member nations, but, 
indeed, virtually every populated land mass on earth.24
Telecommunications Act, S. Rep. No. 95-1036, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5272, 5275.
21 INTELSAT Agreement, Art. X(a), done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 
7532, 1220 U.N.T.S. 22.   These “other activities” included virtually all of INTELSAT’s business 
operations, including procurement, budgeting, allocation of satellite transmission capacity, rate 
setting, and securing patent rights.  Id.  The Board of Governors also was responsible for 
nominating individual candidates to serve as “Director General,” subject to confirmation by the 
Assembly of Parties.  Id. Art. XI(b)(iii).
22 See INTELSAT Agreement, Art. IX(f) (“each Governor shall have a voting participation 
equal to that part of the investment share of the Signatory, or group of Signatories, he represents, 
which is derived from the utilization of the INTELSAT space segment”).   Thus, for example, in 
1999, 22% of INTELSAT traffic worldwide was carried to or from the United States.  Because 
the United States’ “INTELSAT utilization share” was 22%, the investment share of the United 
States Signatory, COMSAT, was correspondingly set at approximately 22%, meaning that 
COMSAT was responsible for making 22% of the capital contributions needed to operate the 
entire system.  In exchange for these capital contributions, COMSAT obtained ownership of a 
22% share in the global system, and was entitled to vote this entire share in the Board of 
Governors.  See INTELSAT Operating Agreement, art. 6, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091.  
In the Assembly of Parties and the Meeting of Signatories, in contrast, the United States and its 
Signatory each were entitled to cast just one vote.
23 INTELSAT Agreement Art. XI(b)(i).
24 From its inception until its privatization in 2001, INTELSAT provided telephone, 
broadcast, internet, and specialized communications services to 214 countries and territories.  See
INTELSAT ANNUAL REPORT at i, 2-3 (2000).
7II. Calls for INTELSAT’s Dissolution.
From its inception, the INTELSAT satellite system was highly successful.  Over 
time, however, the continuing need for INTELSAT to maintain its complex structure of 
governance and its quasi-governmental status was periodically questioned.  By the 1990s, 
calls for the privatization of INTELSAT were regularly heard.  In this Part, the causes of 
INTELSAT’s privatization are reviewed.  In Subpart II.A, some concerns raised by 
INTELSAT’s competitors and potential competitors are discussed.  Subpart II.B then sets 
forth some reasons why INTELSAT eventually came to favor its own privatization.  
A. Calls From Without.
When the Satellite Act was enacted in 1962, many Congressmen and 
Administration officials envisioned the proposed international satellite system as a 
“natural monopoly.”25  Nonetheless, rather than ruling out future competition, the 1962 
Act expressly provided for the eventual “creation of additional communications satellite 
systems.”26
The 1971 accession of the United States to the INTELSAT Agreement, however, 
may have effectively delayed the deployment of separate international communications 
satellite facilities capable of serving the United States.  Article XIV(d) of that Agreement 
authorized the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, upon recommendation of the Board of 
Governors, to veto the development within any member state of any separate international 
satellite systems projected to cause “significant economic harm” to the INTELSAT 
system.27  In practice, INTELSAT probably lacked any means to enforce such a veto 
25 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 87-1584, at 28 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2269, 2289 (statement of President Kennedy) (characterizing COMSAT as “by nature a 
Government-created monopoly. . . .”); id. at 51 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2309 
(minority views) (opposing proposal to “create a private corporation that would own and operate 
the U.S. portion of a worldwide satellite communications system” on ground that “[t]his 
corporation would be a Government-created monopoly.”); see also 108 Cong. Rec. H7505 (daily 
ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Cellar) (noting that in the Satellite Act, “we are creating here 
a private monopoly.”); 108 Cong. Rec. H7515 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. 
Kowalski) (“Let us make no mistake about the bill before us—it proposes to place in private 
hands a Government-created monopoly. . . .”).
26 Satellite Act § 102(d), 47 U.S.C. § 701(d).
27 See INTELSAT Agreement, Art. XIV(d), done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3854 (No 
INTELSAT member state may “establish, acquire or utilize space segment facilities separate 
from the INTELSAT space segment facilities to meet its international public telecommunications 
services requirements” unless INTELSAT first determines that such proposed facilities would be 
technically compatible with INTELSAT and would not cause “significant economic harm to the 
global system of INTELSAT.”) (emphasis added).  The “economic harm” provision was justified 
as a means of protecting INTELSAT against “cream-skimming” in order to safeguard 
INTELSAT’s ability to serve every country on earth, regardless of cost, on non-discriminatory terms 
and conditions.  See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction To International 
(continued. . . . .)
8against an intransigent member state.28  Perhaps for this reason, as international 
telecommunications traffic expanded rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, INTELSAT 
did consent to the development of several competing “separate systems” that provided 
competitive regional international service in different parts of the world.29
On November 28, 1984, President Reagan “determine[d] that separate international 
communications satellite systems [were] required in the national interest.”30   Accordingly, 
he jointly directed both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce “to inform the 
Federal Communications Commission of criteria necessary to ensure the United States 
meets its international obligations [under the INTELSAT Agreement] and to further its 
telecommunications and foreign policy interests” by establishing separate satellite 
systems to compete against the INTELSAT system.31  On January 31, 1985, INTELSAT 
Telecommunications Law 79-80 (1996).  For a discussion of the substantive criteria formerly used 
by INTELSAT to determine whether a proposed separate satellite system would cause 
“significant economic harm,” see Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International 
Communications, 101 FCC 2d 1046, ¶¶ 139-143, 159-169 (1985) (“Separate Systems Order”), 
modified on recon., 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 649 (1986), further recon. denied, 1 FCC Rcd 439 
(1986).
28 See Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim Orbital 
Spectrum Under International Space Law, 9 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 69, 80-81 (Winter 1996) 
(lamenting INTELSAT’s inability to enforce its determinations of “economic harm,” and 
concluding that “[i]n light of the lack of INTELSAT's power over its own member states, . . . 
INTELSAT is a ‘paper tiger’. . . .”) (citing Francis Lyall, The International Telecommunications 
Union and Development, 22 J. Space L. 23, 106-09 (1994)).
29 See Charles H. Kennedy & M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction To International 
Telecommunications Law 80 (1996) (“The first separate system to receive approval was [Western 
Europe’s] EUTELSAT in 1979, which was soon followed by [Southeast Asia’s] PALAPA and 
[the Middle East’s] ARABSAT.”).  See also Richard R. Colino, A Chronicle of Policy and 
Procedure: The Formulation of the Reagan Administration Policy on International Satellite 
Telecommunications, 13 J. Space L. 103, 105-06 n. 10 (1985) (listing all separate satellite 
systems approved by INTELSAT under the Art. XIV(d) coordination process from 1973 to 
1983). 
30 Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46987 (Nov. 28, 1984).  For discussions 
of the deliberations that led to this Presidential determination, see Bert W. Rein & Carl R. Frank, The 
Legal Commitment of the United States to the INTELSAT System, 14 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 
219, 225-27 (1989); Richard R. Colino, A Chronicle of Policy and Procedure: The Formulation of 
the Reagan Administration Policy on International Satellite Telecommunications, 13 J. Space L. 
103 (1985); Richard R. Colino, The Possible Introduction of Separate Satellite Systems: 
International Satellite Communications at the Crossroad, 24 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 13 (1985).
31 Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46987 (Nov. 28, 1984).  The following 
year, Congress endorsed and codified President Reagan’s “separate systems” policy.  See Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93 § 146, 99 Stat. 425 
(1985), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 701 note (2000) (declaring U.S. policy to utilize both INTELSAT 
system and also any separate international satellite telecommunications systems satisfying conditions 
established pursuant to Presidential Determination No. 85-2).
9responded to President Reagan’s determination by adopting a resolution urging its 
members not to participate in establishing any separate international satellite systems 
linking the United States and Europe.32  Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, the FCC 
authorized the development of the first separate international satellite systems to serve 
U.S.-international routes.33  In 1988, the Connecticut-based Pan American Satellite 
Corporation (“PanAmSat”) launched the PAS-1 Atlantic Ocean Region satellite, the first 
U.S. private-sector satellite to provide international satellite services.34  By 1999, more 
than 200 commercial geosynchronous satellites were in orbit above the earth, of which 
approximately 73 served the United States.35  Of these, only 17 satellites belonged to 
INTELSAT, of which just 13 served the United States.36
At the same time, INTELSAT also began to face substantial intermodal 
competition in the market for international communications transmission capacity.   In 
1988, AT&T Corp. completed the world's first transoceanic fiber-optic cable.37  The first 
trans-Pacific fiber-optic cable entered service in 1991.38  During the 1990s, the entire 
world witnessed a proliferation of high-capacity transoceanic submarine fiber optic 
cables that are capable of delivering many of the same services that satellites can deliver, 
often at lower cost.39  In fact, since the early 1990s, fiber-optic cable systems have carried 
32 See Michael R. Gardner, December 19, 1984—A Big Day in Telecommunications, 34 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 625, 633 n.23 (1985).  The resolution, which was supported by every one of 
INTELSAT’s 109 member nations except for the United States, asserted that the prosperity and 
political harmony of the INTELSAT satellite system would be jeopardized if separate systems 
were licensed by the FCC.  Id.  Despite this unequivocal assertion, however, INTELSAT did not 
invoke the procedures set forth in Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement to veto the 
development of separate international satellite systems linking the United States and Europe.
33 See Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 101 
FCC 2d 1046 (1985) (“Separate Systems Order”), modified on recon., 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 
649 (1986), further recon. denied, 1 FCC Rcd 439 (1986).
34 See PanAmSat History Web Page, <http://www.panamsat.com/company/timeline.asp>.
35 See Phillips Satellite Industry Directory, at 17-234, 279-413 (21st ed. 1999) (setting forth 
complete information about each of these satellites and their operators).
36 See In re Availability of INTELSAT Space Segment Capacity To Users and Service 
Providers Seeking To Access INTELSAT Directly, 15 FCC Rcd. 19160, ¶¶ 2, 5 (2000).
37 Neil King Jr., Deep Secrets: As Technology Evolves, Spy Agency Struggles To Preserve 
Its Hearing, May 23, 2001, Wall St. J., at A1.
38 Id.
39 In 1997, for example, the 17,000-mile-long “Flag Telecom” cable connected Europe with 
North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Japan.  Id. See generally In re COMSAT 
Corp. Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶¶ 11, 19, 32-39 (1998) 
(“COMSAT Non-Dominant Order”), modified on recon., 14 FCC Rcd. 3065 (1999) 
(characterizing satellites and submarine cables as fungible commodities serving the markets for 
switched voice, private line, and video services, and noting that cables compete effectively 
against INTELSAT satellites on every major international telecommunications route to or from 
the United States).  By the end of the 1990s, transoceanic submarine fiber-optic cables had 
(continued. . . . .)
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more traffic for U.S.-international switched voice and private line than satellite systems 
have.40
During the 1990s, the international telecommunications market began, for the first 
time, to experience vigorous competition.  Not surprisingly, the special legal status of 
INTELSAT and its Signatories irritated many of INTELSAT’s new private competitors.41
As an intergovernmental treaty organization, for example, INTELSAT was immune from 
paying taxes to any national government.42  INTELSAT (and its Signatories) also 
enjoyed three categories of legal immunities not enjoyed by private satellite operators: 
“immunity from jurisdiction, which prevents courts from considering lawsuits of any type 
against INTELSAT; archival and testimonial immunity, which protects INTELSAT from 
being compelled to provide documents or testimony of its employees; and immunity of 
assets, which prevents courts from enforcing monetary judgments against INTELSAT.”43
proliferated so greatly that the TAT-9, TAT-10, TAT-11 and PTAT cables, which were laid in the 
early 1990s, collectively represented only 0.01% of trans-Atlantic capacity.  Michelle Donegan, 
Carriers Retire Cables, COMMUNICATIONSWEEK INT'L, Oct. 7, 2002, at 4, 2002 WLNR 
10584785.
40 See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, ¶ 56 (1998) (“Excluding traffic 
carried to Mexico and Canada over terrestrial networks, markets COMSAT does not serve, fiber-
optic cable systems carried three times as much switched voice traffic and six times as much 
private line traffic than satellite networks in 1996.”); see also id. ¶ 76 (“Intermodal competition 
leads us to believe that fiber-optic cables represent a substitute for satellites in the transmission of 
switched voice service.”).
41 See Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 
117 (2001) (noting that during the privatization debate, "as a matter of the dogma of competition, 
it [was often] alleged that INTELSAT [did] not compete on that mythical ‘level playing field.’”) 
(footnote omitted).
42 See INTELSAT Agreement, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, Art. XV(b) (“Within 
the scope of activities authorized by this Agreement, INTELSAT and its property shall be exempt 
in all States Party to this Agreement from all national income and direct national property 
taxation and from customs duties on communications satellites and components and parts for 
such satellites to be launched for use in the global system.”).  See also Francis Lyall, On the 
Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 117-18 (2001) (during debate, 
proponents of INTELSAT privatization claimed “that INTELSAT's position as an inter-
governmental organisation, with all the privileges of an international organisation, which includes 
tax exemptions, is an unfair distortion of competition.”).
43 In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 7 & n.13 (2000), recon. denied, 15 FCC 
Rcd. 25234 (2000) (citing Comsat Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14083, 14161-63 (1998) 
and Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non- U.S. Licensed Space 
Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United States, 12 FCC 
Rcd. 24094, 24149 (1997) (“DISCO II Order”), recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 7207 (1999), 
corrected by, 15 FCC Rcd. 5042 (2000)).  See also International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization Headquarters Agreement, entered into force Nov. 24, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 2248, TIAS 
8542 (“INTELSAT Headquarters Agreement”) (providing that INTELSAT and the 
representatives of the parties and of the Signatories shall be immune from suit and legal process 
(continued. . . . .)
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Some critics alleged that but for these immunities, INTELSAT’s relationship with its 
Signatories would violate U.S. antitrust laws.44  Others alleged that INTELSAT’s unique 
“treaty status help[ed] ensure its access to the national markets of member countries”45—
a valuable asset that INTELSAT’s private competitors sometimes experienced difficulty 
in obtaining.46
In 1997, Rep. Thomas Bliley gave effect to such criticism by introducing in the 
105th Congress a bill “to amend the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to promote 
competition and privatization in satellite communications.”47  The bill, which was 
supported by many of INTELSAT’s competitors but opposed by INTELSAT, forthrightly 
sought “to eliminate the provision of commercial satellite communications by 
intergovernmental organizations . . . [and] to ensure that the privatized [successor] 
entities be independent of [INTELSAT’s] ‘signatories.’”48  Rep. Bliley claimed that the 
elimination of INTELSAT would introduce “a level playing field for all competitors” in 
the satellite telecommunications marketplace, which “in turn would bring consumers 
relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions, 
except as such immunity is waived by INTELSAT).
44 In Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 946 
F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 (1992), a putative competitor alleged that 
COMSAT and INTELSAT had violated antitrust law by allegedly boycotting competing satellite 
systems, delaying mandatory Article XIV(d) consultations, pricing satellite telecommunications 
services without regard to cost (i.e. on a nondiscriminatory basis), and purchasing excess satellite 
capacity.  946 F.2d at 172-73.  Dismissing the case on the ground that  INTELSAT and 
COMSAT were immune, the court opined: “Having created COMSAT to wield monopoly power, 
along with the other participants in a global satellite system, Congress did not expect that 
corporation to face antitrust liability in deciding, as a member of INTELSAT, whether and to 
what extent to permit competition.”  Id. at 174.
45 In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 7 (2000), recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 
25234 (2000).  See also Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 111, 118 (2001) (noting competitor’s allegations “that INTELSAT's very existence, and 
the fact that its constitution calls for each member state to designate a signatory to the Operating 
Agreement through which access to the INTELSAT system is given, affords it and its signatories 
a privileged position within a very competitive industry.”) (footnote omitted).
46 See, e.g., Comsat Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14083, ¶ 52 (1998) (“[I]n some 
cases, INTELSAT Signatories are the spectrum licensing authorities and monopoly providers of 
satellite services in their home markets, so they have an incentive to minimize the spectrum 
licenses that they issue to independent satellite systems seeking to compete in their markets.”).  
Accord 145 Cong. Rec. H11933 (Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“Today, the owners 
of [INTELSAT] are often the same folks that control licensing decisions and foreign market 
access. Thus, they have the ability and the incentive to make it hard for U.S. satellite companies 
to enter and to compete in their national telecom markets.”).
47 H.R. 1872, 105th Cong, introduced in 143 Cong. Rec. H3796 (June 12, 1997).
48 House of Representatives Report on the Communications Satellite Competition and 
Privatization Act of 1998, H. Rep. No. 105-494, at 12 (1998).
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lower prices, higher service quality, improved efficiency, innovative new products, and 
more choice.”49  For this reason, the Bliley bill would have privatized INTELSAT by 
requiring it to divest all of its foreign government ownership, and to sell its satellites and 
other assets to private stockholder-owned corporations.50
B. Calls From Within.
While Rep. Bliley and others alleged that INTELSAT’s intergovernmental 
attributes provided unfair competitive advantages, “INTELSAT management and many 
Signatories [asserted] that these very same intergovernmental attributes [were actually] a 
handicap (particularly in getting Signatories to make the necessary capital investment 
commitments) in a dynamic and increasingly competitive global market.”51  Testifying 
before Congress in 1998, INTELSAT’s Director General argued that:
INTELSAT faces intense competition, but is constrained in how it 
may react to that competition.  For example, unlike its competitors, 
INTELSAT must provide connectivity to every point on the globe 
- even remote areas not served by others.  In addition, our charter 
mandates non-discriminatory access and pricing. INTELSAT's 
49 Id.
50 See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong, § 102 (introducing proposed new Satellite Acts §§ 601-02, 
621-22, which set forth these requirements).
51 Changes in International Satellite Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the Sen. Commerce Committee (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of John Sponyoe, 
CEO, Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications), 1999 WL 194674; see also id. (“whatever 
perceived advantages INTELSAT may or may not have in its current incarnation, these 
advantages are certainly not reflected in its steadily decreasing market share.  . . .  Indeed, 
INTELSAT's current position in the US-international market vis-à-vis other satellite and 
terrestrial competitors is so far from anything that could be accurately termed ‘dominant’ that I 
have to wonder whether its current structure might not pose a greater threat to itself than to its 
competitors.”).  
Six months before the CEO of Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications (LMGT) 
delivered this testimony, LMGT had entered into an agreement to purchase 100 percent of the 
outstanding stock ownership of COMSAT (INTELSAT’s U.S. Signatory), pending receipt of 
regulatory approval.  See In re Lockheed Martin Corp., Regulus, LLC, & COMSAT Corp., 14 
FCC Rcd. 15816, at ¶¶ 1-3 (1999) (describing proposed transaction), vacated in part in other 
respects, PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, Nos. 99-1384, 99-1385, 2000 WL 621421 (D.C. Cir. Apr 20, 
2000) (unpublished per curiam slip op.).  After receiving the necessary approvals, LMGT’s 
acquisition of COMSAT was consummated on August 3, 2000.  In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 
Comsat Government Systems, LLC, and Comsat Corp., Applications for Transfer of Control of 
Comsat Corp., Order on Recon., 17 FCC Rcd. 13160, ¶ 4 n.5 (2002) (citing Letter to the FCC 
from Raymond G. Bender, Jr., Counsel for Comsat Corp., dated August 21, 2000).  In 2002, 
LMGT sold the bulk of the facilities and authorizations it had acquired from COMSAT in 2000 to 
the privatized Intelsat Ltd.  See Lockheed Martin/COMSAT and Intelsat Seek FCC Consent to 
Assign Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations, Public Notice, 17 FCC Rcd. 7358 (2002).
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charter also mandates a decision-making process characterized by 
consensus.  This is a deliberative process that, depending on the 
issue, involves multilateral negotiations among our 143 Parties and 
Signatories.  Obviously, such a process takes time. In addition, 
INTELSAT is limited to providing space segment only; we cannot 
provide vertically integrated solutions that deliver services directly 
to end users.52
In 1998, Rep. Bliley’s bill passed the House of Representatives by a large 
majority.53  The bill was not taken up by the Senate during the 105th Congress, however, 
and thus failed to become law.54  Nonetheless, under pressure both from within and from 
without, the Twenty-Fourth INTELSAT Assembly of Parties in 1999 resolved to 
transform INTELSAT from a public intergovernmental treaty organization into an 
ordinary private corporation providing international telecommunications services.55
Within INTELSAT, the United States played a leading role in championing this 
resolution.56  Shortly thereafter, the INTELSAT Board of Governors identified seven 
reasons why retention of INTELSAT’s existing structure as an Intergovernmental 
52 International Satellite Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the 
Sen. Commerce Committee, (Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Conny Kullman, Director General and 
CEO- Designate of INTELSAT), 1998 WL 778936; see also id. (characterizing INTELSAT “not 
as a privileged player in the global telecommunications market but as a somewhat handicapped 
player.”).
53 The recorded vote was 403-16, with 2 absences.  H.R. 1872, 105th Cong., H.R. Roll No. 
129 (May 6, 1998), <http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year=1998&rollnumber=129>.
54 Rep. Bliley reintroduced substantially the same bill in the 106th Congress.  See
H.R. 3261, 106th Cong. (introduced Nov. 9, 1999), reprinted in 145 Cong. Rec. H11929-11933 
(Nov. 10, 1999).   The Senate’s version of this bill (S. 376, 106th Cong.), which differed in some 
respects from Rep. Bliley’s House version, was ultimately enacted as the ORBIT Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-180, 114 Stat. 48 (2000).  See Subpart III.A, infra (discussing ORBIT Act).
55 See In re INTELSAT LLC, Mem. Op. Order and Authorization, 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 8 
& n.14 (2000) (“In response to competition, and the desire of governments to promote a more 
level playing field, INTELSAT and investing Signatories decided to restructure as a private 
commercial entity.”) (citing 1999 INTELSAT Assembly of Parties Decision, AP 24-24-3E Final), 
recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 25234 (2000).  Under its 1999 resolution, the Assembly of Parties 
proposed to take final decisions on all significant aspects of the privatization by November 2000, 
after which the Board of Governors would implement the privatization.  Id.
56 See Changes in International Satellite Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the Sen. Commerce Committee (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of Ambassador 
Vonya B. McCann, United States Coordinator for International Communications and Information 
Policy), 1999 WL 166941 (“The Administration, in partnership with the Congress, has worked 
tirelessly for more than five years to bring about the restructuring and privatization of . . . 
INTELSAT. . . .  These efforts have borne fruit.  . . .  [D]iscussions within the INTELSAT Board 
of Governors on privatization are progressing favorably.  The United States will continue to play 
a leadership role within the international community, to get a pro-competitive transition plan and 
an aggressive timetable for full privatization of INTELSAT.”).
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Organization (IGO) was not viable in the medium term: (1) INTELSAT’s prices for 
services were not flexible and responsive to the market because of the cumbersome 
nature of INTELSAT’s organizational structure; (2) the existing unlimited liability of 
INTELSAT’s owners to the IGO rendered commercial decisions conservative and 
unresponsive; (3) INTELSAT’s governance procedure was slow and open to scrutiny by 
competitors; (4) access to public equity markets for capital was restricted; (5) investment 
in INTELSAT was linked to usage; (6) it was difficult for INTELSAT to leverage its 
intellectual property assets; and (7) distribution channels for INTELSAT were 
determined by governments.57
At the same time, and also with the support of the United States,58 the Twenty-
Fourth Assembly of Parties resolved that any such restructuring must preserve 
INTELSAT’s core principles, which included “maintaining global connectivity and 
coverage of the INTELSAT system, protecting lifeline users and connectivity, and 
ensuring continual non-discriminatory access to the global system.”59  It further 
determined “that lifeline users and connectivity must be protected through the creation of 
a residual intergovernmental organization that would ensure such connectivity to 
countries satisfying certain criteria.”60  As envisioned by the Twenty-Fourth Assembly of 
Parties in 1999, the residual IGO:
would neither function as a commercial provider of space segment 
capacity nor a Signatory, as this role would cease to exist.  Rather, 
57 See New Zealand House of Representatives Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade, Report on International Treaty Examination of the Amendments to the Agreement 
Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, at 2-3 (2001), 
<www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/content/578/fdintelsat.pdf> (listing these reasons).  Cf. Francis 
Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 118 (2001) (criticizing 
claims that INTELSAT was “inefficient, or not as efficient as it could or should be, and unable to 
meet the challenge of competitors who have been newly released from their cages.  On this view 
INTELSAT procedures and the procedural requirements of its constituent documents mean that 
the organisation is hobbled, cribbed, cabined and confined in its response to the changes of the 
marketplace, and the swift development of emergent telecommunications technologies.  A ‘better 
INTELSAT’ should be created on the commercial models of private corporations, which would 
therefore be leaner, fitter, more responsive to market requirements.  Such would be able to meet 
competition both from other satellite systems, as well as from the optical fibre networks, which 
were undreamed of until relatively recently.”).
58 In re INTELSAT LLC, Mem. Op. Order and Authorization, 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 25 & 
n.96 (2000) (“The United States supported the 1999 Assembly decision that INTELSAT must 
continue to maintain global coverage and connectivities and ensure non-discriminatory access to 
the system.”) (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the Twenty-Fourth 
Meeting, AP 24-3E Final August 10, 1999, at 8), recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 25234 (2000).
59 Id. at ¶ 3 & n.3 (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the 
Twenty-Fourth Meeting, AP 24-3E Final Aug. 10, 1999); accord id. ¶¶ 25-27.
60 Id. at ¶ 26 & n.99 (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the 
Twenty-Fourth Meeting, AP 24-3E Final, Aug. 10, 1999, at 8, 10-12).
15
it would supervise the commitment of Intelsat LLC to provide 
satellite capacity to lifeline users for a predetermined number of 
years with price protection during the life of the commitment.  This 
commitment would be contained in an intergovernmental 
agreement creating the IGO and implemented through a ‘public 
services’ agreement between the company and the residual IGO.61
The proposal to divide INTELSAT into two components—a private corporation 
and a residual IGO—reflected “the underlying agreement among INTELSAT Parties . . . 
[that] INTELSAT’s satellites and other assets and personnel necessary to operate the 
satellites will be transferred to a private company that no longer has privileges and 
immunities and is subject to a national licensing authority, as long as that company 
assures continued services to lifeline users under the ‘core principles.’”62  In conformity 
with this understanding, the United States supported the retention, post-privatization, of a 
residual IGO charged with ensuring continued service to “lifeline users.”63
III. INTELSAT Privatization
As calls for the privatization of INTELSAT intensified both inside and outside the 
organization, it perhaps became inevitable that privatization would occur.  And so it did.  
This Part sets forth a narrative documentary history of the privatization of INTELSAT.  
Subpart III.A discusses the mandates imposed by Congress in the ORBIT Act of 2000, 
which codified comprehensive sets of benchmarks, yardsticks, carrots, and sticks, many 
of which substantially dictated the shape of INTELSAT’s privatization.  Subpart III.B 
describes the implementation of the privatization plan, a four-year process that 
culminated in January 2005 with the sale of INTELSAT’s satellite fleet for $5 billion 
dollars to a consortium of private investors.  Subpart III.C then surveys the creation, and 
ongoing work, of the residual intergovernmental organization ITSO that was left in place 
when INTELSAT was privatized.
A. The ORBIT ACT of 2000
In light of the progress towards privatization already underway within the 
INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, the U.S. State Department and some legislators warned 
that unilateral U.S. legislation purporting to mandate INTELSAT privatization would 
now be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive.64  Nonetheless, in March 2000, a 
61 Id. at ¶ 26 (footnotes omitted).
62 Id.
63 Id. at ¶ 26 & n.102 (citing 1999 Assembly Decision, AP 24-3E Final, Aug. 10, 1999, 
at 2).
64 See Changes in International Satellite Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the Sen. Commerce Committee (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of Ambassador 
Vonya B. McCann, United States Coordinator for International Communications and Information 
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skeptical Congress enacted the “Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of 
International Telecommunications Act” (“ORBIT Act”)65 in order to mandate “fully 
privatizing the intergovernmental satellite organizations, INTELSAT and Inmarsat.”66
The Senate Report that accompanied the ORBIT Act explained the perceived need for the 
legislation thusly:
Extraordinary technological and market changes have reshaped the 
global satellite communications marketplace in the thirty-seven 
years since enactment of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 
and the creation of COMSAT and INTELSAT.  Where once only a 
treaty-based intergovernmental satellite system would be willing to 
undertake the enormous financial risks associated with developing, 
launching, and maintaining a global satellite system, there are now 
multiple commercial satellite systems providing an array of 
international telecommunications services in this increasingly 
competitive marketplace.  However, in this mature, competitive 
satellite services environment, it is no longer appropriate for any 
single competitor to be advantaged by an intergovernmental 
structure accompanied by certain privileges and immunities; rather 
it must be transformed into a commercial structure comparable to 
that of any of the existing commercial satellite entities.67
Policy), 1999 WL 166941 (“the Administration does not believe any legislation is necessary to 
ensure that the privatization of INTELSAT . . .  does not harm competition in the U.S. market . . .  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice have ample authority to protect U.S. interests, and the Administration has been 
aggressive in ensuring that plans to restructure and privatize [INTELSAT] are pro-competitive.”); 
see also 145 Cong. Rec. H11936 (Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“Intelsat should be 
privatized as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, the U.S. cannot, by legislative fiat, simply 
impose its will on 143 foreign countries who are signatories to the Intelsat treaty.  I believe the 
Bliley bill, as currently constructed, would actually undermine American diplomatic efforts 
currently underway to secure an Intelsat privatization.”).
65 Pub. L. No. 106-180, 114 Stat. 48 (2000), codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 761-69.
66 ORBIT Act § 2, Pub. L. No. 106-180 § 2, 114 Stat. 48 (2000), codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 761 note.
67 Report of the Sen. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on the ORBIT 
Act, S. Rep. No. 106-100, at 1 (1999); see also 145 Cong. Rec. H11934 (Nov. 10, 1999) 
(statement of Rep. Markey) (“Back in 1962 . . . it took national efforts to build, to launch and to 
maintain satellites in orbit.  But much has changed in the last 35 years, since President Kennedy 
signed the original COMSAT bill into law, since INTELSAT . . . [was] made a part of the 
international telecommunications infrastructure. Today, we have private individuals with their 
own money willing to build and to launch satellites into space.  . . . [T]hat 1962 model . . . is 
counterproductive to American interests today.  It is time to update the [Satellite Act].”).
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To ensure that INTELSAT’s restructuring was not merely cosmetic, the ORBIT 
Act required INTELSAT to satisfy certain specific “pro-competitive privatization” 
criteria.68  First, ORBIT specified that any privatized successor of INTELSAT must be 
organized as an ordinary shareholder-owned corporation or other similarly accepted 
commercial organization under the laws of a single nation.69  In response to the Assembly 
of Parties’ decision to retain a residual IGO after privatization, ORBIT barred the residual 
IGO from owning even a scintilla of equity in the commercial successor corporation.70
In addition, although the successor corporation would necessarily be owned by 
INTELSAT’s Signatories at the moment of privatization, ORBIT mandated the 
substantial dilution of Signatory ownership through an initial public offering to take place 
soon thereafter.71
The ORBIT Act also prohibited any privatized successor of INTELSAT from 
retaining any of the legal privileges or immunities from liability or regulation that 
INTELSAT, as an intergovernmental organization (IGO), had enjoyed.72  Relatedly, 
ORBIT proclaimed that any privatized successor of INTELSAT would need to procure 
future orbital slot registrations and international frequency assignments from the national 
licensing administration of a government that subscribed to the World Trade 
Organization Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement, rather than through 
international legal channels.73  Moreover, a privatized INTELSAT successor was not to 
68 ORBIT Act § 621, 47 U.S.C. § 763.
69 ORBIT Act § 621(5), 47 U.S.C. § 763(5).
70 ORBIT Act § 621(2), 47 U.S.C. § 763(2).  The ORBIT Act further required any future 
transactions or other relationships between a residual INTELSAT IGO and a private successor 
entity to “ be conducted on an arm's length basis.”  ORBIT Act § 621(5)(E), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 763(5)(E).
71 ORBIT Act § 621(2), 47 U.S.C. § 763(2).  In 2000, 80 INTELSAT Signatories were 
agencies of foreign governments.  In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 44 (2000), 
recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 28234 (2000).   These 80 foreign government-owned Signatories 
collectively owned approximately 30 percent of INTELSAT's total equity.  Id.  The remaining 70 
percent of INTELSAT’s equity was owned by 63 private Signatories, including COMSAT.  Id.
Although ORBIT § 621(2) applied to all INTELSAT Signatories, its primary purpose was to 
dilute foreign government ownership of the private successor corporation.
72 ORBIT Act § 621(3), 47 U.S.C. § 763(3).
73 ORBIT Act § 621(6)-(7), 47 U.S.C. § 763(6)-(7).  The FCC, for example, is such a 
national licensing administration.  These provisions were significant because orbital slot 
registrations must be obtained from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a 
specialized agency of the United Nations that deals only with national governments.  Historically, 
as a ministerial matter, INTELSAT's ITU applications for orbital slots were filed by the United 
States on behalf of INTELSAT.  See In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶ 12 (2000), 
recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 28234 (2000). However, the ITU always distinguished INTELSAT 
applications from other United States applications.  Orbital slots earmarked for INTELSAT were 
shown in the ITU listing of network filings as "USA-IT" registrations, and non-INTELSAT U.S.-
licensed satellites were precluded from using those orbital slots.  Id.  Orbital slots allocated to 
(continued. . . . .)
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receive preferential treatment in the assignment of orbital locations from any national 
licensing administration.74   Finally, ORBIT required INTELSAT to put an end to the 
“consultation” process, under which applicants from INTELSAT member nations had not 
been permitted to launch new separate international satellite systems without first 
obtaining INTELSAT’s certification that the new facilities would be technically 
compatible with INTELSAT.75
While ORBIT did not directly abrogate the 1971 INTELSAT Agreement, its 
enactment did exert substantial pressure on INTELSAT to privatize in conformity with 
ORBIT’s “pro-competitive” criteria.  As ORBIT’s Senate sponsor declared, the Act 
“provide[d] new incentives for INTELSAT's privatization, while at the same time, 
carr[ying] tough consequences if INTELSAT fail[ed] to achieve this important 
objective.”76  Perhaps the most attractive incentive set forth in ORBIT was the automatic  
repeal, upon privatization, of a host of unique regulatory burdens to which INTELSAT 
and its U.S. Signatory, COMSAT, had long been subject under the 1962 Satellite Act.77
In particular, ORBIT promised to lift a longstanding prohibition that had prevented 
INTELSAT from providing domestic communications services (including DBS television 
service and retail Internet access) within the United States.78
On balance, however, the ORBIT Act relied more heavily on sticks than on 
carrots to achieve its ends.  Effective on its date of enactment, ORBIT prohibited any 
U.S.-licensed satellites, in contrast, were recorded as “USA” registrations, and could be used by 
any U.S. licensee designated by the FCC.  Id. See also COMSAT Non-Dominant Order & 
NPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, 14130-31 ¶ 92 (1998) (describing details of FCC’s role in 
registering INTELSAT’s orbital locations with the ITU).
74 ORBIT Act § 621(3)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 763(3)(C).  
75 See ORBIT Act § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 763a (“Technical coordination shall not be used to 
impair competition or competitors, and shall be conducted under International 
Telecommunication Union procedures and not under Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT 
Agreement.”); accord ORBIT § 644, 47 U.S.C. § 765c (“The Commission and United States 
satellite companies shall utilize the International Telecommunication Union procedures for 
technical coordination with INTELSAT and its successor entities and separated entities, rather 
than INTELSAT procedures.”).  Cf. note [27-28], supra (discussing INTELSAT Art. XIV(d) 
consultation process).
76 145 Cong. Rec. S8052 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Burns).
77 ORBIT Act §§ 645(2), (4), 47 U.S.C. §§ 765d(2), (4).  Cf. 146 Cong. Rec. H905 (daily 
ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“This compromise legislation unshackles 
COMSAT from the antiquated regulatory burdens that have to date hampered its success.”).
78 See Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed 
Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United States, 12 
FCC Rcd. 24094, ¶¶ 125-127 (1997) (“DISCO II Order”) (reiterating that INTELSAT satellites 
may not be used to serve U.S. domestic service market unless and until such market entry can be 
shown to promote competition and otherwise serve the public interest), recon. denied, 15 FCC 
Rcd. 7207 (1999), corrected by, 15 FCC Rcd. 5042 (2000).
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further expansion of INTELSAT’s U.S.-international service offerings or facilities until 
all of the Act’s “pro-competitive privatization” criteria had been satisfied.79   In addition, 
ORBIT established dates certain by which INTELSAT was directed to satisfy each of its 
privatization criteria.80  If INTELSAT failed to meet these deadlines, ORBIT threatened 
to cut off the U.S. market for all of INTELSAT’s existing services except for certain 
“core” international public-switched telephone network (PSTN) voice telephony and 
occasional-use television services.81  By enacting these provisions, Congress undoubtedly 
hoped that the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties would keep ORBIT’s “tough 
consequences” in mind as it determined the shape of INTELSAT privatization.82
B. Transfer of INTELSAT’s Assets to a Private U.S.-Licensed Successor 
Entity
On January 18, 2000, two months before ORBIT was enacted, a newly formed 
Delaware corporation wholly owned by INTELSAT’s Signatories applied to the FCC for 
U.S. licenses to operate the 17 existing and 10 planned satellites then owned and operated 
by INTELSAT.83  In its application, the new corporation, “Intelsat L.L.C.,” informed the 
79 ORBIT Act §§ 602, 621(4), 47 U.S.C. §§ 761a, 763(4).
80 See ORBIT Act § 621(1), 47 U.S.C. § 763(1) (setting forth deadlines for satisfying initial 
privatization criteria); see also id. § 621(5)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(A) (setting forth later deadline 
for dilution of Signatory ownership).  Subsequent to ORBIT’s enactment in 2000, Congress 
amended the statute several times to extend the IPO deadline set forth in Section 621(5)(A).  See, 
e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-228, 118 Stat. 644 (2004) (extending IPO deadline from 2004 to 2005); 
Pub. L. No. 107-233, 116 Stat. 1480 (2002) (extending IPO deadline from 2002 to 2004).  In 
October 2004, Congress again amended ORBIT to permit Intelsat Ltd. to dilute its percentage of 
former Signatory ownership through a private stock transfer, rather than a through a public IPO.  
See Pub. L. No. 108-371 § 1(2), 118 Stat. 1752 (2004), codified in pertinent part at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 763(5)(F) (Supp. 2005).
81 ORBIT Act §§ 601(b), 621(1), 681(a)(11), 47 U.S.C. §§ 761(b), 763(1), § 769(a)(11).  
The Act contained an exception that would have allowed INTELSAT to continue existing service 
to United States government agencies who utilized INTELSAT service to protect the health and 
safety of the public.  ORBIT § 601(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 761(b)(1)(C).  Another exception would 
have enabled the FCC, under certain circumstances, to allow INTELSAT to continue existing 
service to U.S. customers who depended on the service and could not obtain comparable service 
elsewhere.  ORBIT § 601(b)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 761(b)(3).
82 See, e.g., 146 Cong. Rec. H906 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Pallone) (“[I]f 
INTELSAT thumbs its nose at the standards set forth in this bill for a pro-competitive 
privatization, its ability to offer services in the United States could be hindered dramatically.  
However, this leverage is necessary to ensure that INTELSAT truly privatizes, and to ensure that 
we finally have a level playing field in the satellite services market.”).
83 See In re Intelsat L.L.C., 15 FCC Rcd. 15460, ¶¶ 1, 8 n.15 (2000) (“Intelsat L.L.C. 
Licensing Order”), recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd. 28234 (2000).  Because INTELSAT was an 
intergovernmental organization (“IGO”), its global satellite system had never before been 
licensed by any national licensing authority.  Id. ¶ 2.
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FCC that INTELSAT hoped presently to transfer its satellites and associated assets to 
Intelsat L.L.C.84  It therefore requested that its new FCC licenses become effective 
immediately upon consummation of the transfer.85
On August 8, 2000, after ORBIT had been enacted, the FCC conditionally granted 
the applications Intelsat L.L.C. had filed on January 18, 2000.86  Under this conditional 
grant, Intelsat L.L.C.’s new FCC licenses were to take effect “upon INTELSAT's transfer 
of the satellites and assets necessary to operate the satellites on the effective date of 
privatization.”87  In its Order, the FCC directed Intelsat L.L.C. “to supplement its 
application following the November 2000 Assembly of Parties decision to provide the 
details of INTELSAT's privatization as reflected in the Assembly decision.”88  The 
following month, the INTELSAT Board of Governors formally recommended that the 
Assembly of Parties accept the FCC licenses and select the United States to receive and 
license INTELSAT's orbital registrations upon privatization.89
On November 13-17, 2000, the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of Parties 
unanimously “confirmed the decision of a 1999 Assembly of Parties that INTELSAT 
should restructure, decided on the terms and conditions that would apply to the 
restructuring, and approved amendments to the INTELSAT Agreement necessary to 
effect the privatization.”90  The Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties set a target date of July 
84 Id.  In connection with the transfer of assets, the application stated that INTELSAT also 
planned to transfer its International Telecommunications Union (ITU) network filings (i.e., orbital 
slot registrations) to the U.S. registry.  See id  at ¶ 38.
85 See id  at ¶ 1, 8 n.15.
86 See id.
87 See id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 38 (“The licenses we grant today will become effective only 
upon privatization when the applicant is no longer owned and controlled by an intergovernmental 
organization.  Operating authority would be conferred upon Intelsat LLC only upon the date on 
which INTELSAT transfers its satellite and associated assets to Intelsat LLC and its ITU network 
filings to the U.S. registry.”).
88 Id. at ¶ 38.
89 In re INTELSAT L.L.C., Second Mem. Op. Order & Authorization, 16 FCC Rcd. 12280, 
¶ 8 (2001).  The Board selected the United Kingdom as a backup jurisdiction for licensing 
INTELSAT's existing and planned satellites operating in the C-band and Ku-band “should the 
terms of the U.S. license approval be adversely affected prior to privatization.”  Id.  The Board 
also selected the United Kingdom as the licensing jurisdiction for future satellites that may be 
constructed for operating in the Ka-band, V-band and BSS band.  Id. ¶ 8 n.22.
90 FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 FCC Rcd. 12810, FCC 01-190 
at 9 (2001).  On June 1, 2001, the United States acceded to the amendments to the INTELSAT 
Agreement approved at the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties, and thereby became a Party to the 
residual IGO, discussed infra, immediately upon privatization of INTELSAT.  See United States 
Department of State, Office of Treaty Affairs, 2001 Treaty Actions Web Site (updated Jan. 8, 
2002), <http://www.state.gov/s/l/5234.htm> (reporting Acceptance of the United States on June 
(continued. . . . .)
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18, 2001 for the transfer of INTELSAT’s satellite assets to its private commercial 
successor entity.91  It also decided that the commercial successor entity would be 
structured as a group of affiliated national subsidiary corporations all owned by “Intelsat 
Ltd.,” a holding company to be organized under the laws of Bermuda.92  Finally, it 
decided that the U.S. FCC licenses authorizing the operation of INTELSAT’s existing 
and planned satellites in the C-band and Ku-band would be held by an Intelsat Ltd. 
subsidiary called “Intelsat L.L.C.,” a Delaware corporation whose operations would be 
based in INTELSAT’s former headquarters building in Washington, DC.93
On July 18, 2001, at 7:59:59 PM EDT, INTELSAT transferred all of its satellite 
assets, and virtually all of its other financial assets and liabilities, into the corporate 
holding company structure approved in November 2000 by the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT 
Assembly of Parties.94   At that moment, the intergovernmental “International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization” was transformed immediately upon transfer 
1, 2001 of Amendments to the Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization “INTELSAT” done at Washington, D.C. on Nov. 13-17, 2000).   
Formally, the amendments to the INTELSAT Agreement approved in November 2000 by 
the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties could not “enter into force” until they were ratified by the 
governments of two-thirds of the INTELSAT’s member countries–or 96 countries–that held at 
least two-thirds of INTELSAT’s total investment shares as of November 2000.  ITSO Press 
Release No. 2004-110, Treaty Amendments Enter Into Force Related to Restructuring of the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Nov. 30, 2004), online at
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=news22999&id=334&lin
k_src=HPL&lang=english>.  It was not until September 1, 2004, however, that the requisite 96th 
INTELSAT member country ratified the amendments, and thereby triggered the revised ITSO 
Agreement to enter into force on November 30, 2004.  Id.  As a practical matter, however, the 
restructuring of INTELSAT approved in November 2000 by the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of 
Parties began long before the treaty revisions were formally entered into force.  See id.
(“Although the restructuring of the Organization took place in July 2001, today’s entry into force 
of the amendments to the Agreement fulfills the final treaty obligations for the restructuring 
process.”) (emphasis added).
91 In re INTELSAT L.L.C., Second Mem. Op. Order & Authorization, 16 FCC Rcd. 12280, 
¶ 8 & nn.23-24 (2001) (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the 
Twenty-Fifth (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-25-3E FINAL, W/11/00 ¶ 34 (Nov. 27, 2000)).
92 Id. at ¶ 9; see also id. Attachment A (graphic displaying holding company structure of 
Intelsat Ltd. and its affiliated national corporations).
93 Id. at ¶ 9.  In contrast, the United Kingdom authorizations for ITU registrations for 
planned future satellites in the Ka-, BSS-, and V-bands were to be held directly by Intelsat Ltd., 
the Bermuda holding company.  Id.
94 FCC Report to Congress as Required by the ORBIT Act, 18 FCC Rcd. 12525, FCC 03-
131, at 3 & 12 (2003).  See also id. at 12-13 (describing this corporate holding structure in detail).  
At the time of transfer, the assets transferred to the new Bermuda holding company, Intelsat Ltd., 
were valued at approximately $3.5 billion dollars.  Intelsat Ltd. Fast Facts (July 2002), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/news/mediakit/downloads/fastfacts.pdf>.
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from “a treaty-based Organization [INTELSAT] that at one time enjoyed a monopoly 
position in providing international satellite services, to a treaty-based Organization 
[ITSO] that ensures international satellite public services [without itself providing any 
such services]. . . .”95  At the same time, pursuant to the FCC’s Intelsat L.L.C. Licensing 
Order issued May 29, 2001,96 the private entity that received INTELSAT’s assets, 
Intelsat Ltd., was immediately transformed from an empty corporate shell into a 
functioning U.S.-licensed telecommunications carrier, subject to the pressures of the 
market and the burdens of national government regulation.
Since it began operating on July 18, 2001, INTELSAT’s private successor entity 
“has competed in the marketplace as a U.S.-licensed space station operator on the same 
footing as its competitors—i.e., free from any privileges and immunities derived from its 
former status as an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO).”97  For several years, 
technical constraints hindered the privatized company from capitalizing on its new legal 
right to offer domestic communications services in the United States.98  In March 2004, 
however, Intelsat Ltd. purchased four operational satellites then in orbit above the North 
American continent, plus the right to launch a new satellite into one additional North 
American orbital location later that year.99  Upon consummation of the transaction, 
95 ITSO “About Us” Web Page, <http://www.itso.int/aboutus.htm>.
96 In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 FCC Rcd. 12280, ¶ 72 (2001).
97 FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, FCC 02-170, at 
10 (2002).
98 As discussed at footnote [80?] and accompanying text, Section 645 of the ORBIT Act, 
47 U.S.C. § 765d, repealed upon privatization a rule that had prohibited INTELSAT satellites 
from being used to provide domestic communications services.   Upon privatization, however, 
INTELSAT was not well-positioned to enter the domestic communications market.  In part, this 
was because INTELSAT’s satellites were located primarily over the oceans, rather than over the 
North American continental land-mass, and were thus not well-positioned to provide purely 
domestic service within the United States.  In addition, INTELSAT’s ability to enter the domestic 
communications services market upon privatization was hindered by its lack of excess 
transponder capacity on its existing satellites.
99 See Intelsat Press Release, Intelsat Completes Acquisition of Loral's North American 
Satellite Assets; FSS Leader Begins Executing Customer Transition and Satellite Integration Plan 
(Mar. 17, 2004), online at
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2004&art=20040317_01_EN.
xml&lang=en&footer=54>.   In this $961.1 million dollar transaction, Intelsat Ltd. acquired, from 
the insolvent French-American satellite operator Loral Space & Communications Corporation,
the U.S.-licensed “Telstar 5, 6, and 7,” satellites, which were then located in geostationary orbit 
above the North American continent at 97º W.L., 93º W.L., and 129º W.L., respectively, and also 
an interest in the Papua New Guinea-licensed “Telstar 13” satellite, co-owned with EchoStar 
Communications Corporation, which had recently been launched into geostationary orbit above 
the North American continent at the 121º W.L.  Id.  In addition, Intelsat Ltd. also acquired Loral’s 
rights to launch the planned future “Telstar 8” satellite into orbit at 89° W.L.  See Loral 
SpaceCom Corp., Debtor-in-Possession, & Intelsat North America L.L.C., 19 FCC Rcd. 2404, 
2405-06 ¶ 4 & n.11 (2004), corrected, DA 04-612, 2004 WL 405787 (Int'l Bur. Mar. 4, 2004).  
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Intelsat Ltd. began using these four satellites to provide domestic video services 
throughout North America.100  Both before and after being transferred to Intelsat Ltd., the 
satellites carried traffic for U.S. broadcasters, cable operators and private data network 
operators such as CBS and Fox Broadcasting,101 as well as providing direct-to-home 
(DTH) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) video services to end users in the United 
States.102
Although the FCC also approved the transfer of Loral’s “Telstar 4” satellite to Intelsat Ltd., id., 
that satellite was never transferred because it failed in orbit before the transfer could be 
consummated.   See Intelsat Press Release, Intelsat Completes Acquisition of Loral's North 
American Satellite Assets; FSS Leader Begins Executing Customer Transition and Satellite 
Integration Plan (Mar. 17, 2004). For background on the Loral/Intelsat Ltd. transaction, see Andy 
Pasztor, Intelsat Trumps Echostar in Bid For Loral Assets, Oct. 21, 2003, WALL ST. J., at A2. 
100 See Intelsat Press Release, Intelsat Completes Acquisition of Loral's North American 
Satellite Assets; FSS Leader Begins Executing Customer Transition and Satellite Integration Plan 
(Mar. 17, 2004).  See also Intelsat Press Release, Intelsat Launches Fiber-Based, Digital Video 
Delivery Network, Enabled by Level 3, at NAB 2004 (April 19, 2004) (announcing commercial 
launch of Intelsat’s North American video fiber network, designed to support digital video 
transmissions for broadcast news and sports distribution, including distribution of NBA 
basketball broadcast programming for viewing within North America), online at
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2004&art=20040419_01_EN.
xml&lang=en&footer=55>.
101 Intelsat Signs Agreement to Purchase Loral's North American Satellite Services Assets, 
CAMBRIDGE TELECOM REPORT, July 21, 2003, 2003 WL 7364453.  See also Andy Pasztor, Anne 
Marie Squeo & J. Lynn Lunsford, Satellite Ills Ground Industry Leaders: Loral Files for Chapter 
11, Sets Asset Sale to Intelsat, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2003, at A3  (“After years of unsuccessful 
efforts to get into the U.S. market, Washington-based Intelsat is poised to enter the still-lucrative 
segment for video services in North America.  Buying Loral's U.S. orbital slots, still subject to 
regulatory approval and potential bids from others, amounts to a ‘once in a lifetime opportunity,’ 
according to Intelsat's Chief Executive Conny Kullman.”). 
102 In the same Order in which it otherwise approved the transaction, the FCC initially 
ordered Intelsat Ltd. to terminate provision of direct-to-home (DTH) and direct broadcast satellite 
(DBS) video services within 180 days after acquiring the Loral satellites.  In re Loral Satellite, 
Inc., Assignors, & Intelsat North America, LLC, Assignee, 19 FCC Rcd 2404, 2429 ¶ 65 (Int’l 
Bur. 2004), corrected, 19 FCC Rcd. 4029 (Int'l Bur. 2004), recon denied, 19 FCC Rcd. 7014 (Int'l 
Bur. 2004).  The FCC’s order was predicated on a provision of the ORBIT Act that prohibits 
Intelsat Ltd. from providing any “additional services” before diluting the ownership of 
INTELSAT’s former Signatories.  See ORBIT Act §§ 602(a), 621(4), codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 761a(a), 763(4); see also ORBIT Act § 681(a)(12)(B), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 769(a)(12)(B) 
(defining “additional services” for INTELSAT to mean “direct-to-home (DTH) or direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS) video services, or services in the Ka or V bands”).  Subsequently, the 
FCC extended this deadline an additional 180 days, until March 14, 2005.  See In re Intelsat 
North America, L.L.C., 19 FCC Rcd. 14807, ¶ 6 (Int'l Bur. 2004). Finally, after Intelsat Ltd. 
complied with ORBIT’s final ownership dilution benchmark on January 28, 2005, the FCC 
authorized Intelsat Ltd. to continue providing “additional services” indefinitely.
24
While beginning to function as an ordinary satellite carrier, Intelsat Ltd. also 
began working to comply with the ORBIT Act’s mandate that Intelsat Ltd. dilute the 
share of its ownership held by INTELSAT’s former Signatories. 103  After several false 
starts,104 on August 16, 2004, Intelsat Ltd. announced that it had entered into an 
agreement to sell all of its assets to an international consortium of private investors.105
This announcement appeared to be at odds with the ORBIT Act’s mandate directing 
Intelsat Ltd. to dilute its ownership through an IPO.106  On October 25, 2004, however, 
Congress amended ORBIT to permit Intelsat Ltd. to “forgo an initial public offering and 
public securities listing” if the company was able to “achieve[] substantial dilution of the 
aggregate amount of signatory or former signatory financial interest” through other 
means, such as a private equity transfer.107  Accordingly, on December 22, 2004, the FCC 
tentatively approved the private international investment consortium’s proposed 
acquisition of Intelsat Ltd.108  On January 28, 2005, Intelsat Ltd. announced that it had 
103 See ORBIT Act § 621(5)(A)(i), 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(A)(i) (as amended in 2004) 
(mandating substantial dilution of former Signatories’ ownership interest in Intelsat Ltd. by end 
of 2005).  See also note [80], supra (discussing past extensions of ownership dilution deadline).
104 See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, Intelsat Plans to Hold Long-Delayed Stock Sale before July, 
WASH POST, Feb. 5, 2004, at E5 (discussing past plans for earlier Intelsat Ltd. IPO that had been 
abandoned, and reporting Intelsat Ltd.’s announcement of plans for a new IPO, which never 
subsequently occurred).
105 Intelsat Press Release, Intelsat to be Acquired by Consortium of Private Investors (Aug. 
16, 2004), online at 
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2004&art=20040816_01_EN.
xml>.; see also Ellen Sheng, Intelsat Strikes Deal to Be Bought By 4 Private Funds For $3 
Billion, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 2004, at A12.  On October 10, 2004, the proposed transaction was 
approved by a 99% majority of Intelsat’s shareholders, most of whom at that time remained 
former INTELSAT Signatories.  Intelsat Press Release, Intelsat Shareholders Approve Proposed 
Acquisition by Zeus Holdings (Oct. 10, 2004), online at
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2004&art=20041010_01_EN.
xml>.
106 As enacted in 2000, ORBIT provided that an initial public offering (IPO) of stock was the 
sole permissible means by which Intelsat Ltd. could achieve its required dilution of Signatory 
ownership.  See ORBIT Act § 621(5)(A)(i), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(A)(i) (2000) 
(amended in 2004).
107 Pub. L. No. 108-371 § 1(2), 118 Stat. 1752 (2004), codified at ORBIT Act § 621(5)(F)), 
47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(F) (Supp. 2005).
108 In re Intelsat, Ltd., Transferor, & Zeus Holdings Ltd., Transferee, DA 04-4034, IB 
Docket No. 04-366, 2004 WL 2973804, at ¶ 49 (FCC Int'l Bur. Dec. 22, 2004) (approving the 
transfer “subject to a future Commission decision that the transaction is consistent with the 
requirements of the ORBIT Act, as amended.”); accord id. ¶ 47 (FCC approval of transaction is 
“conditioned on a future Commission finding that Intelsat has fully complied with the 
privatization requirements under section 621 of the ORBIT Act, as amended, by either 
conducting an initial public offering in accordance with sections 621(2) and 621(5)(A)(i) of the 
ORBIT Act, as amended, or making a certification to the Commission pursuant to section 
621(5)(F) of the ORBIT Act, as amended, and that the Commission has determined, after notice 
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sold all its assets to private investors for $5 billion,109 thereby satisfying the ORBIT Act’s 
final ownership dilution benchmark.110  Even subsequent to this acquisition, however, 
ORBIT continues to regulate Intelsat Ltd.’s ownership structure by prohibiting 
INTELSAT’s former Signatories, individually or collectively, from reacquiring a 
controlling interest in Intelsat Ltd.111
C. Establishment of Residual Treaty Organization ITSO
For different reasons, both INTELSAT and the operators of separate satellite 
systems championed INTELSAT privatization.112  To the extent that INTELSAT 
privatization was expected to foster competition, it was also expected to yield benefits to 
the international telecommunications carriers that had been INTELSAT’s principal 
customers, and, ultimately, to U.S. consumers who used international 
telecommunications services.113  Once INTELSAT privatization came to be seen as 
and comment, that Intelsat is in compliance with the certification requirements of section 
621(5)(F) of the ORBIT Act, as amended”).
109 See Intelsat Sale Completed, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2005, at E2; Intelsat Press Rel. No. 
2005-03, Intelsat Announces Completion of Acquisition by Zeus Holdings Ltd. (Jan. 28, 2005),   
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2005&art=20050128_01_EN.
xml&lang=en&footer=87>.  To acquire Intelsat Ltd., the buyers paid $3 billion in cash and 
assumed $2 billion in debt.  Id.  Much of the debt assumed by Intelsat Ltd.’s buyers appears to 
have been incurred just a few days before the acquisition.   See Satellite, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 26, 
2005, 2005 WL 62275807 (reporting that "Intelsat sold $2.55 billion of notes in 3 parts late Mon. 
[Jan. 24, 2005.]  . . .  [T]he company sold $1 billion of 7-year floating-rate notes to yield 487.5 
basis points over the 6-month London interbank offered rate, $875 million of 8-year notes 
yielding 8.25% and $675 million of 10-year notes yielding 8.625%.”).
110 See ORBIT Act §§ 621(5)(A)(i), 621(5)(F) (as amended in 2004), codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 763(5)(A)(i), 763(5)(F) (Supp. 2005).
111 ORBIT Act §§ 621(5)(C), 621(5)(F)(i)(II), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(C),
763(5)(F)(i)(II) (Supp. 2005).  In addition to promoting competition in the U.S. market for 
satellite communications services, ORBIT’s prohibition against Signatory reacquisition of 
ownership in Intelsat Ltd. also appears to advance U.S. geopolitical objectives.  Cf. UNITED 
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS: COMMON PROBLEMS 
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SATELLITE AND RELATED ACQUISITIONS, GAO Rep. No. GAO-03-
825R, at 22 (June 2, 2003), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03825r.pdf> (noting that in 2002 
and 2003, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials raised “pointed objections . . . to the 
DOD’s use of commercial satellite systems such as INTELSAT and INMARSAT because they 
were ‘part owned’ by countries such as Iraq and Iran.”). 
112 See Part II.A, supra (discussing considerations of INTELSAT’s competitors); Part II.B, 
supra (discussing considerations of INTELSAT itself).
113 See House of Representatives Report on the Communications Satellite Competition and 
Privatization Act of 1998, H. Rep. No. 105-494, at 12 (1998) (asserting that INTELSAT 
privatization “would bring consumers lower prices, higher service quality, improved efficiency, 
innovative new products, and more choice.”).
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beneficial to INTELSAT, to U.S. business, and to U.S. consumers, its implementation 
was assured.114
Less clear, however, was whether INTELSAT privatization would benefit users in 
developing nations that relied heavily on INTELSAT to stay connected to the world.  By 
and large, proponents and representatives of “lifeline” countries were wary of relying on 
free markets alone to satisfy those countries’ international telecommunications needs.115
Many disbelieved “that the private operator model [could] generate the same positive 
network externalities and global connectivity as are achieved through the cooperative 
[IGO] model.”116
In consideration of such concerns, the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of 
Parties, in November 2000, reaffirmed the Twenty-Fourth Assembly’s decision to leave 
in place, upon privatization, a small residual intergovernmental organization (IGO) to 
monitor performance of the new private company’s public service obligations.117  The 
Assembly decided that the residual IGO would retain INTELSAT’s full name 
“International Telecommunications Satellite Organization,” but now be known by a new 
114 See Rob Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering A Golden Goose?, 
36 Va. J. Int’l L. 1001, 1003 (1996) (“analysis by the U.S. government of satellite carrier 
privatization appears to have proceeded according to a simple political calculus.  Because both 
[INTELSAT and its competitors] desire a change in the status quo, U.S. officials have considered 
it reasonable to make some kind of change ostensibly promoting competition and private 
enterprise.”); accord id. at 1015 (“the cachet of privatization, combined with support for 
privatization from most constituencies, including the U.S. government . . . make some sort of 
INTELSAT privatization inevitable.”).
115 See, e.g., Changes in International Satellite Policy, Testimony of Lockheed Martin Global 
Telecommunications CEO John Sponyoe Before the Subcomm. on Communications, Senate 
Commerce Comm. (Mar. 25, 1999), 1999 WL 194674 (acknowledging “the concerns of 
developing countries that do not view their small telecom service requirements nor those of their 
consumers as being of any great commercial interest to INTELSAT's commercial competitors.  
INTELSAT’s treaty commitment to serving all countries, rich and poor alike, providing universal 
access under a regime of non-discriminatory pricing—for both lucrative and uneconomical 
routes—has led many of INTELSAT's less developed member countries to rely on INTELSAT as 
not only a carrier of last resort but as their only link to the world.”); accord Statement of Sen. 
John D. Rockefeller IV at same Hearing (Mar. 25, 1999), 1999 WL 170199 (“INTELSAT has a 
history of serving all parts of the world at reasonable prices.  We have an interest in making sure 
that developing nations are part of the global information infrastructure.”).
116 Rob Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering A Golden Goose?, 36 
Va. J. Int’l L. 1001, 1002 (1996); see also id. at 1002-03 (“The fact that both [IGO] cooperatives 
and their commercial competitors agree, for different reasons, that the cooperatives should be 
privatized suggests that more is at stake than simply fostering ‘a level competitive playing 
field.’”).
117 In re Intelsat L.L.C., 16 FCC Rcd. 12280, ¶ 10 (2001).  See also Agreement Related To 
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, done Nov. 17, 2000, 
<http://www.itso.int/agreement.htm>  (“ITSO Agreement”).
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acronym, “ITSO.”118  This residual IGO was envisioned as “the continuation of [the 
INTELSAT] intergovernmental organization and . . . the guarantor of ‘permanent 
connectivity’ of the world through satellite technology.”119  Through the residual IGO, 
“lifeline” countries would retain legal and political—rather than merely economic—
means of protecting their access to the satellite system formerly operated by INTELSAT.  
Post-privatization, the residual IGO’s actions would “continue to be framed by 
Resolution 1721 of the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as the principles 
embodied in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space.”120
To these ends, the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of Parties amended the 
INTELSAT Agreement (now the “ITSO Agreement”) to establish the structure and 
responsibilities that would define the residual IGO “ITSO.”  Post-privatization, ITSO 
would retain an Assembly of Parties and an executive organ, headed by the Director 
General, responsible to the Assembly of Parties.121  Because ITSO was to have no 
operational or commercial role in the privatized commercial entity Intelsat Ltd,122
however, the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties amended the INTELSAT Agreement to 
eliminate both the Meeting of Signatories and the Board of Governors that had previously 
overseen INTELSAT’s commercial operations.123
118 FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 FCC Rcd. 12810, FCC 01-190 
at 10 (June 15, 2001); accord In re INTELSAT L.L.C., Second Mem. Op. Order & Authorization, 
16 FCC Rcd. 12280, ¶ 10 (2001).
119 Presentation by ITSO Director General Ahmed Toumi Before The European Institute 
Roundtable on Telecommunications, E-Commerce & Audiovisual Policies (Feb. 25, 2004), 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=dir_general99&id=323&
link_src=HPL&lang=english>.
120 Id.; see also note [3] and accompanying text, supra (setting forth text of UN General 
Assembly Res. 1721).
121 See ITSO Agreement, Art. VIII, done Nov. 17, 2000.  In addition, the Twenty-Fifth 
Assembly created a new, quasi-judicial branch of the residual IGO: an eleven-member “Panel of 
Legal Experts,” elected by the ITSO Assembly of Parties, to resolve disputes in connection with 
the treaty Agreement between two or more current or former Parties, or between ITSO and one or 
more current or former Parties.  See id. Arts. IX(d)(xiv), XVI, Annex A, Art.3.
122 FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, FCC 02-170, at 
8 (2002).
123 See ITSO Agreement, Art. VIII, done Nov. 17, 2000.  Upon privatization, INTELSAT’s 
Signatories were divested of their special legal status and transformed into ordinary shareholders 
in the new private corporation.  For this reason, in addition to deleting all reference to 
“Signatories” or “Governors” from the amended INTELSAT Agreement (i.e. the ITSO 
Agreement), the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties also approved the decision of the Thirty-first 
Meeting of Signatories (Nov. 9-10, 2000) to terminate the INTELSAT Operating Agreement, 23 
U.S.T. 4091, done Aug. 20, 1971, which had governed commercial relations between the 
Signatories.  See Amendment To The Operating Agreement, Attachment No. 2 to AP-25-3E 
FINAL W/11/00 (Nov. 27, 2000) (amending Art. 23(c) of the INTELSAT Operating Agreement 
(continued. . . . .)
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As its primary responsibility, ITSO was charged with safeguarding three “core 
principles” concerning the ongoing operation of the privatized satellite system.124  First, 
ITSO must protect the “global connectivity and global coverage” of the system.125  This 
duty requires ITSO to ensure that, post-privatization, the satellite system always 
maintains the technical capability to carry communications to and from virtually every 
populated land mass on earth.126
Second, ITSO must safeguard “non-discriminatory access to the [privatized] 
Company’s system.”127  This duty requires ITSO to ensure that all users and prospective 
users enjoy “fair and equal opportunity to access the [privatized] Company’s system,”128
both for existing services and for “future public telecommunications services offered by 
the Company when space segment capacity is available on a commercial basis.”129  With 
respect to this duty, ITSO’s Public Service Agreement with Intelsat L.L.C. emphasizes 
that “the provision of international public telecommunications services on a commercial 
basis, in a manner consistent with the Public Service Obligations, is not met if any 
country or territory which seeks or permits the services provided by the Intelsat system is 
to provide for automatic termination of entire INTELSAT Operating Agreement “when 
amendments to the [INTELSAT] Agreement deleting references to the Operating Agreement 
enter into force. . . .,” i.e., upon privatization of INTELSAT’s satellite system).  On June 1, 2001, 
the United States approved the termination of the INTELSAT Operating Agreement.  See United 
States Department of State, 2001 Treaty Actions Web Page (updated Jan. 8, 2002) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/5234.htm>.
124 FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 FCC Rcd. 12810, FCC 01-190, 
at 10 & n.42 (2001) (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the Twenty-
Fifth (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 ¶ 34, at 6-8 (Nov. 27, 2000).  See also
ITSO Agreement, Arts. III(b), IX(c), done Nov. 17, 2000 (setting forth these “core principles”).
125 See ITSO Agreement, Arts. III(b)(i), IX(c)(i), done Nov. 17, 2000.
126 See ITSO Agreement, Art. I(n), done Nov. 17, 2000 (“‘Global connectivity’ means the 
interconnection capabilities available to the Company’s customers through the global coverage 
the Company provides in order to make communication possible within and between the five 
International Telecommunication Union regions defined by the plenipotentiary conference of the 
ITU, held in Montreux in 1965.”); id. Art. I(m) (“‘Global coverage’ means the maximum 
geographic coverage of the earth towards the northernmost and southernmost parallels visible 
from satellites deployed in geostationary orbital locations.”).  See also ITSO Public Services 
Agreement, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 3, Art. 2, § 2.01(i) (Nov. 27, 2000) 
(obligating Intelsat L.L.C. to “provid[e] the capability for any country or territory to connect with 
any other country or territory through the provision of  capacity from at least one satellite in each 
of the three ocean regions:  the Atlantic Ocean region (304.5 to 359 deg. E), the Indian Ocean 
region (60 to 66 deg. E), and the Pacific Ocean region (174 to 180 deg. E) such that these 
satellites together provide global coverage to all ITU regions.”).
127 See ITSO Agreement, Arts. III(b)(iii), IX(c)(iii), done Nov. 17, 2000.
128 See id. Art. I(o).
129 See id. Art. V.
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denied full and complete access to all services provided by the Intelsat system on any 
ground other than a commercial basis.”130
Finally, ITSO has a duty to ensure that the privatized Intelsat L.L.C. “serve[s] its 
lifeline connectivity customers.”131  Although the revised ITSO Agreement does not 
define the term “lifeline connectivity customers,” the Twenty Fifth INTELSAT 
Assembly of Parties resolved that “Lifeline Connectivity Obligation” (LCO) protection 
must be extended to any country that satisfies at least one of five alternative eligibility 
criteria.132
First, under the “Income/Teledensity Eligibility” criterion, a country that is a 
Party to ITSO qualifies for LCO protection if it either (i) is “low income” as defined by 
the World Bank,133 or (ii) possesses a teledensity of less than three as defined by the 
130 ITSO Public Services Agreement, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 3, Art. 2, 
§ 2.01 (Nov. 27, 2000).
131 See ITSO Agreement, Arts. III(b)(ii), IX(c)(ii), done Nov. 17, 2000.
132 Model LCO Contract (Terms and Conditions of the Lifeline Connectivity Obligation), 
AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 4, at 2-3 (Nov. 27, 2000).  Although there are five 
distinct bases, discussed infra, by which a country may qualify for LCO Protection, Intelsat 
L.L.C.’s “lifeline connectivity customers” have often been collectively described as “those 
customers in poor or underserved countries that have a high degree of dependence on 
INTELSAT.”  FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, FCC 02-
170, at 8 & n.40 (2002) (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the 
Twenty-Fifth (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 ¶ 34, at 6-8 (Nov. 27, 2000)).
133 Model LCO Contract (Terms and Conditions of the Lifeline Connectivity Obligation), 
AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 4, at 2 ¶ 3(a) (Nov. 27, 2000).  In 2000, the World 
Bank defined a country as “low income” if its Gross National Income Per Capita was less than 
$755.  AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 5 (Nov. 27, 2000).   Gross National Income 
Per Capita is defined as “gross national income (formerly called gross national product or GNP) 
divided by midyear population.”  Id. at 237.  GNI per capita is measured in current US dollars.  
Id.  In 2000, nearly 2.5 billion of the world’s 6.1 billion people lived in countries characterized by 
the World Bank as “low income.”  Id. at 8, 16.
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ITU.134  In November 2000, the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties identified 69 member 
nations that qualified for LCO Protection based on “Income/Teledensity Eligibility.”135
Second, until August 1, 2000, INTELSAT member countries that did not qualify 
for “Income/Teledensity Eligibility” were permitted to petition the Assembly of Parties 
for LCO Protection “on the basis that there [was] no cost effective alternative provider of 
a service equivalent to the service” then being provided by INTELSAT.136  Those 
countries whose petitions were granted became eligible for LCO Protection under the 
“Petition Eligibility” criterion.137  In November 2000, the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of 
Parties identified 27 countries or locations that qualified as “Petition Eligible” for LCO 
Protection for all of their international traffic, plus 14 additional countries or locations 
that qualified as “Petition Eligible” for LCO Protection for certain international links.138
Third, a country not otherwise eligible for LCO protection can qualify for limited 
“Correspondent Eligibility” to obtain LCO service for communications to or from a 
country that is a lifeline customer.139  Fourth, a country that has temporarily lost 
connectivity through every international channel except for the Intelsat system due to an 
emergency (e.g., earthquake, war, etc.) may obtain temporary LCO protection under the 
134 Model LCO Contract (Terms and Conditions of the Lifeline Connectivity Obligation), 
AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 4, at 2 ¶ 3(a) (Nov. 27, 2000).  “Teledensity” 
measures the number of telephone access lines per one hundred inhabitants.  International 
Settlement Rates, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806, ¶ 164 (1997), aff'd, Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 
F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  The ITU has noted that “a level of teledensity less than one is 
generally a strong indication that a country's telecommunications infrastructure is severely 
underdeveloped.” Id. ¶ 164 & n. 295 (citing ITU, Telecommunications Indicators for the Least 
Developed Countries, at 4 (1st ed. 1995)).  In 2002, ITU figures showed that “83 countries have a 
teledensity of less than 10% [and] 29  countries have a teledensity of less than 1%.”  Opening 
Address of Director General Ahmed Toumi Before the 27th ITSO Assembly of Parties (June 26, 
2002), <http://www.itso.int/meetings.htm>.
135 See AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 5, at 1-3 (Nov. 27, 2000) (setting forth 
complete list).   
136 Model LCO Contract (Terms and Conditions of the Lifeline Connectivity Obligation), 
AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 4, at 2 ¶ 3(b) (Nov. 27, 2000).
137 Id.
138 See AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 6, at 1-2 (Nov. 27, 2000) (setting forth 
complete lists).
139 Model LCO Contract (Terms and Conditions of the Lifeline Connectivity Obligation), 
AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 4, at 3 ¶ 3(c) (Nov. 27, 2000) (“Contract is eligible 
for LCO Protection if . . . [t]he Contract(s) are not eligible under (a) or (b), above, but, pursuant 
to an approved service order or lease service transmission plan for the Contract(s), as of the 
Closing Date, Customer is a correspondent to one or more other customer(s) that are eligible 
under (a) or (b) for LCO Protection which other customer(s) has signed an LCO Contract, with 
respect to that service.”).
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“Emergency Eligibility” criterion.140  Fifth, a new country created after July 18, 2001 is 
eligible to join ITSO and obtain LCO protection under the “New Country Eligibility” 
criterion if the new country also satisfies the “Income/Teledensity Eligibility” 
criterion.141
ITSO’s primary means of ensuring that the satellite system continues to abide by 
these “core principles” is through enforcement of a contractual “Public Services 
Agreement” that ITSO has executed with Intelsat Ltd.142  Under this “Public Services 
Agreement,” Intelsat Ltd. is contractually bound to adhere to ITSO’s “core principles,” 
and, specifically, to enter into individual “LCO Commitments” with every “lifeline” 
country or territory that qualifies for LCO protection under any of the five eligibility 
criteria.  Although individual terms can vary, generally these LCO Commitments obligate 
Intelsat Ltd. to continue to serve “lifeline” users at fixed pre-privatization costs, at least 
until 2013.143  The lifeline users, in turn, need only commit to purchase capacity on a 
year-to-year basis.144  After twelve years, ITSO’s financing will expire, and the Parties 
will need to decide whether or to retire or to retain it.145
In addition to monitoring Intelsat Ltd.’s performance of its public service 
obligations, ITSO may also pursue its public service mission by “promoting the 
development of telecommunications services and competition as an important means of 
securing international public telecommunications services to all countries in the long 
term.”146  In this regard, ITSO hopes to play “an important role in encouraging the 
creation of a favorable environment for commercial satellite communications, . . . both 
the individual State level, [and] at the multilateral level at the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other 
multilateral fora.”147  Within these multilateral organizations, ITSO “will promote 
140 Id.  The term of LCO Protection under the “Emergency Eligibility” criterion is not 
normally permitted to exceed six months.  Id.
141 Id.  In addition, the “New Country Eligibility” criterion for LCO Protection also applies 
to a new country located in the geographic territory of a former country that had previously 
qualified for “Petition Eligibility.”  Id.
142 FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 FCC Rcd. 12810, FCC 01-190, 
at 10 & n.42 (2001) (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the Twenty-
Fifth (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 ¶ 34, at 6-8 (Nov. 27, 2000).  See also
ITSO Agreement, Art. III(b), done Nov. 17, 2000 (setting forth these “core principles”).
143 FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, FCC 02-170, at 
8 (2002).
144 Id.
145 See ITSO Agreement, Arts. VII, XXI, done Nov. 17, 2000.  See also Subpart IV.A.4, 
infra (discussing procedures for renewing or retiring ITSO after 12 years).
146 ITSO Mission & Role Web Page, <http://www.itso.int/mission.htm>.
147 Id.
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equitable access to orbital / spectrum resources, notably for commercial satellite systems 
committing to international public service.”148
As it begins to define its mission, ITSO necessarily must “define the scope and 
the attributes of public service” that it will devote its efforts to safeguarding.149
Addressing the Twenty-Seventh Assembly of Parties in 2002, ITSO’s new Director 
General sought to establish a broad definition, stating:
The concept of public service adopted in this process differs from 
that of Universal Service commonly defined in national 
regulations. And this distinction is sizeable. . . . [W]here [universal 
service] fills a social function (minimum telephony service, 
sometimes limited to receive only or emergency calls), public 
service has an economic purpose.  . . .  [T]he public service 
definition in the ITSO treaty . . . encompasses delivery of voice, 
data, image and multimedia services to all countries of the world, 
under conditions assuring universality, equality, quality and 
reliability, continuity and, lastly, adaptability.150
  In support of this mission, ITSO’s 27th  Assembly of Parties in June 2002 set 
four overriding goals and objectives for the Organization to pursue from 2002 to 2007:  
(1) maintaining the continuity of the provision of “international public 
telecommunications services”; (2) contributing to the promotion of a global “information 
148 Id.  For examples of ITSO’s promotional activity, see, e.g., INTELSAT Assembly of 
Parties, Record of Decisions of the Twenty-Sixth (Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-26-3E FINAL 
W/4/01, at 5-6 ¶ 13(b) (May 1, 2001) (establishing a “Frequency Working Party (FWP)” to 
develop ITSO positions on “equitable procedures for the management of the radio frequency 
spectrum and orbital locations” to recommend to the ITU); ITSO Press Release No. 2005-2, 
Satellite Industry Takes another Step to Shape Future of Satellite Broadband (Jan. 18, 2005) 
(describing ITSO's Global Broadband Satellite Infrastructure Initiative, designed to provide 
affordable high-speed Internet access to users in remote and underserved areas by creating a 
harmonized technical and regulatory environment that promotes the emergence of a mass market 
for satellite broadband services).
149 Opening Address of Director General Ahmed Toumi Before the 27th ITSO Assembly of 
Parties (June 26, 2002), <http://www.itso.int/htmldocs/speech_AP27_ENGLISH.htm>.
150 Id.; accord ITSO Agreement Art. I(f) (defining the “public telecommunications services” 
safeguarded by ITSO to include “fixed or mobile telecommunications services which can be 
provided by satellite and which are available for use by the public, such as telephony, telegraphy, 
telex, facsimile, data transmission, transmission of radio and television programs between 
approved earth stations having access to the Company’s space segment for further transmission to 
the public, and leased circuits for any of these purposes; but excluding [most] mobile 
services. . . .”).  See also ITSO Global Broadband Satellite Infrastructure Initiative (Dec. 17, 
2002), <http://www.itso.int/htmldocs/BroadbandInitiative-FINAL-english-17Dec02.htm> (“It is 
now universally accepted that [information and communication technology] services are the 
engines for economic and social development.”).
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and communications infrastructure”; (3) improving affordability of satellite services 
“through the promotion of open standards”; and (4) serving as an information resource 
for gathering “and disseminating data about national market and policy environments.”151
Facilitating deployment of the magnitude of telecommunications infrastructure 
that can lead underdeveloped nations to integrate economically with the wider world is a 
lofty and worthwhile goal for ITSO to pursue.  Moreover, ITSO is well-situated to 
catalyze such deployment.  Still unclear, however, is whether ITSO will be fully effective 
in fulfilling its primary mission to safeguard the universal global connectivity of the 
world’s telecommunications systems against political and economic threats that might 
possibly arise.  
IV. Does INTELSAT’s Privatization Threaten Global Universal Service?
During the debate over INTELSAT privatization, some commentators questioned 
whether ITSO, a residual “treaty-based Organization that ensures international satellite 
public services”152 without itself providing any such services, could be as effective at 
promoting and protecting its evolving “public service” mission as was its predecessor 
INTELSAT, “a treaty-based Organization that at one time enjoyed a monopoly position 
in providing international satellite services.”153  To answer this question, both economic 
and political consequences of INTELSAT privatization must be assessed.  Subpart IV.A 
addresses whether an economically viable framework in which satellite communications 
connectivity will continue to be provided to every populated location on earth at 
reasonable and affordable rates remains in place after the privatization of INTELSAT.  
Subpart IV.B then addresses whether the privatization of INTELSAT has left in place a 
legal framework in which global connectivity is now dangerously subject to disruption by 
the unilateral action of the United States government. 
151 ITSO, CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: 1964-2004, at 6-7 (2004), online at
<http://www.itso.int/brochureDocs/english_web_ok.pdf>.
152 ITSO “About Us” Web Page, <http://www.itso.int/htmldocs/aboutus.htm>.
153 Id.  For articles questioning whether ITSO can be as effective as INTELSAT at 
protecting the interests of underserved nations, see, e.g., Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and 
Efficiency Issues In The Management of Shared Global Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. 
Penn. J. Int’l Econ. L. 289, 299 (2003); Ram S Jakhu, Safeguarding the Concept of Public Service 
and the Global Public Interest in Telecommunications, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 71 (2001); 
Patricia M Sterns, Safeguarding the Concept of Public Service in View of Increasing 
Commercialisation and Privatisation of Space Activities, with Particular Attention to the Global 
Public Interest & the Needs of Developing Countries, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 133 (2001); 
Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 28 J. Space L. 101 (2000); Francis Lyall, 
Expanding Global Communications Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON SPACE 
LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE III TECHNICAL FORUM 63 (2000); Rob 
Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering A Golden Goose?, 36 Va. J. Int'l L. 
1001, 1004 (1996); Rob Frieden, Should Intelsat and INMARSAT Privatize?, 18 
Telecommunications Pol’y 679 (1994).
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A. Economic Threats To ITSO’s “Public Service” Mission.
One widespread concern about INTELSAT privatization is that, notwithstanding 
ITSO’s best efforts to enforce its Public Service Agreement with the privatized Intelsat 
Ltd.,154 some “lifeline” countries will nonetheless be unable to afford to purchase needed 
communications services from Intelsat Ltd. or from other market participants.  As one 
leading commentator has stated:
The original conception when space services were contemplated by 
the United Nations was of telecommunications as a public service.  
This is not the same as a service to the public.  While it is equitable 
that payment is made for use of both a public service, and a service 
to the public, a public service should be provided and maintained 
even if it is not itself profitmaking.  A ‘service to the public’ will 
usually be provided only if there is a reasonable prospect of profit.  
Profits will normally be maximized.155
While such concerns are not without force, it must be remembered that even prior 
to privatization, the INTELSAT treaty organization did not—and could not—provide 
service to users who did not pay for the service.156  Moreover, although profitmaking was 
never the primary goal of the INTELSAT treaty organization,157 the organization always 
154 See notes [142-43] and accompanying text, supra (describing contents of Public Service 
Agreement).
155 Francis Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE III TECHNICAL FORUM
63, 65 (2000).
156 See INTELSAT Agreement Art. III(a) (“INTELSAT shall have as its prime objective the 
provision, on a commercial basis, of the space segment required for international public 
telecommunications services of high quality and reliability to be available on a non-
discriminatory basis to all areas of the world.”) (emphasis added); Id. Art. V(d) (“All users of the 
INTELSAT space segment shall pay utilization charges determined in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement and the Operating Agreement.”) (emphasis added).  Cf. Francis 
Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 124 (2001) 
(acknowledging that the INTELSAT treaty organization did take sanctions against users for non-
payment of bills, but characterizing such sanctions as a “hiccup” in INTELSAT’s public service 
obligation that was “unwillingly applied by the Organisation”).
157 See Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and Efficiency Issues In The Management of Shared 
Global Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. Penn. J. Int’l Econ. L. 289, 299 (2003) 
(INTELSAT's charter “emphasized the promotion of world peace and understanding through 
widespread access and use of satellites.  [INTELSAT and other intergovernmental satellite] 
cooperatives operated as businesses, but had missions that emphasized access and service instead 
of profit maximization.”).
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was required to collect utilization charges that were at least sufficient to cover its costs.158
Thus, although INTELSAT from its outset perhaps failed fully to implement the United 
Nations’ original conception of space telecommunications services as a “public service,” 
rather than a “service to the public,” its recent privatization is not the original source of 
this failure.
Nonetheless, privatization has changed the economics of the satellite system’s 
operation in certain significant respects.  While the INTELSAT treaty formerly required 
uniform rates to be offered to all countries for all services,159 the privatized Intelsat Ltd. 
now generally is permitted to set rates that reflect market conditions and market 
competition.  Moreover, as a profit-driven commercial entity, the privatized Intelsat Ltd. 
now has incentive to charge rates that will maximize its profits.  On monopoly routes, of 
course, maximizing profits would entail charging monopoly rents.  For this reason, 
virtually all participants in the privatization process acknowledged the need to explicitly 
guarantee that those nations not served by any satellite systems other than INTELSAT 
would not face increases in their cost of obtaining service.160
Accordingly, as discussed above, qualified “lifeline” countries were granted rights 
to enter into Lifeline Connectivity Obligation (LCO) Commitments with ITSO and 
Intelsat Ltd.161  These LCO Commitments guarantee that Intelsat Ltd. may not raise the 
rates it charges to “lifeline” users above pre-privatization levels until 2013.162  In theory, 
this disposition renders INTELSAT’s privatization Pareto-optimal by yielding the 
158 See INTELSAT Operating Agreement Art. 8(a) (“INTELSAT space segment utilization 
charges . . . shall have the objective of covering the operating, maintenance and administrative 
costs of INTELSAT, the provision of such operating funds as the Board of Governors may 
determine to be necessary, the amortization of investment made by Signatories in INTELSAT and 
compensation for use of the capital of Signatories.”).
159 See INTELSAT Agreement Art. V(d) (“The rates of space segment utilization charge for 
each type of utilization shall be the same for all applicants for space segment capacity for that 
type of utilization.”).
160 See, e.g., See New Zealand House of Representatives, Report on International Treaty 
Examination of the Amendments to the Agreement Relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, at 5 ¶ 11 (Dec. 14, 2001) (“The restructuring is 
unlikely to disadvantage New Zealand but raises issues for lifeline users (such as several Pacific 
Island states with no other international telecommunications circuit available other than 
INTELSAT) who rely on INTELSAT for all their international telecommunications needs.  To 
overcome this possible threat, the interests of lifeline users are to be guaranteed by the 
implementation of the ‘Lifeline Connectivity Obligation’ by the new company, with oversight 
from the new intergovernmental organisation, the ITSO.”), 
<www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/content/578/fdintelsat.pdf>.
161 See notes [131-141], supra (discussing LCO eligibility criteria and terms of LCO 
Commitments).
162 Id.  In other words, “lifeline” users would continue to pay the same unit-price for 
transmission capacity, in nominal dollars, every year from 2001 to 2013.
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benefits of market competition to consumers and investors located in developed nations, 
while making users in underserved countries no worse off.  The question remains, 
however, whether the LCO Commitments, in practice, have left underserved countries in 
a worse position than if INTELSAT had never privatized.163
To answer this question, this Subpart catalogues several ways in which 
INTELSAT privatization arguably may have jeopardized or impaired the ability of 
underserved countries to obtain international satellite communications services, and 
evaluates the merits of each identified potential threat.  Thus, Subpart IV.A.1 analyzes 
whether “lifeline” users will enjoy a fair share of any future cost decreases likely to be 
realized by the privatized Intelsat Ltd., as they would have if privatization had not taken 
place.  Subpart IV.A.2 addresses whether “lower-middle-income” nations not poor 
enough to qualify for “lifeline” protection remain secure in their ability to obtain 
international communications service.  Subpart IV.A.3 discusses whether the system of 
financing Intelsat’s provision of service to “lifeline” users is secure, given that 
privatization has arguably eliminated certain implicit subsidies to such users while failing 
to replace them with explicit subsidies.  Subpart IV.A.4 discusses how “lifeline” users 
will enforce their LCO contracts after 2013, when the endowment that finances the 
residual intergovernmental organization ITSO is scheduled to run out of funds. Finally, 
Subpart IV.A.5 considers whether, and how, global connectivity would survive the 
insolvency or bankruptcy of Intelsat Ltd.
1. Can “lifeline” countries be charged rates higher than the average 
rates paid by high-volume users?
Although the LCO Commitment now protects “lifeline” countries against rate 
increases for satellite communications services before 2013, one consequence of 
INTELSAT’s privatization is that the rates paid by such countries are no longer tied to 
the rate paid by high-income countries for similar services.164  Historically, however, 
global rates for international telecommunications services have tended to decrease over 
time, as technological advancement has steadily reduced the costs of providing such 
service, and has enabled growth in transmission capacity to outstrip growth in demand.165
163 See Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and Efficiency Issues In The Management of Shared 
Global Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. Penn. J. Int’l Econ. L. 289, 301 (2003) (“too little 
time has passed to confirm that spun-off and commercialized former [satellite] cooperatives will 
not further handicap developing nations and worsen the gap between nations in terms of access to 
telecommunications and information-processing services.”).
164 Compare FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, FCC 
02-170, at 8 (2002) (describing Intelsat Ltd.’s obligation to supply transmission capacity to 
lifeline users at fixed pre-privatization costs for 12 years) with INTELSAT Agreement Art. V(d) 
(mandating, prior to privatization, that “[t]he rates of space segment utilization charge for each 
type of utilization shall be the same for all applicants. . . .”).
165 See Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and Efficiency Issues In The Management of Shared 
Global Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. Penn. J. Int'l Econ. L. 289, 299-300 (2003) (“As 
satellite technology evolved and as the marketplace for satellite services developed, the cost of 
(continued. . . . .)
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If the historic trend towards ever-decreasing average global prices continues into the 
future, then “lifeline” countries could have expected further rate decreases from 2001 
through 2013, had INTELSAT’s utilization charges remained uniform and cost-based.    
In contrast, while LCO Commitments protect “lifeline” countries against any rate 
increases until 2013, such Commitments do not guarantee that future cost savings will be 
passed through in the form of rate decreases.  Accordingly, while privatization combined 
with the LCO Commitment essentially has preserved the pre-privatization status quo ante
for “lifeline” countries, in comparative terms it may have curtailed those countries’ 
opportunities to share in potential cost savings derived from continued technological 
advancement.
While the LCO Commitment itself does not require future decreases in cost to be 
shared with “lifeline” users, however, as a U.S.-licensed carrier Intelsat Ltd.’s rates 
remain subject to FCC regulation.   Upon privatization, the FCC classified Intelsat Ltd. as 
a “dominant international carrier” on those U.S.-international “thin routes” that are not 
served by any other carrier.166  Under this classification, Intelsat Ltd. must “provide at 
least a four percent annual [retail price] reduction . . . in its provision of capacity for 
switched voice services on thin routes, comparable to rates charged on thick routes, and 
[to] cap rates for private line service to thin routes at the rates offered on thick routes, 
with no future rate increases.”167  The requirement of an annual four percent reduction in 
price was originally imposed precisely to reduce the rates charged for INTELSAT 
transmission capacity “in ‘non-competitive’ markets to rates below those presently 
constructing, launching, and operating a satellite network dropped substantially.  Demand for 
satellite services, particularly delivery of video content to broadcast and cable television 
networks, stimulated private entrepreneurs to think they could enter the market and thrive.”).
166 Prior to privatization, INTELSAT’s U.S. Signatory, COMSAT, had already been 
classified and regulated as a “dominant international carrier” on the same U.S.-international “thin 
routes.”  See Comsat Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14083 (1998) (reaffirming 1985 Order 
classifying COMSAT as a dominant carrier on monopoly “thin routes,” but reclassifying 
COMSAT as a nondominant carrier on competitive “thick routes”), modified, Policies and Rules 
for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 FCC Rcd 3065 (1999).  
Subsequently, when COMSAT was merged into Intelsat Ltd. during INTELSAT’s privatization 
process, the FCC transferred COMSAT’s regulatory status to Intelsat Ltd.  See Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, COMSAT Corporation, & COMSAT Digital Teleport, Inc., Assignors, & Intelsat, 
Ltd., Assignee, Order and Authorization, 17 FCC Rcd. 27732, 27746 ¶ 22 (Int'l Bur. & Wireless 
Tel. Bur. 2002) (classifying Intelsat Ltd., upon merger with COMSAT, “as dominant in its 
provision of space segment capacity for switched voice and private line service on thin routes.”).
167 See Lockheed Martin Corporation, COMSAT Corporation, & COMSAT Digital Teleport, 
Inc., Assignors, & Intelsat, Ltd., Assignee, Order and Authorization, 17 FCC Rcd. 27732, 27747 
¶ 23 (Int'l Bur. & Wireless Tel. Bur. 2002).  The FCC had originally adopted this regulation 
several years before INTELSAT was privatized.  See Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive 
Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 FCC Rcd 3065, 3072-75 ¶¶ 19-22, 25 (1999) (adopting 
regulation requiring 4% annual reduction in rates charged by the U.S. Signatory, COMSAT, for 
INTELSAT transmission capacity used to serve “thin routes”).
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charged . . . in ‘competitive’ markets.”168  Moreover, this mandatory annual price 
reduction will continue until “market conditions ha[ve] changed enough to warrant a 
modification.”169  Thus, although Intelsat Ltd.’s LCO Contracts do not require future cost 
savings to be passed through to “lifeline” users, longstanding FCC regulations that 
remain in effect do appear to ensure that “lifeline” users will never be charged rates that 
substantially exceed the average rates charged by Intelsat Ltd.
2. Are the LCO eligibility criteria so stringent that they fail to protect 
underserved “lower-middle-income” nations?
In 2000, 69 nations were determined to qualify for LCO protection under the “low 
income” or “low teledensity” LCO eligibility criteria established by INTELSAT’s 25th 
Assembly of Parties.170  Other underserved nations with very limited resources, however, 
were not sufficiently destitute to satisfy those criteria.  Specifically, a country whose 
gross national income per capita in 2000 was more than $755 would not qualify for LCO 
protection under the “low income” criterion.171  In comparison, however, the world’s 
mean gross national income per capita in 2000 was $5,170.172  Thus, countries whose 
2000 gross national incomes were as low as $756 per person—less than 15% of the world 
average—were not granted LCO protection under the “low income” criteria.173  Instead, 
despite their relative need, such countries now generally must pay market prices to obtain 
international satellite communications services.174
168 Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 FCC 
Rcd 3065, 3072 ¶ 19 (1999) (emphasis added).
169 Lockheed Martin Corporation, COMSAT Corporation, & COMSAT Digital Teleport, 
Inc., Assignors, & Intelsat, Ltd., Assignee, Order and Authorization, 17 FCC Rcd. 27732, 27747 
¶ 23 (Int'l Bur. & Wireless Tel. Bur. 2002).
170 See notes [132-38], supra (discussing these criteria).  See also AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 
Attachment No. 5, at 1-3 (Nov. 27, 2000) (setting forth complete list of 69 eligible countries).
171 See notes [131-41], supra (explaining eligibility criteria).
172 World Bank, The Little Green Data Book From The World Development Indicators, No. 
24521, at 8 (April 2002).
173 Examples of poor countries that did not qualify for LCO protection under the “low 
income” criteria are Bolivia, whose gross national income per capita in 2001 was $950, and 
Kiribati, whose gross national income per capita in 2001 was $830.  See World Bank, The Little 
Green Data Book From The World Development Indicators 2003, at 47, 122 (April 2003).  The 
World Bank refers to such countries as “lower middle income” countries.  See id. at 15 (defining 
“lower-middle-income economies” as “those with a GNI per capita of more than $745 but less 
than . . . $2,975”).
174 A country that did not qualify for LCO protection under the “low income” criteria might 
still qualify for such protection under the separate “low teledensity” criteria if it had fewer than 
three telephone access lines per one hundred inhabitants.  See notes [133-35], supra (discussing 
“low teledensity” eligibility criteria).
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Presumably, of course, the market-based prices paid by such countries are kept in 
check by competitive forces.175  But competition can do no more than force Intelsat Ltd. 
to match the terms and conditions of service offered by its competitors.  Under conditions 
of oligopoly, low-volume, “lower-middle-income” countries may not enjoy sufficient 
bargaining power to obtain favorable terms from any of the handful of international 
telecommunications providers willing to serve them.  INTELSAT privatization, however, 
provides a benefit to “lower-middle-income” countries only if the rates now available to 
such countries are set in a market that is truly competitive.  If, in contrast, those rates 
simply reflect price-leadership in an uncompetitive oligopoly market, then even the 
advent of formal competition is not guaranteed to yield rates more favorable to “lower-
middle-income” countries than those countries would have paid if INTELSAT’s former 
uniform pricing policy had remained in effect.176
3. Have implicit subsidies to underserved nations been eliminated, 
without being replaced by explicit subsidies?  
Before privatization, INTELSAT’s rates for transmission capacity were uniform 
throughout the world.177  Arguably, INTELSAT’s uniform pricing policy caused the 
system’s low-cost and high-volume users to implicitly subsidize its high-cost users.178  In 
that respect, INTELSAT’s historic pricing policy mirrored the system of implicit 
subsidies that was used to finance the deployment of wireline telephone service to high-
175 A country that could not qualify for “Income/Teledensity Eligibility” nonetheless 
remained eligible for LCO Protection if, at the time of INTELSAT privatization in 2000, that 
country could not obtain equivalent service from any cost-effective alternative provider.  See
notes [136-38], supra (discussing “petition eligibility” criteria); see also AP-25-3E FINAL 
W/11/00 Attachment No. 6, at 1-2 (Nov. 27, 2000) (setting forth list of 27 countries or locations 
that are “petition-eligible” for LCO protection for all international traffic, plus 14 additional 
countries or locations “petition-eligible” for LCO protection for certain international links).  
Thus, any “lower-middle-income” countries ineligible for LCO protection should presumably be 
able to obtain equivalent service, cost-effectively, from providers other than Intelsat Ltd.
176 Cf. Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General and 
Individual Taxation, 21 Va. Tax Rev. 293, 351-52 n.139 (2002) (discussing economic literature 
suggesting that prices frequently can be maintained at levels far in excess of marginal cost in 
markets characterized by oligopoly and price-leadership).
177 INTELSAT Agreement Art. V(d).  In practice, the uniform pricing policy ensured that 
INTELSAT’s rates did not vary to reflect any differences in the organization’s cost of providing 
service to different countries, nor to reflect competitive pressures on pricing brought to bear in 
particular national markets.
178 See Francis Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE III TECHNICAL FORUM
63, 69 (2000) (Prior to privatization, “[i]n terms of Article V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement, 
the charging rate for each type of utilisation of the INTELSAT space segment [was] the same for 
all users of that service.  What this means is that routes and connections which [did] not 
themselves generate sufficient income to pay for their provision [were] charged at less than 
cost.”).
40
cost, low-volume rural locations in the United States.179  In both situations, users in low-
cost, high-volume locations historically had little choice but to pay the implicit subsidies 
at issue; served by monopoly providers, these low-cost users had no ability to take their 
business elsewhere.
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to bring the benefits of 
competition to U.S. telephone consumers by bringing an end to the “regulated monopoly” 
environment under which wireline local telephone service had long been provided.180  At 
the same time, Congress recognized that the advent of competition would threaten the 
ability of incumbent local exchange carriers to continue to “overcharge” low-cost urban 
users as a means of implicitly cross-subsidizing service to high-cost rural users.181  For 
this reason, the 1996 Act established a new, competitively neutral system of explicit 
subsidies designed to finance the continued provision of affordable telephone service to 
high-cost users.182  Under the 1996 Act, every telecommunications carrier that provides 
interstate telecommunications service is required to contribute regularly into a Universal 
Service Fund.183  The revenues paid into this fund are then used to underwrite “the 
provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services for which the support is 
179 See generally In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 
13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11504 ¶ 7 (1998) (explaining that historically, “universal service was 
promoted through a patchwork quilt of implicit and explicit subsidies. . . .  Charges to long 
distance carriers and rates for certain intrastate services . . . were priced above cost, which 
enabled local telephone companies to . . . [subsidize the cost of providing phone service to] 
residents in rural and high cost areas. . . .”).
180 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996) (stating 
Congress’s intent “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework 
designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications 
markets to competition. . . .”).
181 See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 104-
230, at 4-5 (1995) (stating 1996 Act’s twin goals of “protect[ing] and advanc[ing] universal 
service” while also “allow[ing] competition for local telephone service”).
182 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress,13 FCC 
Rcd. 11501, 11510 ¶ 18 (1998) (stating that “establishing an orderly transition from federal 
implicit subsidies to federal explicit subsidies” was the “intended goal” of the 1996 Act); accord
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 254(e), 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (mandating that subsidies to 
support universal service “should be explicit”); see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 131 (1996) (stating Congress’s intention that universal service 
support mechanisms “continued or created under [the 1996 Act] should be explicit, rather than 
implicit as many support mechanisms are today.”).
183 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (“every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate 
telecommunications service shall contribute, on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis, to the 
specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and 
advance universal service.”).
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intended.”184  This system of explicit payments and explicit subsidies ensures that the 
burden of providing service to high-cost rural and low-volume users is apportioned across 
all industry participants in a competitively neutral manner.
The revised ITSO Agreement, in contrast, requires Intelsat Ltd. alone to support 
ITSO’s public service mission to bring international communications service to 
underserved global regions.185  None of Intelsat Ltd.’s competitors must meet any similar 
public service obligation.  Nor are those competitors required to contribute any funds to 
help underwrite Intelsat Ltd.’s provision of service to high-cost, low-volume “lifeline” 
users.  In essence, Intelsat Ltd.’s post-privatization commercial operations, while subject 
to substantial competition on all high-volume international routes, now must underwrite 
the company’s costs of serving low-volume routes.  Arguably, however, under conditions 
of competition, Intelsat Ltd. cannot continue to command rates from its high-volume 
route customers that are sufficiently high to cross-subsidize service to lifeline users.  
Rather, if the analogy to wireline telephony is apt, then Intelsat Ltd.’s competitors now 
have incentive to “cream-skim” Intelsat Ltd.’s customers by charging slightly lower rates 
than Intelsat Ltd. on profitable high-volume routes, while leaving Intelsat Ltd. alone with 
the burden of serving low-volume “lifeline” users at price-capped rates.186  Such a 
paradigm would not be economically sustainable.
On the other hand, the marginal cost of providing satellite transmission capacity 
to low-volume users located in remote locations may not be as burdensome as the 
marginal cost of providing wireline telephone service to such users.  While a domestic 
local exchange carrier may need to string and maintain miles of costly copper wire to 
reach a single remote residential customer,187 satellite telecommunications do not require 
184 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(e).  See also 47 U.S.C. § 214(e) (setting forth eligibility criteria for 
telecommunications carriers who seek to provide services financed by universal service fund).
185 See ITSO Agreement Arts. III, V (obligating Intelsat Ltd., post-privatization, to maintain 
global connectivity and global coverage; serve its lifeline connectivity customers; and provide 
non-discriminatory access to its satellite system to such customers).
186 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1324 (2003) (defining “cream skimming” as “offering service only to the 
most profitable customers,” and noting that competitive “cream skimming” poses a threat to 
universal service when telecommunications systems that formerly relied on implicit subsidies are 
privatized);  cf. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress,13 
FCC Rcd. 11501, 11505 ¶ 8 (1998) (stating that Congress in 1996 created the Universal Service 
Fund to collect and administer explicit subsidies precisely because Congress “[r]ecogniz[ed] the 
vulnerability of . . . implicit subsidies to competition”).
187 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress,13 FCC 
Rcd. 11501, 11504 ¶¶ 6-7 (1998) (without subsidies, consumers located in “remote and sparsely 
populated areas” would be “forced to pay prohibitively high rates for their phone service”; the 
high cost of serving “residents in rural and high cost areas” would have prevented such residents, 
if unsubsidized, “from receiving phone service because of prohibitively high telephone rates”).
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any additional physical facilities or resources to reach highly remote locations.188
Moreover, technological innovation has tended to increase the transmission capacity of 
satellites, and thereby to continually reduce satellite operators’ unit cost of providing 
service.189  Indeed, for these reasons, Intelsat Ltd.’s competitors have often purported to 
covet Intelsat Ltd.’s monopoly “thin routes,” which they often have characterized as a 
potential source of monopoly profits for Intelsat Ltd., rather than a costly burden.190
Only time will tell whether Intelsat Ltd.’s exclusive capability—and 
corresponding obligation—to serve “lifeline” countries at ever-decreasing regulated rates 
will prove, in fact, to be a burden or a benefit to the company financially.  If it is a 
burden, however, then the burden is relatively light.191  Specifically, shortly before 
privatization, the FCC determined that only thirteen percent of INTELSAT’s U.S.-
international circuits were deployed for service to the 63 “thin routes” that no other 
188 See Rob Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering A Golden Goose?, 
36 Va. J. Int’l L. 1001, 1004 (1996) (“The unconcentrated signal from a geostationary orbiting 
satellite can illuminate as much as one-third of the earth's surface.  Once a carrier incurs the 
substantial sunk cost to make this footprint available, the incremental cost for it to serve an 
additional point of communication and additional users via another earth station approaches 
zero.”) (footnote omitted).
189 See Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 
FCC Rcd 3065, 3071-73 ¶¶ 15-21 (1999) (assuming that the unit cost of providing satellite 
communications services declines by at least four percent per annum).  See also Welcoming 
Address by ITSO Director General Ahmed Toumi at the Opening Session of the 28th Assembly 
of Parties (June 29, 2004), 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=dir_general99&id=322&
link_src=HPL&lang=english>  (noting that the price of supplying satellite transmission capacity 
dropped precipitously in the early 21st century due to “[t]he drop in demand for satellite capacity 
by major telecommunications carriers that are consolidating and reducing costs, the competition 
from transoceanic fiber optics cables, and the drop in demand for bandwidth as a consequence of 
digital compression”).
190 See Lockheed Martin Corporation, COMSAT Corporation, & COMSAT Digital Teleport, 
Inc., Assignors, & Intelsat, Ltd., Assignee, Order and Authorization, 17 FCC Rcd. 27732, 27744  
¶ 19 (Int'l Bur. & Wireless Tel. Bur. 2002) (Intelsat Ltd.’s rates are regulated “as dominant on 
thin routes because [Intelsat Ltd.] possesses market power in this geographic market.”); Comsat 
Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14083, 14090-91 ¶ 9 (1998) (as a dominant carrier on its 
“thin routes,” Intelsat Ltd. “require[e] detailed regulatory scrutiny” because its “market power” 
creates “incentive to charge rates or engage in practices that contravene the requirements of the
Communications Act”).  But see United States Government Accountability Office, Intelsat 
Privatization and the Implementation of the ORBIT Act, GAO-04-891, at 15-16 (Sept. 2004), 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04891.pdf>  (“While Intelsat is the sole provider of satellite 
service into certain countries, . . . traffic into some countries is ‘thin’—that is, there is not much 
traffic, and therefore there is little revenue potential.  In such cases, global satellite companies 
other than Intelsat may not be interested in providing service to these countries.”).
191 See Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 
FCC Rcd 3065, 3073 ¶ 21 (1999) (noting “the small size of the [thin-route] markets. . . .”).  
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carrier then served.192  Moreover, only eight percent of U.S. revenue derived from 
INTELSAT services was then attributable to thin routes.193  To date, these ratios appear 
to remain relatively unchanged.194  In the future, as commercial communications 
satellites continue to proliferate and the number of thin routes decreases, Intelsat Ltd.’s 
obligation to serve lifeline customers can only grow less burdensome.195   Thus, even if 
Intelsat Ltd.’s obligation to serve “lifeline” users at price-capped rates does impose a cost 
burden on Intelsat Ltd., this cost burden appears small in comparison with the company’s 
overall operating revenues, and can only diminish over time.  Accordingly, the lack of 
any explicit subsidy mechanism through which other carriers and users contribute 
payments toward the cost of serving “lifeline” users does not appear seriously to 
jeopardize Intelsat Ltd.’s financial viability or its ability to fulfill its public service 
obligation.196
4. Will global connectivity survive the possible retirement in 2013 of 
the residual treaty organization ITSO?
On July 18, 2001, the international treaty organization INTELSAT formally 
transferred its satellites to the new private company Intelsat Ltd., and simultaneously 
192 Id. at 3068 ¶ 9.
193 Id. at 3068 ¶ 8.  In 1997-98, of $263 million derived from the provision of INTELSAT 
service on all U.S.-international routes, only $19 million was attributable to service provided on 
U.S.-international “thin routes.”  Id. 
194 Since privatization, the FCC has not performed any new study of the revenues or circuit 
resources attributable to the Intelsat Ltd.’s “thin routes.”  However, during the privatization 
process, the FCC ruled that upon privatization, Intelsat Ltd. would be regulated as a “dominant 
carrier” on its “thin routes.”  In the regulatory proceedings that led to this decision, the FCC 
considered revising some of the specific regulations that had previously applied to the U.S. 
Signatory, COMSAT, prior to privatization.  See, e.g., In re Lockheed Martin Corp. & COMSAT 
Corp., Assignors, & Intelsat, Ltd, Assignee, 17 FCC Rcd. 27732, 27744-47 ¶¶ 19-23 (Int'l Bur. & 
Wireless Telecom. Bur. 2002), aff'd on recon., 18 FCC Rcd. 16605, 16607 ¶ 3 & nn.9-10 (Int'l 
Bur. & Wireless Telecom. Bur. 2003).  The Commission ultimately declined to make any 
changes, however, because it concluded that the underlying market conditions had not changed in 
any significant respect.  See id.
195 See Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 
14 FCC Rcd 3065, 3079-80 ¶¶ 39-41 (1999) (assuming that current “thin routes” will gradually 
become competitive, and establishing a procedure for reclassifying them as “thick routes” when 
competition arises); cf. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 
13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11503-04 ¶ 3 (1998) (“[I]n general, continued growth in the information 
services industry will buttress, not hinder, universal service.”).
196 Notably, Intelsat Ltd.’s obligation to serve to its “lifeline” users at price-capped rates did 
not deter a group of sophisticated private investors from paying $5 billion dollars to purchase 
Intelsat Ltd. on January 28, 2005.  See Intelsat Sale Completed, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2005, at 
E2.  See also [note 109], supra (discussing the transaction).
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transformed itself into the residual treaty organization ITSO.197  When it transferred the 
satellites, however, the treaty organization retained “certain financial assets” to be used to 
fund ITSO’s operating costs until 2013.198  In 2013 or thereafter, when these funds run 
out, ITSO’s member governments must decide whether to continue the residual treaty 
organization ITSO, or to retire it.199  Should ITSO be retired, then “lifeline” users will no 
longer be able to enlist the treaty organization’s aid in enforcing Intelsat Ltd.’s public 
service obligations.200  Arguably, such a development could leave such users vulnerable 
to detrimental price increases or service reductions.201
For several reasons, however, such an outcome is unlikely.  First, a decision to 
terminate the ITSO treaty organization would require the approval of two-thirds of 
ITSO’s member governments.202  Thus, if just 51 of ITSO’s 150 member countries vote 
to continue the treaty organization beyond 2013, then the treaty organization will 
continue.203  At present, however, at least 110 countries qualify for LCO protection under 
197 See page __, supra.
198 See ITSO Agreement Art. VII(a), done Nov. 17, 2000 (“ITSO will be financed for . . . 
twelve year[s] . . . by the retention of certain financial assets at the time of transfer of ITSO’s 
space system to the Company.”).
199 See ITSO Agreement Art. XXI, done Nov. 17, 2000 (“This Agreement shall be in effect 
for at least twelve years from the date of transfer of ITSO’s space system to the Company. The 
Assembly of Parties may terminate this Agreement effective upon the twelfth anniversary of the 
date of transfer of ITSO’s space system to the Company. . . .”).
200 ITSO was originally created because some “lifeline” users and commentators were 
“reluctant to see INTELSAT’s public service obligation secured through the vagaries of U.S. law 
as it now exists,” and therefore preferred “to entrust the supervision of such matters to an 
international body.”  Francis Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE 
III TECHNICAL FORUM 63, 69 (2000).  Notably, however, Intelsat Ltd.’s contractual obligations to 
“lifeline” users, including particularly the Lifeline Connectivity Obligations set forth in its “LCO 
Contracts,” do not necessarily expire in 2013, even if the ITSO treaty organization should be 
retired.   See pages __, supra.
201 See Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 
131 (2001) (expressing “fear that, even with the . . . temporary securing of lifeline services for 
remote and under-developed areas [through the LCO Commitment], in fifteen years such services 
provided by the new INTELSAT structures on a subsidised basis will have disappeared on 
commercial grounds.”).
202 See ITSO Agreement Art. XXI, done Nov. 17, 2000 (“The Assembly of Parties may 
terminate this Agreement . . . . by a vote pursuant to Article IX(f) of the Parties.  Such decision 
shall be deemed to be a matter of substance.”); see also id. Article IX(f) (“Decisions on matters of 
substance shall be taken by an affirmative vote cast by at least two-thirds of the Parties whose 
representatives are present and voting.”).
203 See ITSO Member Countries Web Page, 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=&id=3&link_src=HPL&
lang=english> (listing 150 member countries).
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ITSO’s various criteria, for at least some services or some routes.204  If, in 2013, even 
half of these “lifeline” countries believe that ITSO’s continuation would serve their 
national interests, such countries would control a sufficient number of votes to ensure that 
ITSO will continue.
Of course, any individual ITSO member country that favors retirement of the 
treaty organization in 2013 would be free to withdraw at that time, even if the 
organization continues in existence.205  But individual ITSO member countries already 
have the right to withdraw today.206  For non-lifeline ITSO member countries, the costs 
and benefits of maintaining membership in an ongoing ITSO would not change 
significantly in 2013.  Indeed, should ITSO remain in existence after its initial twelve-
year endowment is exhausted, the organization’s modest operating costs would then be 
paid by Intelsat Ltd., and not by ITSO’s member governments.207  Thus, it is very likely 
that ITSO will remain in existence beyond 2013 if the “lifeline” countries consider its 
continuation to be beneficial.
Moreover, even if ITSO is retired in 2013, lifeline countries would not be left 
wholly unprotected.  While it exists, ITSO provides assistance to “lifeline” users by 
monitoring Intelsat Ltd.’s performance in honoring its commitments to such users, and by 
assisting in resolving any disputes between Intelsat Ltd. and its “lifeline” users.208  Even 
204 See notes [131-35], supra (discussing criteria for lifeline connectivity protection and 
counting numbers of countries that qualify).  See also AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 
5, at 1-3 (Nov. 27, 2000) (listing 69 countries eligible for lifeline connectivity protection under 
“low income”/“low teledensity” criteria); AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 6, at 1-2 
(Nov. 27, 2000) (listing 41 additional countries or locations that do not meet “low income”/”low 
teledensity” criteria but nonetheless are eligible for lifeline connectivity protection on ground that 
no other carrier provides service).
205 See ITSO Agreement Art. XIV(a)(i) (“Any Party may withdraw voluntarily from 
ITSO.”).
206 Id.
207 See ITSO Agreement Art. VII(b), done Nov. 17, 2000 (“In the event ITSO continues 
beyond twelve years, ITSO shall obtain funding through the Public Services Agreement.”); see 
also id. Art. I(j) (“‘Public Services Agreement’ means the legally binding instrument through 
which ITSO ensures that the Company [Intelsat Ltd.] honors the Core Principles”).  The funds 
required would be modest: at present, ITSO has only four professional employees, and is based in 
office space that is located inside Intelsat Ltd.’s headquarters building.  See ITSO Contact 
Information Web Page, 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=&id=17&link_src=HPL
&lang=english>.
208 See ITSO Agreement Art. X(f).   To date, ITSO appears to have played an important 
behind-the-scenes role in performing these functions.  See Welcoming Address by ITSO Director 
General Ahmed Toumi at the Opening Session of the 28th Assembly of Parties (June 29, 2004), 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=dir_general99&id=322&
link_src=HPL&lang=english> (“July 2002 signaled the start of the active supervision of
privatized Intelsat’s performance.  This phase has definitely had its share of problems. . . . [I]t has 
(continued. . . . .)
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if ITSO eventually is retired, however, Intelsat Ltd.’s Lifeline Connectivity Obligation 
contracts with its “lifeline” users would still remain in effect.  If necessary, these LCO 
contracts could be enforced directly against Intelsat Ltd. in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the United States.209
In sum, ITSO will continue beyond 2013 if the “lifeline” users collectively 
determine that the organization is still needed to protect their interests.  Even if the 
organization is retired in 2013, lifeline users still enjoy the benefit of their LCO 
Protection and the legal means of enforcing this benefit.  For these reasons, the possibility 
that ITSO might be retired in 2013 does not appear seriously to threaten the ability of 
“lifeline” users to receive service from Intelsat Ltd.
5. What will happen if Intelsat Ltd. goes bankrupt? 
Before its satellites were privatized, the international treaty organization 
INTELSAT was not susceptible to financial failure.  Instead, had INTELSAT’s 
commercial revenues ever failed to cover the organization’s costs, INTELSAT was 
authorized to make capital calls to its Signatories to make up the difference.210
Moreover, for the first decade of its existence, INTELSAT also was protected by 
international law against competition from separate satellite systems that could cause 
“significant economic harm” to INTELSAT’s operations.211  Even after it waived this 
protection in 1984, INTELSAT remained capable of furnishing substantially all of its 
satellite transmission capacity at rates more than sufficient to cover all of the 
taken time to establish a relationship of mutual and solid trust between ITSO and Intelsat Ltd., 
and to develop effective work methods.  . . . [I]n 2003 the focus was chiefly on . . . Intelsat 
[Ltd.]’s compliance with its lifeline connectivity obligations with countries benefiting from LCO 
protection.  For customers in countries without any real power to negotiate price reductions with 
Intelsat, the LCO Pricing Index is a guarantee that, under certain conditions, they will enjoy 
market prices.  After several months of painstaking discussions, we reached an acceptable 
solution for both the annual calculation of the current Index, and the principles that will govern 
[its future] revision. . . .”).
209 Cf. FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, 11467 
(2002) (Post-privatization, Intelsat Ltd. “do[es] not maintain an immune or privileged status.”).
210 See INTELSAT Agreement Art. V(c) (“Each Signatory shall contribute to the capital 
requirements of INTELSAT, and shall receive capital repayment and compensation for use of 
capital. . . . ”); see also INTELSAT Operating Agreement Art. 8(f) ("To the extent, if any, that the 
revenues earned by INTELSAT are insufficient to meet INTELSAT operating, maintenance and 
administrative costs, the Board of Governors may decide to meet the deficiency by using 
INTELSAT operating funds, by overdraft arrangements, by raising a loan, by requiring 
Signatories to make capital contributions in proportion to their respective investment shares or by 
any combination of such measures.”).
211 See INTELSAT Agreement Art. XIV(d).  In fact, INTELSAT never invoked this 
protection, which it permanently waived in 1984.  See notes [27-29], supra.
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organization’s costs.212   Thus, prior to privatization, “lifeline” users enjoyed an 
extremely high level of assurance that financial difficulties would never force 
INTELSAT to go out of business.
Post-privatization, in contrast, Intelsat Ltd. is an ordinary commercial entity, 
subject to competition and operated according to ordinary business principles.  Moreover, 
Intelsat Ltd.’s business operations take place in a market sector in which bankruptcies are 
far from unknown.213  Arguably, therefore, the privatized Intelsat Ltd. could fail.  If so, 
then the company’s public service obligations to “lifeline” users seemingly might go 
unfulfilled. 
In practice, however, even if Intelsat Ltd. does fail, the company’s satellites—
which are each worth hundreds of millions of dollars—would not likely go dark.214
Rather, if Intelsat Ltd. should become insolvent and is forced into receivership, its 
insolvency would not excuse the company from fulfilling its public service obligations.215
Indeed, even if Intelsat Ltd. ultimately were to be dissolved in bankruptcy, the company’s 
satellites would then be transferred to a new owner.  In the event that such a transfer takes 
place, U.S. law provides several safeguards that should prove adequate to protect the 
interests of “lifeline” users.  
First, arguably Intelsat Ltd.’s LCO Contracts are best characterized as property 
instruments through which Intelsat Ltd.’s “lifeline users” have been vested with leasehold 
interests in Intelsat Ltd.’s satellite transmission capacity.  If so, then the rights of 
“lifeline” users under the LCO Contracts are analogous to a tenant’s leasehold interest in 
real property owned in fee simple by her landlord.  Under U.S. bankruptcy law, however, 
212 See Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, 14 FCC Rcd. 15703, 15734-35 ¶ 74 (1999) 
(INTELSAT’s utilization charges (“IUC”) historically were set at rate levels sufficient to provide 
an 18% return on investment to INTELSAT); see also Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of 
INTELSAT, 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 117 (2001) (“At present INTELSAT finances are 
very healthy.  It has not had to call on capital from its Signatories to finance new satellites series 
for many years.”).
213 See Andy Pasztor, After Debacles High and Low, Satellite Concerns Rise Again, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 4, 2003, at C3 (recounting bankruptcies of commercial satellite communications 
companies including New ICO, Globalstar, Iridium, Teledesic, and Loral Space & 
Communications Ltd. that occurred from 1996-2002).
214 See id. (describing the dispositions of the satellites that had belonged to bankrupt 
commercial satellite communications companies New ICO, Globalstar, Iridium, Teledesic, and 
Loral Space & Communications Ltd.; in all cases, satellites were transferred to new owners who 
continued to operate them).
215 See, e.g., Final Analysis Communications Services Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 4768, 4783 ¶ 36 & 
n.91 (Int’l Bur. 2004) (holding that “bankruptcy proceedings [are not] an excuse for failure to 
meet unrelated regulatory obligations where debt is not an issue,” and noting that bankrupt 
satellite carriers have provided service to the public “before, during, and after [their] bankruptcy 
proceeding[s]”) (citing LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
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when a landlord becomes bankrupt, any post-petition disposition of the bankrupt 
landlord’s property must “provide adequate protection” of the tenants’ leasehold interest 
in the property.216   To provide such protection, the transferee of a bankrupt debtor’s 
property ordinarily must take such property subject to any preexisting third-party 
leasehold interests or encumbrances.217
Moreover, even if the LCO Contracts are better characterized as “executory 
contracts”—rather than as property instruments that vest “lifeline” users with leasehold 
interests in Intelsat Ltd.’s satellite transponder capacity—Intelsat Ltd.’s public service 
obligations to “lifeline” users would nonetheless survive any dissolution in bankruptcy.  
Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, an executory contract to which a bankrupt debtor is a 
party normally remains in effect so long as neither party defaults in its obligations under 
the contract.218  Here, the LCO Contracts require Intelsat Ltd. to do no more than to 
furnish transmission capacity to “lifeline” users.  Significantly, the LCO Contracts do 
not, under any circumstances, require Intelsat Ltd. to pay any money to anyone.  
Accordingly, Intelsat Ltd. would presumably remain capable of satisfying its obligations 
under the LCO Contracts even if the company were to become insolvent.  Moreover, 
even if Intelsat Ltd. does fall into bankruptcy, “lifeline” users would have no incentive to 
seek termination or modification of the LCO Contracts.  Accordingly, the Bankruptcy 
216 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[O]n request of an entity that has an interest in property used, 
sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the [bankruptcy] trustee, the court . . . 
shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection 
of such interest.”).  In the present context, it is unnecessary to decide whether satellites in orbit 
are better characterized as real property or personal property, because this rule governs 
dispositions in bankruptcy of either type of property that is encumbered by a third-party interest  
Id
217 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (property of a bankrupt debtor’s estate ordinarily must be 
transferred subject to “any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate”).  The U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code enumerates five exceptional situations in which the property of the bankrupt 
debtor may be transferred “free and clear of” any third-party interest in the property:  where 
applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of the property free and clear of such interest, 11 
U.S.C. § 363(f)(1); where the interested third-party entity consents to waive its interest in the 
property, id. § 363(f)(2); where such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be 
sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property, id. § 363(f)(3); where such 
interest is in bona fide dispute, id. § 363(f)(4); or where the interested third-party entity could be 
compelled by law to accept a money satisfaction of such interest, id. § 363(f)(5).  Should Intelsat 
Ltd. become bankrupt, none of those five statutory exceptions would appear to apply.  Thus, even 
in bankruptcy, Intelsat Ltd.’s satellite assets could not be transferred “free and clear” of the 
company’s LCO commitments to its “lifeline” users.  Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (restrictive 
covenants that are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law survive lease rejection).
218 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (“[A]n executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may 
not be terminated or modified . . . at any time after the commencement of [a bankruptcy 
proceeding] solely because of [the debtor’s bankruptcy]”).   Where the bankrupt debtor has 
defaulted, or likely will default, its obligations under a contract, the other contracting party may 
seek to have the contract terminated or modified.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a)-(c).   
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Code’s general rule favoring nontermination of executory contracts would apply.219
Under this rule, Intelsat Ltd.’s LCO Contracts with its lifeline users would not be 
extinguished in bankruptcy even if those Contracts are characterized as “executory 
contracts” rather than as property encumbrances.
Finally, if Intelsat Ltd. ever should be dissolved in bankruptcy, the 
Communications Act would provide an additional layer of protection to “lifeline” users, 
separate and apart from that provided by the Bankruptcy Code.  Specifically, when the 
operator of an FCC-licensed communications facility becomes bankrupt, the bankrupt 
operator’s existing FCC licenses can be assigned to a putative new owner only if the FCC 
determines that the proposed assignment would serve the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity.220  To satisfy this statutory standard, the proposed transaction must comply 
with the Communications Act, the FCC’s Rules, federal communications policy,221 and 
other United States policies and objectives.222  Generally, when a bankrupt operator’s 
license is transferred, federal communications policy holds that the public interest is 
served by continuation of uninterrupted service to that operator’s existing customers.223
Moreover, in ratifying the ITSO Agreement, the United States adopted a specific federal 
policy and objective of maintaining the global connectivity and global coverage of the 
satellite system established by INTELSAT.224  In particular, United States policy now 
holds that the satellite system should continue to serve its “lifeline” users for at least as 
219 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1).
220 See, e.g., In re Leap Wireless Int'l, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 14909, 14914 ¶ 10 (Wireless 
Telecom. Bur. 2004) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 310(d)).
221 See, e.g., id. at 14915 ¶ 10 (citing cases).
222 See Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1536, FCC 86-67, 1986 
WL 291498, at ¶ 7 & n.20 (1986) (“While [the FCC’s] primary mission is to implement the 
Communications Act, we believe that, in doing so, it is both necessary and appropriate for us to 
harmonize our actions with other federal policies and objectives.”), appeal dismissed sub nom.,
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C.Cir.1987) 
(citing Storer Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 763 F.2d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1985) & LaRose v. 
FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); cf. FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications 
Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 304 (2003) (FCC must harmonize its implementation of the Communications 
Act with policies and objectives of Bankruptcy Code and other federal statutes).
223 See, e.g., Applications of Verestar, Inc. for Assignment of Licenses to SES Americom, 
Inc., DA 04-3639, IB Docket No. 04-174, 2004 WL 2648124, at ¶ 14 (FCC Int'l Bur. & Wireless 
Telecom. Bur. Nov. 19, 2004) (“Allowing the assignment of these assets to SES Americom is 
critical to the uninterrupted provision of service to [bankrupt operator] Verestar's customers, 
which we find, in this instance, to be a specific benefit of the proposed assignments.”).
224 See ITSO Agreement prmbl. (“The States Parties to this Agreement . . . [i]ntend[] that the 
Company will honor the Core Principles set forth in Article III of this Agreement and will 
provide, on a commercial basis, the space segment required for international public 
telecommunications services of high quality and reliability. . . .”);  Art. III(b) (“The Core 
Principles are: (i) maintain global connectivity and global coverage; (ii) serve its lifeline 
connectivity customers; and (iii) provide non-discriminatory access to the Company’s system.”).
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long as the ITSO Agreement remains in effect, regardless of whether the system remains 
in the hands of Intelsat Ltd. or is passed to subsequent successors-in-interest.225  For both 
of these reasons, even if Intelsat Ltd. ultimately is ever dissolved in bankruptcy, the FCC 
should not approve the assignment of its operating authority to any entity that is not 
committed to honoring the LCO Commitments to serve Intelsat Ltd.’s “lifeline” users.
B. Political/Legal Threats to ITSO’s “Public Service” Mission.
As a facilities- based international intergovernmental organization (IGO), the 
former INTELSAT treaty organization was immune from the operation of national laws 
and trade policies of its Member states.226  As a Delaware corporation, a District of 
Columbia domiciliary, and a licensee of the United States Federal Communications 
Commission, in contrast, the privatized Intelsat Ltd. is now fully subject to U.S. law and 
FCC policy.227  Accordingly, Intelsat Ltd. must now comply with a myriad of U.S. 
international trade statutes under which the President may invoke various trade sanctions 
or restrictions on foreign commerce as a means of achieving political or economic 
objectives of the United States.228  Such trade sanctions or restrictions, if invoked, could 
225 See id.; see also ITSO Agreement Art. I(d) (defining “Company” to include both Intelsat 
Ltd. and its “successors-in-interest” to the satellite system).
226 See INTELSAT Agreement, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, Art. XV(c) (requiring 
all INTELSAT Member nations to grant to INTELSAT and its officers and employees “immunity 
from legal process in respect of acts done or words written or spoken in the exercise of their 
functions and within the limits of their duties. . . .”).  See also International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization Headquarters Agreement, entered into force Nov. 24, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 
2248, TIAS 8542 (“INTELSAT Headquarters Agreement”) (providing that INTELSAT and the 
representatives of the parties and of the Signatories shall be immune from suit and legal process 
relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions, 
except as such immunity is waived by INTELSAT).  In 1977, President Ford issued an Executive 
Order  designating INTELSAT “as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the 
privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by” the International Organizations Immunities 
Act of 1945 (IOIA), 22 U.S.C. § 288 et seq. See Exec. Order No. 11996, 42 Fed. Reg. 4331 (Jan. 
19, 1977).  President Ford’s Executive Order superseded an earlier Executive Order in which 
President Nixon had similarly designated INTELSAT as an immune international organization 
under the IOIA.  See Exec. Order No. 11718, 38 Fed. Reg. 12797 (May 14, 1973).  See also Exec. 
Order No. 11277, 31 Fed. Reg. 6609 (Apr. 30, 1966) (designating an INTELSAT predecessor 
organization immune under IOIA);  Exec. Order No. 11227, 30 Fed. Reg. 7369 (June 2, 1965) 
(same).
227 See FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 FCC Rcd. 11458, 11467 
(2002) (Post-privatization, Intelsat Ltd. "do[es] not maintain an immune or privileged status,” but 
instead is now “subject to U.S. or U.K. licensing authorities”). 
228 See, e.g., Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3101-11 (2000), Export 
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000), International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2000), National Emergencies Act, 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1621-51 (2000), Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2000), 
Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-09 (2000).
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potentially prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from “doing business” with certain foreign 
telecommunications carriers, even where such business relations are necessary for 
existing telecommunications links to be maintained.  
For this reason, critics have charged that by rendering the ongoing operation of 
the INTELSAT satellite system subject to the control of U.S. law, the privatization of 
INTELSAT threatens the universal global connectivity of the world’s 
telecommunications systems.229   In particular, at the outset of the privatization process, 
one leading critic voiced the following specific concerns raised by rendering Intelsat Ltd. 
subject to regulation under U.S. law:  
[C]an it be expected that the [United States government] will 
always remain aloof and allow the provision of service to all 
customers? . . .  [W]ill the US Congress refrain from seeking to 
direct how services are provided?  Will contentions with Iran, 
Libya, Yugoslavia, or Iraq not impel the use of 
telecommunications as an economic weapon?   . . . [T]he attitude 
to international law seen in recent US cases increases one’s fears.  
The residual [treaty organization ITSO] may have little actual 
power to secure [Intelsat Ltd.’s] immunity from such pressures.  
Ultimately enforcement of any arbitral award would end up 
requiring the intervention of a normal judicial system.  How would 
a [United States] court respond to an action to enforce an award 
under the Public Service Agreement if there is also either a 
governmental direction, or a Congressional statute on the point?230
Now that INTELSAT’s privatization process has been completed, these concerns 
merit serious consideration.   Post-privatization, does the global connectivity of the 
world’s communications systems rest solely on the continued support of incumbent U.S. 
policymakers?   Subpart IV.B.1 addresses whether any United States law or policy now 
in effect threatens Intelsat Ltd.’s continued ability to provide global connectivity.  
Subpart IV.B.2 then analyzes whether, as a matter of current U.S. law, the President and 
his Administration have authority to adopt policies that impact Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to 
maintain global connectivity.  Subpart IV.B.3 assesses whether the United States 
229 Cf. Francis Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE III TECHNICAL FORUM
63, 68 (2000) (“[W]e must recognize that incorporation of a legal entity within a legal system 
makes that entity subject to the law of that system, and to governmental pressures backed up, if 
necessary, by appropriate legal changes.”); accord Francis Lyall, Expanding Global 
Communications Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE III TECHNICAL FORUM 63, 68 (2000) (same); Francis Lyall, 
Privatisation and International Telecommunications Organisations, 38 Proc. Inst. Space L. 168, 
168-74 (1995) (same).
230 Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 28 J. Space L. 101 (2000), reprinted in
5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 124-25 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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Congress has the power to violate the ITSO Agreement by enacting new laws or policies 
that threaten global connectivity, or, alternatively, whether such laws would violate the 
U.S. Constitution.  Subpart IV.B.4 considers whether non-U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates 
of Intelsat Ltd. that serve non-U.S. locations via foreign-licensed satellites can be 
rendered subject to U.S. law.  Finally, Subpart IV.B.5 considers whether global 
connectivity would continue if Intelsat Ltd. were rendered incapable of fulfilling its 
public service obligation.
1. Is Intelsat Ltd. violating current U.S. law by providing service to 
countries that are subject to U.S. trade sanctions?
The United States has been said to “lead[] the world in resorting to economic 
sanctions for foreign policy purposes.”231  Indeed, the United States currently maintains 
economic trade sanctions against Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe, and several Balkan States.232  Except for Burma 
(Myanmar) and Liberia, each of these countries is a Party to ITSO.233   Moreover, three 
such countries—North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe—have been designated by ITSO as 
“lifeline” users of Intelsat Ltd.’s services.234  As “lifeline” users, these countries depend 
heavily on Intelsat Ltd. to keep them connected with the rest of the world.  Accordingly, 
consistent with the former INTELSAT treaty organization’s historic practice, Intelsat Ltd. 
has continued to serve every ITSO member country since privatization.235  In so doing, 
however, has Intelsat Ltd. violated U.S. international trade law?
231 Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal 
Regime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1162, 1169 (1987).
232 See United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
Sanctions Program and Country Summaries Web Page, 
<http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/> (listing economic sanctions in 
effect, and providing citations to Executive Orders and statutes implementing such sanctions); see 
also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (2000 & Supp. 2005) (setting forth text of various statutes that have 
enacted trade sanctions against specific countries pursuant to International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act).
233 See ITSO Member Countries Web Site, 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=&id=3&link_src=HPL&
lang=english>.   With respect to the Baltic States, ITSO Members include Croatia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, and the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro).  Id.
234 See ATTACHMENT NO. 5 TO AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 (identifying the Democratic 
People’s Republic of (North) Korea as eligible for lifeline connectivity protection based on its 
low per capita income, and identifying both Sudan and Zimbabwe as eligible for lifeline 
connectivity protection based on both low per capita income and low teledensity).  In addition, if 
they were ITSO Members, both Burma (Myanmar) and Liberia also would qualify for “lifeline 
connectivity” protection.  See id.
235 See, e.g., Media in Iraq, BBC Monitoring Media, Jan. 24, 2005, 2005 WL 58346487 
(“Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran television in Arabic is based in Tehran and sponsored by 
the state-run Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  It broadcasts daily to Iraq on the Intelsat 902 
(continued. . . . .)
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Historically, the United States Treasury Department has allowed U.S. 
telecommunications carriers to provide international telecommunications services to 
countries otherwise subject to U.S.-international trade sanctions—perhaps on the sound 
theory that communication must be possible in order for international disputes to be 
resolved.  Accordingly, the Treasury Department has expressly excepted the provision of 
basic international telecommunications service from trade sanctions otherwise currently 
in effect against ITSO “lifeline” countries North Korea,236 Sudan,237 and Zimbabwe,238
satellite at 62 degrees east, 10973 MHz, vertical polarization.”).  For a description of the 
programming transmitted by Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, see Steven Barraclough, 
Satellite Television in Iran: Prohibition, Imitation and Reform, Middle E. Stud., July 31, 2001, at 
25, 2001 WLNR 4692654 (“As described by Ayatollah Khamene'i, the country's constitutional 
leader, Iranian broadcasting . . . is ‘the mouthpiece of the Islamic system.’  Its duty is to stand at 
the ‘forefront’ against ‘a well-organised and obvious offensive (which) has been launched by 
(the) enemies of Islam against divine principles with an aim of promoting secularism, 
undisciplined behaviour and corruption among the people.’  Since this onslaught is directed 
specifically against Islam and the Islamic Revolution, [the network] is required to promulgate 
'religious thoughts and introduce the politics of the Islamic Republic in conformity with Islam 
and other parameters effective in the administration of the country.’”) (footnotes omitted).
236 See 31 C.F.R. § 500.571 (“All transactions of U.S. common carriers incident to the 
receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving North Korea are authorized.”).
237 See 31 C.F.R. § 538.512 (“All transactions with respect to the receipt and transmission of 
telecommunications involving Sudan are authorized. This section does not authorize the provision 
to the Government of Sudan or a person in Sudan of telecommunications equipment or 
technology.”).   For background, see generally Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-497 § 6, 118 Stat. 4012 (2004) (implementing trade sanctions against Sudan “in 
support of peace in Darfur”); see also Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245 § 6(b)(2), 116 Stat. 
1507 (2002) (setting forth specific trade sanctions), both codified at 50 U.S.C. 1701 note (Supp. 
2005).
238 On March 6, 2003, President Bush issued an Executive Order prohibiting U.S. businesses 
from trading with “certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons [whose 
actions] . . . contribut[ed] to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Zimbabwe, to 
politically motivated violence and intimidation in that country, and to political and economic 
instability in the southern African region. . . .”  Exec. Order No. 13288 (March 6, 2003), 68 Fed. 
Reg. 11457 (Mar. 10, 2003).  Subsequently, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations 
that prohibit trade only with certain named persons, while continuing generally to permit trade 
with the Zimbabwean government and other persons or companies located in Zimbabwe.  See 
generally Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 45246-02 (July 29, 2004).   Even with 
respect to the named Zimbabwean persons who are subject to U.S. sanctions, the provision of 
“postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication that does not involve the 
transfer of anything of value” is expressly excepted from the sanctions.  31 C.F.R. § 541.206(a) 
(2005).  However, the regulations did not “exempt from regulation or authorize transactions 
incident to . . . the provision, sale, or leasing of capacity on telecommunications transmission 
facilities (such as satellite or terrestrial network connectivity) for use in the transmission of any 
data.”  31 C.F.R. § 541.206(b)(3).  Rather, “[t]he exportation of such items or services and the 
provision, sale, or leasing of such capacity or facilities to a [named] person whose property or 
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and also several “non-lifeline” countries currently subject to U.S.-international trade 
sanctions.239  Similarly, in the special case of Cuba, the United States Congress has 
imposed seemingly permanent general trade sanctions, but has expressly exempted 
international telecommunications services from such trade sanctions.240  At present, no 
existing U.S. law or trade policy purports to forbid the private, U.S.-licensed Intelsat Ltd. 
from providing basic international telecommunications service to any nation on earth.
2. Does the U.S. Administration have authority to promulgate new 
U.S.-international trade sanctions that might threaten Intelsat Ltd.’s 
ability to maintain global connectivity?
As discussed in Subpart IV.B.1, the United States Treasury Department, by 
administrative rule, has generally excepted the provision of international 
telecommunications services from the coverage of U.S. trade sanctions otherwise in 
effect against certain foreign countries.   Arguably, however, any rules that have been 
promulgated by the Treasury Department might some day be repealed by that 
Department.241  The question thus arises whether the patchwork of Treasury Department 
interests in property are blocked . . . are prohibited.” Id.  Thus, while existing U.S. trade sanctions 
do not interfere with Intelsat Ltd.’s provision of “lifeline” connectivity to Zimbabwe, apparently 
Intelsat Ltd. is prohibited from furnishing satellite transmission capacity directly to any of the 
individuals named in the Treasury Department regulations that implement limited trade sanctions 
against Zimbabwe.
239 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 550.510 (authorizing "[a]ll transactions of common carriers 
incident to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications . . . between the United States and 
Libya”); 31 C.F.R. § 560.508 (authorizing “[a]ll transactions of common carriers incident to the 
receipt or transmission of telecommunications . . . between the United States and Iran”); 31 
C.F.R. § 515.542(b) (generally authorizing “all transactions incident to the use of cables, satellite 
channels, radio signals, or other means of telecommunications for the provision of 
telecommunications services between Cuba and the United States, including telephone, telegraph 
and similar services, and the transmission of radio and television broadcasts and news wire feeds 
between Cuba and the United States”); 31 C.F.R. § 515.418 (authorizing U.S. communications 
carriers to make settlement payments to Cuba to complete international calls).
240 The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, as modified by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (2000), generally prohibits U.S. persons 
and business entities from engaging in virtually any commercial business transactions with Cuba.  
But the same Act specifically provides that international “[t]elecommunications services between 
the United States and Cuba shall be permitted.” 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(1) (emphasis added); see 
also 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(2) (“Telecommunications facilities are authorized in such quantity and 
of such quality as may be necessary to provide efficient and adequate telecommunications 
services between the United States and Cuba.”).  For an accounting of payments made to Cuba by 
U.S. telecommunications carriers pursuant to this statute, see Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 
F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
241 From a procedural standpoint, Treasury Department regulations that implement trade 
sanctions are particularly susceptible to hasty repeal, since the promulgation and repeal of such 
regulations need not comply with the transparent public notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures generally required by the Administrative Procedure Act.   See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) 
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regulations now in effect are subject to unilateral repeal by the Executive Branch of the 
U.S. government.  If so, then these regulations may provide a very weak foundation upon 
which to entrust the continued global connectivity of world’s telecommunications 
systems.
Ordinarily, administrative agencies enjoy considerable discretion to repeal 
regulations that they have promulgated.242  Such discretion, however, is not unlimited.  In 
particular, an agency may not take any action (including repeal of an existing regulation) 
that is “not in accordance with law” or that is “contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity.”243   At present, several U.S. statutes would appear to require the 
maintenance of at least a limited exception from trade sanctions for international 
telecommunications services.  In particular, the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act of 1977,244 under which most U.S.-international trade sanctions imposed 
since 1977 have been promulgated,245 expressly disclaims vesting the Executive Branch 
with authority to “prohibit, directly or indirectly, any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or 
other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value.”246
The same Act further disclaims providing “authority to regulate or prohibit . . . the 
importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or 
otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or 
informational materials, including but not limited to . . . news wire feeds.”247  While not 
entirely free from ambiguity, these statutory reservations appear to contemplate that any 
trade sanctions imposed under the Act would provide exemptions that would allow at 
least some commercial operation of the communications facilities needed to transmit 
(excepting from public notice-and-comment requirements those rulemakings that concern “a 
military or foreign affairs function of the United States”).
242 See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (agency's rescission of a 
rule is reviewed under same deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard by which 
promulgation of rule is reviewed).
243 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(B).  See also National Emergencies 
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (even “[w]hen the President declares a national emergency, no powers or 
authorities made available by statute for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised 
unless and until the President specifies the provisions of law under which he proposes that he, or 
other officers will act.”).
244 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07.
245 See United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
Sanctions Program and Country Summaries Web Page, 
<http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/> (listing economic sanctions in 
effect, and providing citations to Executive Orders and statutes implementing such sanctions).
246 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1).
247 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3); accord Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 § 5(b)(4) (as 
amended in 1994), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4) (same).
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telegraph messages, telephone calls, and news wire feeds.248  If so, then any future 
attempt by the U.S. Treasury Department to prohibit all commercial provision of 
international telecommunications service between the U.S. and another country would be 
subject to judicial reversal on the ground that it is “not in accordance with law.”249
Similarly, the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988 also vests the President 
with authority to impose trade sanctions under certain conditions.250  At the same time, 
however, this Act cabins the scope of such authority by providing that the President shall 
not impose sanctions that are “inconsistent with the international obligations of the 
United States. . . .”251   The current ITSO Agreement, like the INTELSAT Agreement 
before it, places the United States under an international obligation, even post-
privatization, to “maintain [the] global connectivity and global coverage” of the satellite 
system formerly operated by INTELSAT.252  Accordingly, the Telecommunications 
248 A similar implication can be derived from a provision of the Trading With The Enemy 
Act of 1917 that exempts from trade sanctions the transmission of “any telegram, cablegram, or 
wireless message, or other form of communication intended for or to be delivered, directly or 
indirectly, to an enemy or ally of enemy,” provided the communication is first submitted for 
censorship to the U.S. government.  50 U.S.C. app. § 3.  Like the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act of 1977, the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 appears to contemplate 
that commercial facilities used to transmit communications to and from hostile countries would 
remain operational during the period of hostilities.  
249 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
250 See Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3101-11.  This Act authorizes 
the imposition of trade sanctions primarily as a tool for assisting U.S. telecommunications 
providers to obtain access to foreign markets in which they seek to provide service.  See 19 
U.S.C. § 3101(b) (setting forth purposes of Act); see also 19 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(1) (setting forth 
specific trade sanctions authorized by Act).  While the U.S. has never actually imposed trade 
sanctions under this Act, it has periodically threatened to do so.  See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, 
Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation In Network Industries, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL 
L. REV. 741, 752 (2003) (asserting that the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) has implicitly threatened initiating trade sanctions against Japan, in order to pressure 
Japan into emulating US domestic regulatory policy on pricing of mandatory competitor access to 
the unbundled elements of the local network belonging to the operating companies of Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT)); Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J. Gregory Sidak, Exporting 
Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 317, 318 (2002) (same); Luz Estella Ortiz Nagle, Antitrust in the International 
Telecommunications Sector:  The United States Challenges Mexico’s Telmex Monopoly, 33 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 183, 227 (2002) (in the 1990s, United States sought WTO sanctions 
and punitive actions against Mexico during trade dispute over access to Mexican 
telecommunications markets).
251 Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988 § 1382, 19 U.S.C. § 3111 (2000).  Accord Tariff 
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(4)(E)(v), 1677(9) (2000) (same); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 
U.S.C. § 608e-1(c)(2) (2000) (same).
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Trade Act cannot provide a basis for adopting any trade sanctions that would violate the 
ITSO Agreement by preventing Intelsat Ltd. from maintaining the global connectivity 
and global coverage of its satellite system.
Collectively, these statutes appear to bar the U.S. Executive Branch from 
unilaterally rescinding the regulatory exemptions that currently allow Intelsat Ltd. to 
serve every nation on earth.  On the other hand, these statutes do not leave the U.S. 
Executive Branch powerless to slow the expansion of Intelsat service to U.S. rivals.  To 
the contrary, early in the privatization process, the U.S. Executive Branch in 2001 did 
block the deployment of the planned U.S.-licensed Ku-band “Intelsat APR-3” satellite.253
From its planned orbital location at 85° E.L., the “Intelsat APR-3” satellite would have 
offered “strategic landmass coverage of China, Russia, India and the Middle East.”254
For this reason, SINOSAT, an agency of the Chinese government, had pre-purchased the 
right to use six of the satellite’s transponders for the entire orbital maneuver life of the 
satellite.255  Launch services for the “Intelsat APR-3” satellite were to be provided by the 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation, another Chinese government agency.256  While 
the proposed lease of “Intelsat APR-3” transponders to SINOSAT did not violate any 
U.S. law or policy, the U.S. State Department denied Intelsat Ltd.’s application for the 
export license that would have permitted China Great Wall Industry Corporation to 
obtain certain U.S. technology needed to perform the launch.257   Rather than trying to 
252 ITSO Agreement, Art. III(b)(i); accord id. Art IX(c)(i) (same).  See also id. Art. XI(a) 
(“The Parties shall . . . meet their obligations under this Agreement in a manner fully consistent 
with and in furtherance of . . . the Core Principles in Article III and other provisions of this 
Agreement.”).
253 See INTELSAT Press Release, Intelsat Announces New Satellite at 85° E; Establishes 
Strategic Relationship with SINOSAT for Use of Capacity (Feb. 8, 2001), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/news/releases/press/2001/2001-02e.asp> (announcing plan to launch 
the “Intelsat APR-3” satellite).  Under earlier plans that also were never implemented, the satellite 
to be located at 85° E.L. was variously called the INTELSAT “KTV satellite” or the New Skies 
Satellite “NSS-6 satellite.”  See Chris Bulloch, Satellite Builders’ Tough Times, 57 INTERAVIA
No. 661, at 43, 2002 WLNR 5140096 (Mar. 31, 2002) (reviewing history).
254 Nick Mitsis, Asian Economic Tigers Re-Awaken Satellite Industry Pounces On Market 
Potential, VIA SATELLITE, April 10, 2001, 2001 WL 11617138.   The “Intelsat APR 3” satellite 
was intended to provide service to corporate Very Small Aperture Terminals Networks (VSATs), 
video distribution to cable head-ends, and Internet connections to ISPs.  Id.
255 See INTELSAT Press Release, Intelsat Announces New Satellite at 85° E; Establishes 
Strategic Relationship with SINOSAT for Use of Capacity (Feb. 8, 2001), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/news/releases/press/2001/2001-02e.asp>.
256 See id.
257 See Chris Bulloch, Satellite Builders’ Tough Times, 57 INTERAVIA 4347, 2002 WL 
17651360 (Mar. 1, 2002) (the Intelsat APR-3 satellite “was denied an export license for a Chinese 
launch by the US State Department, and so is once more ‘spare’.”); accord Intelsat Denies It Was 
Sending Message To State Dept, COMM. DAILY, Vol. 21, Issue 170, Aug. 31, 2001, 2001 WL 
5053923 (“Intelsat planned to launch APR-3 aboard Chinese Long March rockets, but after 
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launch the “Intelsat APR-3” satellite from a different country, Intelsat Ltd. instead 
terminated deployment of the satellite.258  In this regard, the U.S. Executive Branch did 
hinder Intelsat Ltd.’s efforts to expand the capacity of its global network.259  Under 
current U.S. law, however, the Executive Branch probably lacks the means to go any 
farther.  Specifically, the U.S. Administration seemingly lacks a legal basis to unilaterally 
order Intelsat Ltd. to curtail the provision of any existing service.
3. Does the U.S. Congress have authority to enact new U.S.-
international trade sanctions that might prevent Intelsat Ltd. from 
maintaining the global connectivity of the satellite fleet formerly 
operated by INTELSAT?
At present, several U.S. statutes appear to safeguard the patchwork of regulatory 
exemptions that currently protects Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to serve every nation on earth.  
Seemingly, however, nothing would bar the U.S. Congress from one day repealing the 
relevant statutory provisions in order to rescind such exemptions.  In particular, the fact 
that an Act of Congress might cause the United States to breach its international 
obligations under the ITSO Agreement would not bar such an Act from taking effect.260
Rather, under longstanding U.S. constitutional doctrine: 
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and 
made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are 
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and 
no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two 
relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to 
months of waiting was unable to obtain necessary presidential waiver that’s provided after State 
Dept. recommendation.”).
258 See Intelsat Denies It Was Sending Message To State Dept, COMM. DAILY, Vol. 21, Issue 
170, Aug. 31, 2001, 2001 WL 5053923 (“  Intelsat . . . confirmed that . . . APR-3 had been 
terminated. . . .  [but] insisted Intelsat wouldn't let U.S. licensing process deter it from procuring 
non-U.S. satellite launches in future.”).   
259 After Intelsat Ltd. was unable to launch the “Intelsat APR-3” satellite into the 85° E.L. 
orbital location, a satellite launched in 1996 was relocated into that location.  See In re INTELSAT 
L.L.C., 18 FCC Rcd. 16414 (Sat. Div. 2003) (authorizing Intelsat Ltd. to relocate the “Intelsat 
709” satellite from the 55.35° W.L. orbital location into the 85.15° E.L orbital location); see also 
Comsat Corporation, Authority to Participate in the Launch of the INTELSAT 709, 11 FCC Rcd. 
12170 (Sat. Div. 1996) (authorizing original launch of “Intelsat 709” satellite)
260 See A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 379, 381-82 (1997) (“[I]t is clear that Congress is free to enact legislation 
that violates the international legal obligations of the United States. This was made clear in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, [130 U.S. 581, 599-601 (1889),] which upheld legislation requiring the 
United States to take action in violation of a treaty in the face of a challenge based squarely on 
the fact that the legislation conflicted with the treaty.”) (footnotes omitted).
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construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done 
without violating the language of either; but, if the two are 
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other. . . .261
Accordingly, should the U.S. Congress ever enact a statute that prohibits Intelsat 
Ltd. from fulfilling its contractual obligations to ITSO or to a foreign “lifeline customer,” 
that statute would be “last in date” as compared with the ITSO Agreement, and would 
therefore “control” that Agreement.  Under such circumstances, international law would 
not be sufficient to safeguard Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to preserve global connectivity and 
serve “lifeline” users.262
Nor would such a statute likely be held to violate the U.S. Constitution.  Possibly, 
depending on its scope and effect, such a statute might unconstitutionally abridge the 
recognized First Amendment right of persons located inside the United States to receive 
information from foreign sources.263  That First Amendment right, however, has not 
261 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (emphasis added).  Although Whitney is 
more than a century old, throughout the twentieth century the Supreme Court consistently 
reaffirmed “that an Act of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute 
which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict 
renders the treaty null.”  Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion)) (ellipses in Breard); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1)(a) (1986) (“An act of Congress 
supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement as law 
of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if 
the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.”).
262 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“If the country with which the 
treaty is made is dissatisfied with the action of the legislative department, it may present its 
complaint to the executive head of the government, and take such other measures as it may deem 
essential for the protection of its interests. The courts can afford no redress. Whether the 
complaining nation has just cause of complaint, or our country was justified in its legislation, are 
not matters for judicial cognizance.”).  The constitutional principle that U.S. courts may not 
fashion remedies to redress U.S. violations of international trade treaties is also reflected 
throughout the U.S. Code.  See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (“No 
provision of any trade agreement approved by the Congress . . . which is in conflict with any 
statute of the United States shall be given effect under the laws of the United States.”); 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3512 (same, concerning U.S. violations of World Trade Organization Uruguay Round 
Agreements); 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (same).
263 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972) (recognizing First 
Amendment right of U.S. citizens to hear Belgian professor “explain and seek to defend his 
views,” but sustaining professor’s exclusion from United States based on his previous violations 
of visa restrictions); Lamont v. Postmaster General of United States, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) 
(holding unconstitutional statute requiring destruction of unsealed mail from foreign countries 
determined to be “communist political propaganda” unless addressee returned reply card 
indicating desire to receive such mail).  Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (upholding 
statute requiring registration as “political propaganda” of certain expressive materials sponsored 
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generally been construed to include any concomitant right of U.S. persons to expend or 
receive money in connection with the receipt of information from foreign sources,264 and 
thus might not sufficiently safeguard Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to provide global connectivity 
on a commercial basis.265  Alternatively, to the extent that the INTELSAT treaty 
organization’s privatization was predicated in substantial part on its reliance on U.S. 
government assurances that privatization would not impair the satellite system’s ability to 
provide global connectivity, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment arguably 
might be construed to prevent the government from later reneging on its assurances.266  In 
practice, however, whatever assurances the U.S. government gave to INTELSAT (and 
INTELSAT’s state Parties) would not likely satisfy the stringent standard of 
“unmistakabity” needed to bind the U.S. government to a promise under the Due Process 
Clause.267
4. If the U.S. Congress enacts new U.S.-international trade sanctions 
that hinder Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to maintain global connectivity, 
by foreign governments and intended to influence U.S. foreign policies, on ground that 
registration requirement did not suppress distribution of such materials in the United States).
264 See, e.g., Veterans & Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Comm’r of Customs, 
459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1972) (sustaining regulations prohibiting U.S. residents from paying money 
to booksellers located in North Vietnam, North Korea, or China, to obtain books); Teague v. 
Regional Comm’r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977 
(1969).
265 For arguments that judicial protection of the First Amendment right to receive 
information from foreign sources has generally been inadequate, see Burt Neuborne & Steven R. 
Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 719 (1985); Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 
840 (1989).
266 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875-76 (1996) (holding that Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause prohibited U.S. government from reneging on promise to apply 
special accounting treatment to acquirers of failing thrifts; “[a]though the Contract Clause has no 
application to acts of the United States, it is clear that the National Government has some 
capacity to make agreements binding future Congresses by creating vested rights.  The extent of 
that capacity, to be sure, remains somewhat obscure.”) (internal citations omitted)
267 See Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 877 (reciting “unmistakability doctrine,” which provides 
that “absent an ‘unmistakable’ provision to the contrary, contractual arrangements, including 
those to which a sovereign itself is a party, remain subject to subsequent legislation by the 
sovereign.”) (internal quote marks and citations omitted); accord id. at 878 (“a contract with a 
sovereign government will not be read to include an unstated term exempting the other 
contracting party from the application of a subsequent sovereign act (including an Act of 
Congress), nor will an ambiguous term of a grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or 
surrender of sovereign power.”).  But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1665-66 (2002) (arguing that the strong 
presumption “barring legislative entrenchment should be discarded; legislatures should be 
allowed to bind their successors, subject to any independent constitutional limits in force.”).
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would Intelsat Ltd.’s non-U.S.-licensed satellites be required to 
comply with the sanctions?  
Would the world’s communications systems remain interconnected if, in the 
future, the U.S. Congress were to enact legislation prohibiting the provision of basic 
international telecommunications services to certain “rogue states”?   Even in this “worst-
case” scenario, Intelsat Ltd. arguably has some means of fulfilling its public service 
obligations to maintain global connectivity and serve “lifeline” users.  This is because 
some non-U.S. users of the Intelsat satellite system now take service from non-U.S. 
affiliates and subsidiaries of Intelsat Ltd, via satellites that are operated pursuant to non-
U.S. licenses and registrations.  Specifically, since obtaining U.S. government licenses to 
operate the fleet of 17 in-orbit satellites previously operated by the INTELSAT treaty 
organization,268 Intelsat Ltd. has diversified the regulatory jurisdiction to which its 
operations are subject.  At the outset of its privatization process, Intelsat Ltd. announced 
its intention to license the operation of its planned future Ka-, BSS-, and V-band satellites
in the United Kingdom, rather than the United States.269  Moreover, under arrangements 
set in place just before INTELSAT was privatized, Intelsat Ltd. now provides some 
service in the eastern hemisphere via satellite space stations owned by the governments 
of India270 and the People’s Republic of China.271  Since privatizing, Intelsat Ltd. has also 
268 See In re Intelsat L.L.C., 16 FCC Rcd. 12280, ¶¶ 8-9 (2001) (licensing a U.S. subsidiary 
of Intelsat Ltd. to operate the 17 C-band and Ku-band satellite space stations then in orbit, which 
formerly had been operated by the international treaty organization INTELSAT).
269 See id at ¶ 8 n.22 (noting that INTELSAT had “selected the United Kingdom as the 
licensing jurisdiction for future satellites that may be constructed for operating in the Ka-band, V-
band and BSS band.”); see also id. ¶ 9 (noting that Intelsat Ltd., the Bermuda holding 
corporation, “will hold the United Kingdom authorizations for ITU registrations in the Ka-, BSS-, 
and V-bands.”).  As of 2005, Intelsat Ltd. has not yet launched any Ka-band, V-band, or and 
BSS-band satellites.
270 On April 3, 1999, the “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite space station was launched into 
fixed orbit at 83° E.L. by the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) program.  Aparna Achar, Insat 
2E Impacts Indian Communications, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, Volume 33, Issue 
5, at 22, 1999 WL 12495481 (May 1, 1999).  The “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite is owned by 
the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), an agency of the Indian government.  Id.  The 
83° E.L. orbital location is registered to India by the ITU.   Id.  Even before the Insat 2E/ Intelsat 
APR-1 satellite was launched, INTELSAT leased nine of the satellite’s 17 C-band transponders 
for a period of 10 years.  Id.  By 2000, INTELSAT was using eleven of the satellite’s seventeen 
transponders.  Insat-3B: Big Leap For Net Services, COMPUTERS TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000, at 68, 
2000 WL 3282501; accord Space-Based Digital Embrace, THE HINDU, July 25, 2002, 2002 WL 
24723404 (“Interestingly, Intelsat uses some of India’s satellite capacity: ISRO has leased 11 C-
Band channels on INSAT-2E to the global company.”).  For background on INTELSAT’s 
involvement in the financing and launch of the “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite, see COMSAT 
Corp., DA 97-330, 1997 WL 54847 (Int'l Bur. Feb. 12, 1997) (authorizing INTELSAT’s U.S. 
Signatory to lease eleven 36 MHz units of C-band capacity from the Indian National Satellite 
System on the INSAT-2E spacecraft, and to provide INTELSAT services via those facilities).
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acquired an operational satellite licensed by the government of Papua New Guinea, an 
independent parliamentary democracy.272  To the extent that Intelsat Ltd. (a Bermuda 
holding company)273 uses Chinese-, Indian-, British-, or Papua New Guinean- licensed 
271 On July 18, 1998, the “Sinosat-1/ Intelsat APR-2” satellite space station was launched 
into fixed orbit at 110.5° E.L, an orbital location whose ITU registration is held by the Peoples’ 
Republic of China.  The “Sinosat-1/ Intelsat APR-2” satellite is owned by the SINO Satellite 
Communications Company Ltd. (“SINOSAT”), a state-owned telecommunications operator of 
the Peoples’ Republic of China.   See Sinosat English Language Web Page, 
<http://www.sinosatcom.com/english/company/index.htm>.  On June 6, 2000, INTELSAT and 
SINOSAT announced that Intelsat Ltd. would use up to six of the Sinosat-1 satellite’s twenty-
three “36 MHz C-band transponders” to provide Internet backbone connections or ISP access, 
regional business voice/data networks, regional backbone networks, multimedia, VSAT/virtual 
private networks, and video contribution and distribution networks in the Asia Pacific Region.  
Intelsat Ltd. Press Release, Intelsat to Lease Six Transponders on SINOSAT-1 (Singapore, June 6, 
2000), <http://www.intelsat.com/news/releases/press/2000/2000-14e.asp>.
272 See note [99], supra, and surrounding text (describing Intelsat Ltd.’s purchase of the 
“EchoStar 9/Telstar 13” satellite from the insolvent Loral Space & Communications 
Corporation). The “EchoStar 9/Telstar 13,” satellite, originally a joint venture of Echostar and 
Loral, was launched into the 121º W.L. orbital location on August 7, 2003.  See Boeing News 
Release, Sea Launch Successfully Launches EchoStar IX/Telstar 13 Satellite into Orbit (Aug. 7, 
2003), <http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2003/q3/nr_030807s.html> (reporting launch).  
At that time, the satellite’s C-Band transponders, which serve the North American continent, were 
designated as the “Telstar 13” satellite, owned by Loral SpaceCom Corp., and operated under 
license from the government of Papua New Guinea.  EchoStar Satellite Corp., 18 FCC Rcd. 
15862, ¶ 6 (Int’l Bur. Aug. 1, 2003), modified, EchoStar Satellite Corp., 18 FCC Rcd. 15875 (Sat. 
Div. Aug. 1, 2003).  The Ka-band and Ku-band transponders on board the same satellite were 
designated the “EchoStar 9” satellite, owned by Echostar, and operated under U.S. license and 
registration.  Id. at ¶¶ 5, 15 (authorizing operation of EchoStar 9 satellite).  When ownership of 
the C-band transponders aboard the “Telstar 13” satellite was transferred from Loral to Intelsat 
Ltd. in March 2004, those transponders retained their Papua New Guinean licensure.  See In re 
Visionstar Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 14820, ¶ 13 n.36 (Int’l Bur. 2004) (“The C-band payload aboard the 
EchoStar 9 satellite is operated pursuant to an authorization from Papua New Guinea under the 
name ‘Telstar 13.’  Although Loral SpaceCom Corp. was the original operator of the Telstar 13 
payload, its interest in the payload was recently transferred to Intelsat North America LLC 
(Intelsat).”) (citing Loral Satellite, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 2404 ¶ 10 (Int'l Bur. 2004) and Loral 
SpaceCom Corp., 18 FCC Rcd. 16374 (Int'l Bur. 2003)).  The Ka-band and Ku-band transponders 
on board the same satellite continue to be owned by Echostar and operated as the “EchoStar 9” 
satellite, which remains licensed in the United States.
273 See Intelsat Ltd. Annual Report for 2003 (stating that Bermuda is Intelsat Ltd.’s 
“Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Organization” and its “Address of Principal Executive Offices”), 
filed with U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Form 20-F (filed March 15, 2004), 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1156871/000095013304000891/w95010e20vf.htm>.  
Because Intelsat Ltd. is a Bermuda holding company, disputes concerning Intelsat Ltd.’s internal 
governance generally must be resolved under Bermuda law.  See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 
224 (1997) (under the “internal affairs doctrine” in conflict of laws, courts “normally look to the 
State of a business’ incorporation for the law that provides the relevant corporate governance 
general standard of care.”) (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 309 (1971)). 
63
satellites to provide communications services on international routes that do not begin, 
end, or pass through the United States, the attenuation of such services from the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the United States arguably might provide Intelsat Ltd. with a 
measure of insulation against U.S. national laws and trade policies.
Intelsat Ltd.’s use of non-U.S.-licensed satellites, however, is unlikely to fully 
insulate the company’s operations against adverse U.S. legislation.  Rather, in a handful 
of previous instances, the U.S. Congress has enacted statutes purporting to prohibit non-
U.S. entities located outside the United States from engaging in certain business 
transactions with third party “rogue states.”274  As of 2005, the U.S. government has 
never actually enforced any of these statutes against a non-U.S. entity.  Nor have any of 
these statutes purported to restrict the provision of basic international telecommunications 
service, even to “rogue states.”275  Nonetheless, these statutes illustrate Congress’s 
occasional predilection to legislate extraterritorially.  Accordingly, enactment of a statute 
purporting to prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from using its non-U.S.-licensed satelites to serve 
certain “rogue states” would not be wholly unprecedented.  
Nor would such a statute be unenforceable against Intelsat Ltd.’s non-U.S. 
subsidiaries or affiliates.  Rather, U.S. courts have generally sustained the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. substantive law, subject only to the ability of those courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over non-U.S. defendants.276   Here, should Intelsat Ltd. ever be 
sued or prosecuted in connection with its use of non-U.S.-licensed satellites, the 
Washington DC-based company would almost certainly be subject to personal 
274 See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172 §§ 5-6, 110 Stat. 
1541, 1543-45 (1996) (imposing sanctions against any non-U.S. company or person who directly 
and significantly enhances Iran’s or Libya’s ability to develop their petroleum resources, or 
enhances Libya’s aviation, military, or paramilitary capabilities), amended by, Pub. L. No. 107-
24, §§ 2(a), 3 to 5, 115 Stat. 199, 200 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note 
(Supp. 2005); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,  (“Helms-
Burton Act”), Pub. L. No. 104-114 § 102(a)(2), 110 Stat. 785, 792 (1996), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 
6032(a)(2) (“urg[ing] the President to take immediate steps to apply . . . sanctions . . . against 
countries assisting Cuba.”).  For a thorough analysis of these statutes, see Harry L. Clark, Dealing 
With U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. Pa.  J.  Int’l Bus. L. 61 
(1999).  For a European perspective, see KINKA GERKE, UNILATERAL STRAINS ON
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS : US SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO TRADE WITH CUBA, IRAN, 
AND LIBYA, AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE WORLD TRADE REGIME (1997). 
275 See note [n-1], supra (discussing scope of foreign business activities restricted by Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act and Helms-Burton Act); see also Subpart IV.B.1, supra (discussing 
history of exempting basic international telecommunications service from scope of U.S.-
international trade sanctions).
276 The constitutionality of the Helms-Burton Act was sustained in a case brought by a 
domestic public interest organization.  See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 
1431 (9th Cir. 1996).  See also Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial 
Legislation?, 35 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 379 (1997) (arguing that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment imposes no territorial limits on the legislative power of Congress).
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jurisdiction in U.S. courts—even if the suit or prosecution concerned only the use by a 
non-U.S. subsidiary or affiliate of Intelsat Ltd. of non-U.S.-licensed satellites to serve 
countries or territories located outside the United States.277
In addition, separate and apart from any threat of suit or prosecution, Intelsat 
Ltd.’s operations remain subject to regulatory control by the U.S. FCC, whose arsenal of 
tools is substantial.  Most directly, should Intelsat Ltd.’s non-U.S. subsidiaries or 
affiliates fail to honor any U.S. trade sanctions imposed by Congress, the FCC could 
revoke (or threaten to revoke) Intelsat Ltd.’s existing U.S. licenses.278  Were its U.S. 
licenses to be revoked, Intelsat Ltd. would be unable to operate the majority of its 
satellites.  In addition, the FCC could also revoke (or threaten to revoke) Intelsat Ltd.’s 
existing authority to use at least one of its non-U.S. licensed satellites, the Papua New 
Guinea-licensed “Telstar 13,” to serve users located in the United States.279  Finally, the 
277 See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 & n.9 
(1984) (U.S. courts will exercise “general jurisdiction” over a nonresident defendant that has 
“continuous and systematic” contact with the forum, regardless of whether the controversy at 
issue arises out of any such contacts).   Because most of Intelsat Ltd.’s employees are located in 
the United States and much of its service is provided to users located in the United States, Intelsat 
Ltd. would clearly satisfy the “continuous and systematic” contact standard.  For criticism of the 
application of “general jurisdiction” in international litigation involving foreign defendants who 
do business in the United States, see Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the 
Exercise of General Jurisdiction, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1035, 1037-38 & nn.8-9 (2004).  For a 
general defense, see Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 141.
278 Should Intelsat Ltd. violate any FCC rules or policies, the FCC could revoke or suspend 
the satellite space station licenses currently held by Intelsat Ltd.’s U.S. subsidiary.  See Policy 
Regarding Character Qualifications In Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179, ¶¶ 7, 21 (1986) 
(FCC licensees must “comply with the Communications Act and [FCC] rules and policies” in 
order to obtain and retain their licenses,), recon. denied, 1 FCC Rcd. 421 (1986).  In this regard, it 
is significant that in certain circumstances, an FCC licensee can be held responsible for violations
of FCC rules and policies committed by its corporate parent or subsidiary, whether or not the 
licensee is directly involved in the parent’s or subsidiary’s misconduct. See id. at ¶¶ 79, 82.  Thus, 
Intelsat Ltd.’s U.S. subsidiary licensee could possibly be held responsible if Intelsat Ltd. or an 
affiliate were to use Intelsat Ltd.’s non-U.S.-licensed satellites as a means of circumventing U.S. 
law or FCC policy.  Moreover, although the FCC has very rarely revoked licenses from existing 
licensees, few licensees would risk revocation by continuing to engage in conduct of which the 
FCC has expressed disapproval.  See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting In The Shadow of 
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 873 (1997) (arguing that 
“administrative arm-twisting”—i.e., “a threat by an agency to impose a sanction or withhold a 
benefit in hopes of encouraging ‘voluntary’ compliance with a request that the agency could not 
impose directly on a regulated entity”—represents a broad and important category of informal 
agency activity).
279 See Loral SpaceCom Corp., Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Add Telstar 13 to the 
Permitted Space Station List, 18 FCC Rcd. 16374 (Sat. Div. 2003) (authorizing the Papua New 
Guinea-licensed “Telstar 13” satellite located at the 121° W.L. orbit location to communicate 
routinely, without additional FCC action, with earth stations located in the United States); see 
(continued. . . . .)
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FCC probably could exercise additional leverage over Intelsat Ltd. by prohibiting (or 
threatening to prohibit) Intelsat Ltd.’s U.S.-licensed telecommunications customers from 
communicating with Intelsat Ltd.’s satellites.280
Finally, in addition to the power that the U.S. government wields in its sovereign 
capacity as a regulatory authority, it also yields additional power in its commercial 
capacity as a consumer of satellite services.  At present, the United States government 
purchases up to ten percent of all satellite capacity available commercially in the U.S. 
market.281  At least half of this capacity is used to fulfill U.S. military requirements.282
also FCC International Bureau, Permitted Space Station List Web Page, 
<http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sd/se/permitted.html> (listing the “Telstar 13” satellite as a foreign-
licensed “permitted space station,” authorized to communicate with earth stations located inside 
the United States).  As of 2005, Intelsat Ltd. has never sought to add any non-U.S.-licensed 
satellite space station other than the “Telstar 13” to the FCC’s “permitted space station list.” 
Neither the Indian-licensed “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite nor the Chinese-licensed 
“Sinosat-1/ Intelsat APR-2” satellite is located in an orbital location from which it is possible to 
serve the United States.  See notes [270-71], supra (discussing these satellites).
280 In International Settlement Rates, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806 (1997), aff’d, Cable & Wireless 
PLC v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the FCC essentially dictated to every foreign 
telecommunications carrier on earth the maximum “settlement rates” receivable by those foreign 
carriers to complete an international phone call originating in the United States.   Although it 
lacked direct authority to regulate non-U.S. carriers, the FCC accomplished its objective by 
prohibiting U.S. carriers from paying to foreign carriers any “settlement rates” in excess of the 
FCC-prescribed caps.  See Cable & Wireless PLC, 166 F.3d at 1229-32 (describing, and 
sustaining, FCC’s indirect strategy for imposing settlement rate caps on foreign carriers).  See 
also Rob Frieden, Regulatory Opportunism In Telecommunications: The Unlevel Competitive 
Playing Field, 10 CommLaw Conspectus 81, 92 (2001) (noting that the FCC’s “Settlement 
Rates” Order was affirmed notwithstanding that FCC efforts “to affect the behavior and the 
financial performance of [foreign] carriers has generated vocal opposition, at home and abroad, 
that the Commission failed to appreciate international comity and national sovereignty.”) 
(footnotes omitted).  Here, by analogy, in the event that Intelsat Ltd.’s non-U.S.-licensed satellites 
were ever used in ways inconsistent with U.S. policy, the FCC would likely have authority to 
prohibit U.S.-licensed carriers and users from communicating with those satellites. 
281 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION: COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SECURITY SHOULD BE MORE FULLY ADDRESSED, GAO 
Rep. No. GAO-02-781, at 6 (Oct. 3, 2002), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02781.pdf>.  
Historically, federal agencies spent an estimated $400 million annually to secure capacity from 
commercial satellites.  Andy Pasztor, U.S. Contracts Bring Windfall For French Firm, WALL 
ST. J., March 28, 2003, at A11, 2003 WL-WSJ 3963189. 
282 Andy Pasztor, U.S. Contracts Bring Windfall For French Firm, WALL ST. J., March 28, 
2003, at A11, 2003 WL-WSJ 3963189.  For example, commercial communications satellites 
carried 45 percent of all military communications between the United States and the Persian Gulf 
region during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991.  UNITED STATES GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: COMMERCIAL SATELLITE 
SECURITY SHOULD BE MORE FULLY ADDRESSED, GAO Rep. No. GAO-02-781, at 7 (Oct. 3, 
2002), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02781.pdf>.  As of 2002, nearly 60 percent of the 
(continued. . . . .)
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By potentially threatening to take its substantial business elsewhere, the U.S. government 
has an additional means of pressuring Intelsat Ltd. to comply with U.S. laws and policies.  
For all of these reasons, if the U.S. Congress should ever enact a statute purporting to 
prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from providing international telecommunications services to “rogue 
states,” even Intelsat Ltd.’s non-U.S.-licensed satellites would almost certainly be 
compelled to comply with such a statute.
5. Does the United States now have the ability to disrupt the universal 
global connectivity of the world’s communications systems, or to 
remove individual countries from the world’s communications 
infrastructure?  
The United States Congress, working in conjunction with the President, probably 
now does possess power to disrupt Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to maintain global 
connectivity.283  For proponents of the principle of global connectivity, the de facto
devolution to the U.S. government of legal authority to disrupt Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to 
serve every nation on earth is a cause for concern.  By the same token, however, the 
impact of INTELSAT’s privatization on the urgency of that concern should not be 
overstated.  Even before privatization, the United States government exercised 
tremendous influence on INTELSAT’s decision-making and conduct.284  Nonetheless, 
the United States never sought to use that influence to advocate the exclusion or 
expulsion from INTELSAT of any country or territory.   Nor, since privatization, has the 
United States sought to prevent the privatized Intelsat Ltd. from providing service to any 
country.  Indeed, by ratifying the ITSO Agreement in 2000, the United States formally 
reaffirmed its commitment to preserving universal global connectivity.285  Since 2000, no 
U.S. elected official has publicly called for reconsideration of that commitment.286
satellite capacity purchased commercially by the Department of Defense was supplied by Intelsat 
Ltd.  Renae Merle, U.S. Probes Military's Use of Commercial Satellites, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 
2002, at E5, 2002 WL 103574491.
283 See Subpart IV.B.4, supra.
284 As the largest user of the INTELSAT system, the United States exercised substantial 
influence within INTELSAT through its participation in INTELSAT governance.  See
INTELSAT Agreement Art. IX(f) (allocating certain voting rights within INTELSAT based on 
each member country's investment share, where investment share reflected each country's 
utilization of INTELSAT satellite transmission capacity).  See also COMSAT Study, 77 FCC 2d 
564, ¶¶ 436-42 (1980) (discussing the mechanism by which the U.S. Government formerly 
participated in INTELSAT’s governance through its “instructional process”).  On occasion, the 
United States also influenced INTELSAT by threatening to withdraw from the organization if it 
did not have its way.  See, e.g. Subpart III.A, supra (describing the U.S. government’s role in 
influencing INTELSAT’s decision to privatize in 1999-2000).
285 See ITSO Agreement Arts. III(b)(i), IX(c)(i) (providing that State Parties to ITSO, 
including the United States, must ensure that the satellite system formerly operated by 
INTELSAT maintains “global connectivity and global coverage” post-privatization, including
(continued. . . . .)
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Moreover, while privatization undoubtedly has enhanced the ability of the United 
States to control access to the INTELSAT satellite system, it bears remembering that, 
prior to privatization, the same gatekeeping role formerly was performed by the 
INTELSAT treaty organization itself.  Recognizing that some form of gatekeeping is 
inevitable, some commentators have reasonably opined that universal global connectivity 
would be better safeguarded by internationalizing that gatekeeping function (as was done 
by INTELSAT prior to privatization), rather than by vesting such power in a single 
national government.287  However, it must be noted that intergovernmental treaty 
organizations do not necessarily prioritize the principle of universal global 
communications connectivity above other political concerns.  The Charter of the recently 
formed African Union, for example, expressly contemplates the disruption of 
international telecommunications links as a permissible political sanction against 
intransigent member nations.288  In this regard, the African Union has followed the lead 
of the United Nations, whose Charter has long authorized the interruption of international 
“non-discriminatory access to the . . . system” and continued service to “lifeline connectivity 
customers”).
286 During the same time period, in contrast, the United States formally “unsigned” the 
Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. See Letter from John R. Bolton, 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, to U.N. Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm> (“unsigning” 
treaty).  Also during the same time period, various “U.S. officials and their political supporters 
urged the unsigning of a number of important treaties that the United States has signed but not yet 
ratified—such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Biodiversity Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the ILO Convention on Race 
Discrimination in Employment.”  Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2064 
& n.15 (2003) (citing news accounts and press releases).
287 See, e.g., Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 28 J. Space L. 101 (2000), 
reprinted in 5 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 111, 128-29 (2001) (arguing that “the FCC as custodian 
of the US interest is likely to listen to comments and argument made by US nationals, and the 
very nature of these proceedings is culturally alien to most of the world and therefore their 
outcomes can be difficult to accept.  . . .  [I]n licensing the FCC takes account of US interests.  
While it is true that it is supposed to have some regard to more general interests, it would be 
preferable to have INTELSAT's licensing done with regard to the world as a whole, and to leave 
national interests aside.”) (footnotes omitted).
288 See Constitutive Act of the African Union, Organization of African Unity, done July 11, 
2000, entered into force May 26, 2001, Art. 23, ¶ 2 (African Union Member States that fail to 
comply with the decisions and policies of the African Union will be subject to sanctions, 
including “the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other 
measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.”) (emphasis 
added), discussed in Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Unfinished Business: Conflicts, the African 
Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 55, 68 
& n.81 (2003).
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telecommunications links as an acceptable form of political sanction against international 
aggressors.289
Of course, the INTELSAT treaty organization—unlike the African Union, the 
United Nations, or the United States—was never empowered to impose political 
sanctions against individual INTELSAT member countries.290  INTELSAT was, 
however, empowered to expel individual countries from membership in the 
organization.291  While INTELSAT never exercised this power, it does appear that the 
Peoples’ Republic of China successfully exercised its influence within the INTELSAT 
treaty organization to prevent the Republic of China (Taiwan) from ever obtaining 
INTELSAT membership.292  Accordingly, by removing China from the gatekeeping 
process, INTELSAT’s privatization, in fact, has greatly enhanced the ability of at least 
one territory, Taiwan, to obtain service from INTELSAT’s former satellite system.293
Conversely, while undeniably raising some concerns, to date the introduction of a U.S. 
gatekeeping role has not actually impaired the ability of any country or territory on earth 
to obtain service from the satellite system now operated by Intelsat Ltd.  
Moreover, certain developments since privatization have further reduced the 
likelihood that the United States might seek to bar Intelsat Ltd. from maintaining 
universal global connectivity.  Specifically, in addition to providing some services via 
non-U.S.-licensed satellite space stations,294 Intelsat Ltd. has also recently begun to do 
289 See U.N. Charter Art. 41, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) (In response to a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, “[t]he Security Council may . . . call upon the Members 
of the United Nations to apply . . . measures . . . include[ing] complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”) (emphasis added).
290 See INTELSAT Agreement Art. III (“INTELSAT shall have as its prime objective the 
provision, on a commercial basis, of the space segment required for international public 
telecommunications services of high quality and reliability to be available on a non-
discriminatory basis to all areas of the world.”).
291 See INTELSAT Agreement Art. XVI(b)(i), (k) (setting forth procedure for “involuntary 
withdrawal” from INTELSAT of state Parties that “failed to comply with any obligation under 
this Agreement”).  This “involuntary withdrawal” procedure was never invoked.
292 Author’s Interview with Prof. Yu-Li Liu, Department of Radio and Television, National 
Chengchi University, College of Communication, Taipei, Taiwan (Sept. 29, 2002).  The Republic 
of China (Taiwan) was never admitted to membership in INTELSAT or ITSO.   See ITSO 
Member Countries Web Page, 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=&id=3&link_src=HPL&
lang=english>.  Similarly, the Republic of China (Taiwan) also has never been admitted to 
membership in the United Nations.  See United Nations List of Member States Web Page, 
<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>.
293 Author’s Interview with Prof. Yu-Li Liu, Department of Radio and Television, National 
Chengchi University, College of Communication, Taipei, Taiwan (Sept. 29, 2002).  
294 See Subpart IV.B.4, supra.
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the reverse: to sell individual transponders located on board its own U.S.- licensed 
satellites to foreign government users.  Thus, under an agreement negotiated in 2000, a 
telecommunications operator controlled by the Norwegian government (“Telenor 
A.S.”)295 purchased the permanent right to use one quarter of the transmission capacity of 
the U.S.-licensed Intelsat Ltd. “10-02” satellite, which became operational in August 
2004.296  The “10-02” satellite is located at 359°E, with spot beams that cover all of 
Europe and the Middle East and much of Central Asia and North Africa.297  Moreover, 
Telenor uses its transmission capacity on the “10-02” satellite to serve not just Norway, 
but also other territories throughout Europe and the Middle East.298  Similarly, in 2001 a 
telecommunications agency of the Chinese government (“SINOSAT”) acquired the rights 
to use two C-band transponders on a planned Intelsat satellite then scheduled for launch 
into the 178° E.L. orbital location.299   In 2004, Portugal's government broadcasting 
295 In September 2000, when it entered into the agreement with INTELSAT described 
herein, “Telenor AS” was an agency of the Norwegian government, but had already initiated a 
process of privatization.  Telenor History Web Page, 
<http://www.telenor.com/about/history/chronology/>.  Shortly thereafter, on December 4, 2000, 
Telenor was partly privatized, and its stock was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  Id.  The 
Kingdom of Norway, however, retained a 79% ownership interest in the partly privatized 
Telenor.  See In re Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications, Comsat Corp., Comsat General 
Corp., & Telenor Satellite Services Holdings, Inc., Order on Reconsideration, 17 FCC Rcd. 
14030, 14032 ¶ 3 (2002).
296 In September 2000, before either INTELSAT or Telenor had been privatized, 
INTELSAT leased to Telenor the right to use 10 high-power Ku-band transponders located on the 
planned “Intelsat 10-02” satellite, for the entire life of the satellite.  Intelsat Ltd. Press Release, 
Intelsat and Telenor Launch New Satellite Partnership at 359° E (Sept. 21, 2000), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/news/releases/press/2000/2000-24e.asp>.  Upon privatization of both 
parties, rights and obligations under this lease agreement were assigned to the respective private 
successor entities, Intelsat Ltd. and Telenor Satellite Services Holdings, Inc.  The “Intelsat 10-02” 
satellite, which is U.S.-licensed, was launched into orbit at 359° E.L. (1° W.L.) in June 2004, and 
became operational in August 2004.  Intelsat Ltd. Press Release, Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite 
Launch Successful: Satellite to Provide High-Power Coverage of Europe, Africa, South America 
and the Middle East (June 17, 2004), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2004&art=20040617_01_EN.
xml&lang=en&footer=65>.  At the time the satellite became operational, approximately 50 
percent of its 36 Ku-band transponders were owned by Telenor.  Id.  (In addition to these 36 Ku-
band transponders, the “10-02” satellite also carries 70 operational C-band transponders).  Id.
297 See Intelsat Ltd. Press Release, Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite Launch Successful: Satellite 
to Provide High-Power Coverage of Europe, Africa, South America and the Middle East (June 
17, 2004); see also Coverage Maps: Intelsat 10-02 @ 359°E Web Page, 
<http://www.intelsat.com/satellites/covmaps/10-02@359.asp> (illustrating the coverage of the 
satellite’s spot beams in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa).
298 See Intelsat Ltd. Press Release, Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite Launch Successful: Satellite 
to Provide High-Power Coverage of Europe, Africa, South America and the Middle East (June 
17, 2004).
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agency entered into leases to purchase transmission capacity on three separate U.S.-
licensed Intelsat Ltd. satellites from 2005-2007.300
Selling or leasing transponders to foreign government users cannot immunize 
Intelsat Ltd. from having to comply with U.S. laws.  Such activity can, however, interject 
diplomatic ramifications into any decision by the U.S. Congress to enact legislation that 
would hinder Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to fulfill its public service obligations.  Undoubtedly, 
some U.S. Congress Members might favor prohibiting U.S. commercial communications 
carriers (including Intelsat Ltd.) from serving “rogue states” such as Iran or North Korea. 
The same Members, however, might pause before enacting legislation that would dictate 
to the governments of Norway, Portugal, or China, new limitations on the permissible 
uses of satellite transponders that those governments have already purchased from a U.S. 
company.  In response to Congress’s enactment of such legislation, those foreign 
governments, at a minimum, might raise a meritorious claim against the United States 
through ITSO’s dispute resolution process.301  At a maximum, those governments might 
lodge complaints with the World Trade Organization, or might retaliate by enacting 
corresponding sanctions affecting U.S.-international trade.  Alternatively, those 
governments might simply ignore any resale restrictions imposed by U.S. legislation, 
leaving the U.S. government to face difficult choices about whether and how to pursue 
enforcement.  Because of these considerations, Intelsat Ltd.’s practice of selling 
transponders on some of its U.S.-licensed satellites to foreign government users may 
constitute a political safeguard that contributes to protecting Intelsat Ltd.’s continued 
ability to maintain global connectivity.  
299 See INTELSAT Press Release, Intelsat Announces New Satellite at 85° E; Establishes 
Strategic Relationship with SINOSAT for Use of Capacity (Feb. 8, 2001), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/news/releases/press/2001/2001-02e.asp>.  See also Paul Dykewicz, 
Further Consolidation Among Operators Is Ahead, SATELLITE NEWS, Aug. 23, 2004, 2004 
WLNR 839039 (reporting that “Sinosat acquired rights to use two C-band transponders on . . . 
[an] Intelsat satellite at 178 degrees E.”).   Although Intelsat Ltd. to date has not carried out its 
plan to launch a new satellite into the 178° E.L. orbital location, in April 2005 it migrated its 
existing “Intelsat 605” satellite into that location.  See Actions Taken, Public Notice, 19 FCC Rcd. 
20950, 20950 (Int'l Bur. Oct. 22, 2004) (authorizing Intelsat Ltd. “to immediately begin drifting 
the INTELSAT 605 satellite from its current location at 32.9° E.L. to 178.0° E.L.”); see also 
Satellite Space Applications Accepted for Filing, Public Notice, NO. SAT-00251, 2004 WL 
2376094 (FCC Satellite Policy Branch Oct. 22, 2004) (noting that the “INTELSAT 605 [satellite] 
is expected to be at the 178.0° E.L. location in March/April 2005.”).
300 See INTELSAT Press Release, Intelsat to Provide International Distribution for Radio e 
Televisao de Portugal (Sept. 10, 2004), 
<http://www.intelsat.com/aboutus/press/release_details.aspx?year=2004&art=20040910_01_EN.
xml>.
301 See ITSO Agreement Art. XVI(a) (“All legal disputes arising in connection with the 
rights and obligations under this Agreement between Parties with respect to each other, or 
between ITSO and one or more Parties, if not otherwise settled within a reasonable time, shall be 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Annex A to this Agreement.”).
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Finally, it must be noted that even if the U.S. Congress should enact legislation 
that effectively prevents Intelsat Ltd. and other U.S.-international carriers from providing 
service to users located in certain foreign countries, at this late date such legislation 
would not likely cause any country to be disconnected from the global communications 
grid.  In 2005, nearly 250 commercial communications satellites operate from locations 
in geostationary orbit above the earth.302  Correspondingly, almost every populated land-
mass on earth falls within the “footprint” of at least six of these 250 satellites.303   Only 
30 of these 250 operational commercial communications satellites, however, belong to 
Intelsat Ltd.304  Other satellites, in contrast, are operated by the governments of Russia,305
France, 306 China,307 India,308 and the Arab States,309 none of which would be bound to 
302 See Commercial Communications Satellites in Geosynchronous Orbit Web Page, Boeing 
Corp. (updated Dec. 30, 2004), <http://www.boeing.com/defense-
space/space/bss/launch/980031_001.pdf> (showing 247 commercial communications satellites 
currently in geostationary orbit).
303 See id.; see also COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 14083, 14117 ¶ 64 (1998) 
(“A number of non-U.S. regional satellite providers can be used to provide international video 
services. These systems and their regions include Arabsat (Middle East), Eutelsat (Europe), Astra 
(Europe), AsiaSat and APStar (Asia),and Palapa (Southeast Asia).  . . .  Also, a number of 
countries are served by domestic satellite systems. These countries include Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South 
Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the United States. Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico and 
Thailand also obtain regional services on their domestic satellites.”) (footnotes omitted).
304 Compare Commercial Communications Satellites in Geosynchronous Orbit Web Page, 
Boeing Corp. (updated Dec. 30, 2004), <http://www.boeing.com/defense-
space/space/bss/launch/980031_001.pdf> (showing 247 commercial communications satellites 
currently in geostationary orbit) with Intelsat Ltd. Satellite Coverage Maps Web Page, 
<http://www.intelsat.com/resources/coveragemaps.aspx> (showing 30 Intelsat satellites currently 
in geostationary orbit).
305 Russia holds ITU registrations for three satellites that are owned and operated by the 
Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communities, an ongoing public international 
intergovernmental organization originally established in 1971 by the former Soviet Union.  See
Agreement on the Establishment of the Intersputnik International System and Organization of 
Space Communications, 862 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 12, 1972) (establishing 
Intersputnik treaty organization); see also Intersputnik Organization Web Page, 
<http://www.intersputnik.com/company.shtml>.   Today, Intersputnik’s 25 member governments 
include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Georgia, Hungary, India, Kazakhstan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea), Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Russia, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and 	
 	


.  See Intersputnik 
Members Web Page, <http://www.intersputnik.com/countries.htm>.  In addition to operating 
three Russian-licensed satellites, Intersputnik also participates in a joint venture with the U.S.-
based Lockheed Martin Corp. to operate a Belarus-licensed satellite (the “LMI-1”) located at 
75° E.L.  See In re Lockheed Martin Corp., Comsat Government Systems, LLC, & Comsat Corp., 
15 FCC Rcd. 22910, ¶ 4 nn.5-6 (2000).
306 Among the many commercial communications satellites licensed in France are those 
belonging to Eutelsat S.A., the private commercial successor entity of the former European 
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implement trade sanctions undertaken by the United States for political purposes.310
Moreover, many regions of the earth now receive international telecommunications 
Telecommunications Satellite Organisation “EUTELSAT.”  Originally formed in 1977 by the 
governments of Western Europe, the EUTELSAT treaty organization was privatized on July 2, 
2001, when its satellite assets were transferred to Eutelsat S.A., a limited liability company 
established under French law and headquartered in Paris.  See EUTELSAT 2000 Annual Report, 
at 3, <http://www.eutelsat.com/about/pdf/report_an_00.pdf>.  As with INTELSAT, the 
privatization of EUTELSAT left in place a residual treaty organization “to ensure that Eutelsat 
S.A. continues to observe basic principles of pan-European coverage, universal service, non-
discrimination, and fair competition.”  Id.  From its fleet of 23 satellites (18 owned and 5 leased), 
Eutelsat S.A. is technically capable of serving up to 90 percent of the world’s population.  
Eutelsat Web Page, <http://www.eutelsat.com/about/1_1_1.html>.
307 See note [271], supra (discussing the Chinese-licensed “Sinosat-1/ Intelsat APR-2” 
satellite located in orbit at 110.5° E.L).  In 2005, without Intelsat Ltd.’s involvement, the Chinese 
government launched its second satellite, the Ku-band “Sinosat-2” satellite located above China 
at 134°E.L.   Sinosat-2 Satellite Web Page, 
<http://www.sinosatcom.com/english/satellite/wx_2.htm>.
308 See note [270], supra (discussing the Indian-licensed “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite 
located in orbit at 83° E.L.).  In addition to the “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite, the Indian 
government also operates nine other commercial communications satellites currently located in 
fixed geostationary orbit.  See Indian Space Research Organisation, Indian National Satellite 
System (INSAT) Programmes Web Page, <http://www.isro.org/programmes.htm> (setting forth 
launch dates and orbital locations of the Indian government’s Insat-1D, Insat-2A, Insat-2B, Insat-
2C, Insat-2DT, “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1,” Insat-3A, Insat-3B, Insat-3C, and Insat-3E satellites).
309 The Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT) is a regional  
intergovernmental treaty organization established on April 14, 1976 by the member states of the 
League of Arab States.  Arabsat Web Page, <http://www.arabsat.com/about_us/index.asp>; see 
also note [29], supra (discussing ARABSAT’s first satellite launch in 1980).  “ARABSAT is 
dedicated to enabling the Arab World with a range of satellite-based communications services.”  
Id.  ARABSAT operates three satellites currently in geostationary orbit above the Middle East:  
the “ARABSAT-2B” satellite located in orbit at 30.5º E.L., and the “ARABSAT-2A” and 
“ARABSAT-3A” satellites collocated at 26º E.L.   See ARABSAT Satellite Features Service 
Brochure, online at
<http://www.arabsat.com/downloads/pdf/brochures/SATELLITE_Features.pdf>  At present, 
ARABSAT’s Member states include Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.   ARABSAT Member Countries Web Site, 
<http://www.arabsat.com/about_us/about.asp?code=member>.  Notably, four ARABSAT 
member countries—Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria—are currently subject to various U.S.-
international trade sanctions.  See [note 232], supra.  Should these sanctions ever be expanded to 
prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from serving any ARABSAT member country, such a country would still be 
able to remain connected with the world via ARABSAT.    
310 Indeed, the Russian-led Intersputnik treaty organization was originally founded in 1971 
precisely in order to provide an alternative to INTELSAT.  Today, Intersputnik continues to hold
itself out as “an open intergovernmental organization that can be joined by any state.” 
Intersputnik Web Page,  <http://www.intersputnik.com/>.   Notably, Intersputnik’s 25 member 
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service via transoceanic submarine fiber optic cable, which can provide many of the same 
services as satellites.311   Finally, if necessary to preserve global connectivity or to protect 
“lifeline” users, Intelsat Ltd. potentially could dispose of its interests in its Indian-312 and 
Chinese-licensed313 satellites, leaving the governments of India and China free to operate 
those satellites unencumbered by adverse U.S. legislation.
CONCLUSION
  The transformation of INTELSAT into a profit-seeking commercial entity 
inevitably has raised concerns about whether the privatized successor entity will continue 
to be willing—and financially able—to serve high-cost, low-volume “lifeline” users 
around the world.  These concerns are not without force.  Particularly with respect to 
“lower-middle-income” nations that do not qualify for “lifeline connectivity” protection, 
privatization may not provide as strong a guarantee of affordable service as was formerly 
provided by INTELSAT’s uniform pricing policy.  Nonetheless, the safeguards discussed 
in this Article collectively ensure that the privatization of INTELSAT should not deprive 
qualified “lifeline” users of basic international telecommunications service at affordable 
rates.  Under the LCO Commitments that Intelsat Ltd. has executed with “lifeline” users, 
service to such users cannot be reduced or curtailed.  Moreover, under FCC regulatory 
rules that now apply to Intelsat Ltd., the rates charged to “lifeline” users must decline by 
no less than four percent annually.  While explicit subsidies have not been introduced, 
Intelsat Ltd.’s business model appears viable and capable of supporting the company’s 
public service obligations.  And if the company should fail, any successor who obtained 
control of the satellites would continue to be bound by Intelsat Ltd.’s public interest 
obligation.  For these reasons, in theory and in practice, these safeguards substantially 
ensure that no individual user’s economic ability to obtain such service has been 
diminished by the privatization.  Moreover, the market competition on many international 
routes that privatization has facilitated—and will likely continue to facilitate—is likely to 
produce costs savings and other economic benefits for users worldwide.
countries include three—Cuba, North Korea, and Syria—that are currently (and perennially) 
subject to various U.S.-international trade sanctions.  Compare  [note 305], supra (listing 
Intersputnik member countries) with [note 232], supra (listing countries currently subject to U.S.-
international trade sanctions).  Should U.S. -international trade sanctions ever be expanded to 
prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from serving Cuba, North Korea, or Syria, those countries would still be 
able to remain connected with the world via Intersputnik.
311 See notes [37-42], supra
312 See note [270], supra (discussing the Indian-licensed “Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1” satellite 
located at 83° E.L., which is a joint venture of Intelsat Ltd. and the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO), an agency of the Indian government).
313 See note [271], supra (discussing the Chinese-licensed “Sinosat-1/ Intelsat APR-2” 
satellite located at 110.5° E.L, which is a joint venture of Intelsat Ltd. and the government of the 
Peoples’ Republic of China).
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The transformation of INTELSAT into an ordinary U.S.-licensed satellite system, 
subject to the laws and policies of the United States, has also given rise to reasonable 
concern that the U.S. government might someday seek to restrain the privatized Intelsat 
Ltd. from continuing to serve certain geopolitical rivals of the United States, or certain 
U.S.-defined “rogue states.”  At present, existing U.S. statutes and treaty obligations 
appear to foreclose such an eventuality.  These statutes and treaty obligations deny the 
U.S. President and his Administration the legal authority to unilaterally impose sanctions 
that might threaten global connectivity.  Unlike the President, however, the U.S. 
Congress has authority to repeal existing statutes and to breach or abrogate existing U.S. 
treaty obligations.  Moreover, U.S. courts would likely uphold Congress’s authority to 
regulate Intelsat Ltd.’s provision of service to customers located outside the United 
States, via non-U.S.-licensed satellites.  Thus, as a matter of law, Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to 
serve every nation on earth is not entirely secure.  As a practical and political matter, 
however, because several of Intelsat Ltd.’s satellites are operated as joint ventures with 
foreign governments, the U.S. government could not implement trade sanctions 
threatening Intelsat Ltd.’s ability to serve “rogue states” without potentially creating 
diplomatic difficulties with U.S. allies or trading partners.  Moreover, even if the U.S. 
should adopt such sanctions, the redundancies in coverage that are now provided by 
several non-U.S. satellite systems ensure that no country need ever find themselves 
wholly unable to obtain international telecommunications service in the wake of 
INTELSAT’s privatization.
